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ABSTRACT 
 
DENNIS ARNOLD: Administration, Border Zones and Spatial Practices in the Mekong 
Subregion 
(Under the direction of John Pickles) 
 
This dissertation focuses on transformations in border-based economic zones in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).  The political and economic processes building 
border economies in the GMS over the past 10-20 years shed light on the politics of scale 
and the ways in which states do and do not seek to link territories and citizens with the 
political dynamics, economic systems, labor and natural resources of neighboring 
countries.  Mechanisms of global economic management, regulation and control are a 
fragile, eclectic mixture.  Governance networks comprising state practices, labor regimes, 
globalized production networks and multilateral agencies are creating spaces for capital 
accumulation in the borderlands of the GMS.  I find that no one actor can independently 
configure and maintain the geo-economic and geo-political re-ordering taking place in 
the GMS.  This is largely due to the fact that space making is never only about locking in 
capital, but also about shaping a range of political desires through spatial reconfigurations 
that offer new opportunities for profit and power.  From this perspective space is multiple 
and contingent, and global and situated elements combine to create new forms of spatial 
administration to control feminized and migrant labor.  The different forms these take 
along the GMS borderlands offers insight into changing global-local governance 
structures and practices. 
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Chapter 1 
Governing a Geo-economic Subregion 
Introduction 
The borderlands of continental Southeast Asia have long been territories beyond 
the control of central state authorities.  Examples include Khmer Rouge bases along the 
Cambodia-Thailand border in the 1980s to mid-1990s, and insurgent groups along 
Burma‘s borders with Thailand, China and India from the Cold War to the present.  Intra- 
and inter-state wars and conflicts have been commonplace in recent decades.  They 
include the 60+ year insurgency in Karen state of Burma (Myanmar),
1
 Khmer Rouge 
incursions into Vietnam in the mid to late 1970s and subsequent Vietnamese invasion and 
occupation of Cambodia, and the Thailand-Cambodia conflict over the Preah Vihear 
Temple since 2008, to name only a few.  One consequence of these conflicts is border 
areas have been destinations for refugees numbering in the millions.  In the 1980s-1990s 
several million from Cambodia and Laos lived in border refugee camps (see Figure 1).  In 
2010 roughly 240,000 people from Burma live in refugee camps in Thailand (see Figure 
2), in addition to tens of thousands of internally displaced people.   
                                                          
1
 The use of Burma or Myanmar is, of course, a politicized matter.  The name is one aspect of struggles 
over political legitimacy in the country, the name being changed in 1989.  Following Josef Silverstein 
(2007), I maintain that political legitimacy is for the people of that country to decide.  I use Burma 
throughout this dissertation, but both Myanmar and Burma historically refer to the majority Burmans.  
Needless to say, using either name is problematic from the perspective of the many ethnic minority groups 
struggling for greater autonomy, a federal state, or even independence.  
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Over the past 15 to 20 years there has been a pronounced shift in population 
movements.  Increasingly people are moving for work rather than to escape wars and 
fighting.  Migrants searching for better life options and work have increasingly populated 
both border areas and much of Thailand, the primary destination for migrant workers in 
the subregion.  For example, there are some 3-4 million migrant workers throughout 
Thailand (80% from Burma, 20% from Cambodia and Laos).  In Cambodia many 
different kinds of migration have taken place, both domestic and international, the largest 
scale being resettlement of hundreds of thousands from the refugee camps in the 1990s.  
Around the same time garment factories in the Phnom Penh vicinity began to employ 
rural-urban migrants, with employment peaking at 350,000 in 2008, some 80% from rural 
households.  For both Burmese migrants in Thailand and Cambodia‘s internal migrants, 
informalized labor practices are the norm, particularly in terms of implementing 
legislation on contracts, wages, collective bargaining, freedom of association and the like. 
The borders are places where powerful meanings are generated with respect to 
ideas of national identity and conceptions of security (Hughes 2011).  These processes 
continue to play a central role in state legitimacy among the countries of the Mekong.  
Political rhetoric and nationalisms contain a rich repertoire of images that derive their 
force from derogatory portrayals of neighboring countries (Hughes 2011).  Reminders of 
the Burmese sacking of Ayutthaya (Thailand) in the 18
th
 century, Vietnam‘s annexation 
of lower Cambodia or what is today the Mekong Delta, and perceptions of Thai 
ambitions for Cambodia‘s Angkorean heritage are central aspects of politics in the region 
and sources of political legitimacy.  As a result, border security is a critical albeit 
contested aspect of state power and national cohesion.   
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Figure 1: Location of Cambodia-Thailand Refugee Camps, 1979-1984
 
Source: http://www.websitesrcg.com (last accessed March 25, 2010) 
In the post-cold war era border trade has been largely ‗illegal‘ or unregulated (see 
Figure 3), customs procedures (where they exist) tend to be slow and subject to 
corruption, and physical infrastructure is either in disrepair or non-existent.  It is in this 
area that states of continental Southeast Asia and China‘s southern provinces have to 
varying degrees cooperated under the Asian Development Bank‘s (ADB) Greater 
Mekong Subregion (GMS) program.  In 1992, the ADB initiated the GMS Economic 
Cooperation Program.  Members comprise countries along the Mekong River, including  
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Figure 2: Burma-Thailand Refugee Camps, 2010 
 
Source: http://www.tbbc.org (last accessed March 25, 2010) 
Burma, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam and Yunnan province and Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region of China (see Figure 4).  The program‘s activities can be 
grouped into three main areas (ADB 2007): a) physical infrastructure—transport, power, 
and telecommunication facilities—to promote overall economic growth and greater trade, 
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investment, and tourism flows; b) policy and institutional initiatives to maximize the 
benefits and opportunities from physical infrastructure; and c) initiatives to address 
common social development and environmental sustainability concerns.  This has 
become one of the most sustained and high profile impetus for stimulating free trade in 
the region.
2
  It has, among other things, assisted states‘ efforts to gain control of ‗vague‘ 
areas through infrastructure development programs and trade facilitation projects 
implemented since the late-1990s.   
Figure 3: Traders wading across the Moei River at the Thailand-Burma border 
(left), about 20m upstream from the Thailand-Burma Friendship Bridge (right) 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
In the ADB‘s GMS framework economic corridors and border growth nodes are 
two primary means to attract private sector investment in peripheral areas of the GMS.  
These investments are deemed necessary to activate the long term, fixed capital 
investments in infrastructure, or, ―Build it and they will come.‖  Combined these are 
among the most prominent aspects of the GMS project, yet the project‘s motto,  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The term ‗Greater Mekong Sub-region‘ did not exist prior to this, yet the notion of the territories along the 
Mekong forming a sub-region has existed since 1957 with the formation of the Mekong Committee (Mya 
Than 1997; Oehlers 2006).  
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Figure 4: The Greater Mekong Subregion  
 
Source: Asian Development Bank 
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‗connectivity, cooperation, community‘ is not designed to address two of the most 
sensitive issues of national and sub-regional development initiatives: labor migration and 
labor regimes more generally,
3
 and integration of cross border investment and production 
networks.     
 
The Thesis 
This dissertation focuses on two emerging border economic zones in the GMS, 
Mae Sot in Thailand (Burma border) and Bavet in Cambodia (Vietnam border).  In these 
places state practices, changing labor regimes, the shifting Asia-regional division of labor 
in globalized manufacturing networks, and multilateral agencies ambitions embed a sub-
regional economy in the circuits of the global factory.  I present a differentiated analysis 
of the evolution of individual states and economies acting within a sub-regional 
development framework.  This approach explores how the economy, state, labor and 
multilateral institutions are mutually imbricated, structurally coupled and coevolving.  
State practices in these border areas are flexible, and two movements are identified.  One 
is the state withdrawing to accommodate global production networks and interventions of 
the Asian Development Bank.  And the second movement is the state deepening its reach 
in border territories and the control of populations, at times utilizing ADB and other 
interventions to extend its reach.  The two movements are layered and the multiple 
tensions are addressed throughout the dissertation.   
In the GMS specific border and cross-border zones once seen as territorial 
boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly being re-
                                                          
3
 Yushu Feng of the ADB said that the ADB distances itself from the labor migration issue (interview, 
June, 2009).  Ronald Butiong from the ADB said that the ADB does not have technical expertise in labor 
migration, and it‘s a sensitive area (interview, August 21, 2009). 
8 
 
articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.  The border is increasingly becoming the site in which these new 
articulations of investment and spatial administration are emerging.  Regional integration 
is, as a consequence, becoming more appropriately represented as a process by which 
new regulatory regimes emerge, offering new opportunities for profit and power (Hughes 
2011).   
The Greater Mekong Sub-region provides a particularly clear illustration of the 
complex intertwining of state practices, global production network dynamics, multilateral 
institutions and labor formations.  Programs associated with the ADB GMS Program are 
established by international organizations and national authorities, but they are 
implemented by the local, national and trans-national organizations that manage the flow 
of labor and investment.  Comparing two border economic zones in different parts of the 
subregion focuses attention on the socially embedded, socially regularized ensemble of 
economic activities, organizations and institutions that combine to give a distinctive 
dynamic to specific capitalisms in distinct times and places (Jessop and Sum, 2006).  This 
moves away from general stylized models of GMS development to more differentiated 
analyses of the evolution of individual states and economies acting within a sub-regional 
development framework.  Thus, it entails a move beyond market-state debates to explore 
how the economy, state, labor and multilateral institutions are mutually imbricated, 
structurally coupled and coevolving. 
The thesis of the dissertation is centered on the contention that mechanisms of 
global economic management, regulation and control are a fragile, eclectic mixture.  
Governance networks comprising state practices, labor regimes, globalized production 
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networks and multilateral agencies are creating spaces for capital accumulation in the 
borderlands of the GMS.  I explore these governance networks primarily through the 
prism of global production networks to understand competing interests within and among 
states, capital and multilateral institutions.  No one actor can independently configure and 
maintain the geo-economic and geo-political re-ordering taking place in the GMS.  This 
is largely due to the fact that space making is never only about locking in capital, but also 
about shaping a range of political desires through spatial reconfigurations that offer new 
opportunities for profit and power.  From this perspective space is multiple and 
contingent, and global and situated elements combine to create regulatory regimes that 
offer new opportunities for profit and power.  Control of feminized and migrant labor 
requires new forms of spatial administration, and the different forms these take within the 
GMS offers insight into changing global-local governance structures and practices. 
 
Introducing the Case Studies  
It is easily assumed that the GMS is a post-Cold War creation—a vision 
expressed by former Thai PM Chatichai Choonhavan of ‗turning battlefields into 
marketplaces,‘ or enabling economic development to bring peace and prosperity after 
decades of war and trauma in continental Southeast Asia.  What is less discussed is that 
the GMS idea was fostered at the height of the Cold War in the early to mid-1980s, and 
the foundations for the GMS were laid in 1983-1985 at a time of extreme political 
confusion and tension in the sub-region.  For example, in the early 1980s China, the US 
and Thailand were supporting Khmer Rouge positions along the Thai border to counter 
Vietnam‘s occupation of Cambodia.  It was a time when Thailand and Laos had a short 
10 
 
border war.  Also, the Communist Party of Burma, Karen National Liberation Army and 
other ethnic groups controlled nearly all of Burma‘s borders areas.   
Noritada Morita is credited with having founded the GMS project during his 
tenure as the ADB‘s Director of the Programs West Department (Chen 2005:196; 
Glassman 2010:79; Medhi 2004:996).
4
  When asked to discuss the geo-politics of GMS 
formation in an interview in October 2009 in Bangkok, he began by stating that ―The 
GMS is not associated with Japan or the US.  In terms of money, maybe, but that is 
nothing to me.  The point is, looking objectively, the GMS has nothing to do with any 
specific power, unlike Asean‖5 (interview, October 30, 2009).  The point he made is that 
Asean was born out of the Vietnam War and was a formal political association to counter 
communism in Asia.  Mr. Morita, looking back at his role in the mid-1980s, said that if 
there was to be peace in the region it could not be achieved through US, Japanese and 
other ―foreign affairs people.‖  Rather, he said ―the initiative had to start with the region.‖  
Interestingly, he noted that he came to this realization around the time, when stationed in 
Laos, there was a Thai artillery blast near his hotel.  It was amidst this short border 
skirmish between Thailand and Laos that Mr. Morita facilitated a deal for Thailand to not 
only continue but to increase its purchase of Laos‘ hydroelectric power.  That Laos did 
not cut off its power supply to Thailand during the conflict, and both sides agreed to 
increase production and purchase of electricity in its aftermath was, according to Mr. 
                                                          
4
 Mr. Morita has received various awards for his efforts, including Cambodia‘s highest medal, Sahametrei, 
as well as being appointed as a Senior Adviser to the Supreme National Economic Council in 2002.  He 
retired from the ADB in 1997 but is still active in the GMS in different capacities.  Prior to Cambodia‘s 
approving the GMS process in the early 1990s Mr. Morita was working with the ADB‘s approval but 
outside of official capacities when shoring up support for the project.   
5
The geo-politics and geo-economics of the economic corridors is, however, another central factor to 
consider (see Chapter 5).  The ADB, Japan and China, not to mention GMS member states, have significant 
interests in the sub-region as a political and economic space.   
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Morita, the turning point of establishing the GMS.   In other words, he proved that 
despite the military conflict the two countries could nevertheless cooperate economically.  
Mr. Morita said that Cambodia was the final country to be brought into the GMS and this 
was possible after the Paris Peace Accord in 1990.  He explained the Thai-Lao case to the 
new government, including leaders such as Hun Sen, who agreed to participate.   
In the course of the interview he reiterated that the ―roads, electricity etc [of the 
GMS] is minor,‖ and that ―money later came [to the GMS] from Japan, and this you can 
count, but what you cannot count is the common value and culture [of the GMS].‖6  
Addressing what he and others consider the common values and culture of the GMS is a 
topic I do not address.  I contend that one must focus attention on the multiple parts that 
comprise the sub-region to understand it, with the ADB clearly a central component.  
However, rather than read the GMS solely through ADB initiatives, the focus is equally 
the interests of transnational corporations, power struggles of state authorities and the 
aspirations of workers and labor organizations.  This approach pries open the highly 
complex tensions among these different social forces.  I do this primarily through two 
‗border growth nodes‘ in the GMS, Bavet, Cambodia and Mae Sot, Thailand.  I find these 
two places to be critical components of the terrain in which emerging sub-regional 
contestations can be understood.   
 Mae Sot is on the Thailand-Burma border, and very clearly displays the 
―kaleidoscopic realities of the border zones‖ (Tangseefa 2006:406).  Mae Sot is unique in 
that it is a global center for the Burmese dissident movement (the ‗8-8-88 generation‘), is 
home to large populations of Burmese migrant workers and refugees, and is the busiest 
                                                          
6
 Glassman (2010) contends that ADB officials have gone to great lengths to distance themselves from 
GMS formation, echoing Noritada Morita‘s claim in the interview.  
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Thai-Burma trading point with a long history on trade routes.  In Mae Sot the cross-
border, global, national and local collide and these scales are in many ways obfuscated in 
struggles over power, social rights, ideology and economic gain.  The other is Bavet, on 
Cambodia‘s border with Vietnam.  Bavet‘s economy is centered on casinos, attracting 
gamblers from Ho Chi Minh City, and emerging border special economic zones (SEZ) set 
up to tap into cheaper supplies of electricity and better infrastructure in Vietnam.  Five 
SEZs have been approved in Bavet since December 2005.  Bavet and Chantrea district 
have been deeply embroiled in wars and conflicts during the US-Vietnam war era and the 
Khmer Rouge-Vietnam war.  Since the 1990s this area has been a focal point of 
Cambodian contentions that Vietnam is attempting to ―swallow up‖ Khmer territory.  
With border SEZs the ruling Cambodian People‘s Party is able to demonstrate both 
material and discursive re-territorialization of this troubled area.  
The two border areas are very different and I approach each from varying 
perspectives that build an understanding of broader sub-regional dynamics.  For instance, 
the first factories began operation in Bavet in 2006, and in 2009 there were only 10.  Mae 
Sot factories first opened in the mid-1990s and in 2009 there were roughly 400.  In 
general terms, the Mae Sot economy is relatively developed while Bavet is only just 
emerging.  In Mae Sot provincial business interests, local state officials and Mae Sot-
based labor organizations are better situated to project their interests on the national and 
sub-regional scales.  In Bavet it is the combination of central state, national/regional scale 
business interests and sub-regional development projects that come to define changes 
taking place.   
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Mae Sot and Globalized Garments 
Mae Sot is a rising industrial center for the textile and garment industry in 
Thailand.  It is a well established manufacturing area; in fact it is the most industrialized 
border city in the GMS.  In Mae Sot tens of thousands of Burmese migrant workers are 
employed on highly flexible work ‗contracts.‘  Mae Sot is home to large gem and jewelry 
markets, where Burmese traders sell their goods.  It is also the de-facto headquarters of 
the Karen National Union, a ‗government‘ in exile whose army has waged a 60 year war 
for independence or greater autonomy from Burma.  In addition to these populations, the 
Mae Sot area is host to tens of thousands of refugees fleeing fighting and a wide variety 
of human rights abuses in Burma.  Refugees live in relative isolation in border camps and 
are not able to move freely in and out of the camps.  Furthermore, Mae Sot is arguably 
the nerve center of Burmese dissidents and democracy advocates in exile (see Figure 5).  
A wide array of organizations base their operations in Mae Sot, including those focusing 
on political prisoners, human rights, women‘s issues, labor rights, a National League for 
Democracy Office, monks in exile in addition to many others.   
Mae Sot is a border district in Tak Province, roughly 500km northwest of 
Bangkok (See Figure 6).  It sits across the Moei River from Myawaddy, Burma.  The two 
towns are connected by the ‗Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge‘, completed in 1997, funded 
by the Thai government.  Mae Sot-Myawaddy lies on the ADB‘s East-West Economic 
Corridor, connecting central Vietnam with coastal Burma.  Private and public sector 
actors in Mae Sot have mobilized ADB GMS programs, particularly physical 
infrastructure, to boost the competitiveness of the cross-border economy.  As addressed 
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in more depth in Chapter 7, the discursive element of the East-West Corridor has been 
prominent in promoting Mae Sot as a hub.   
 
Figure 5: A typical office in Mae Sot with a photo of Daw Aung San Syu Kyii; and a 
Burmese market in Mae Sot, Thailand 
 
Photos: Geoff Thant 
There are nine districts in Tak Province.  The five border districts Mae Sot, Mae 
Ramat, Phrop Phra, Um Phang and Tha Song Yang are host to some 150,000 migrant 
workers from Burma, according to the Mae Sot Department of Labor Protection (LPD) 
(Interview, June 20, 2008) (See Figure  7); other informal estimates put the number at 
200,000.  The distribution of these workers is roughly 40:40:20 in industry, agriculture 
and domestic work/services.  Of the five border districts Mae Sot is the economic center.  
Mae Sot is also the economic center of Tak Province, although Meuang Tak (City of Tak) 
is the provincial capital.
7
  Mae Sot is both a municipality and a district, with a population  
 
                                                          
7
 For several years civic and business leaders in Mae Sot and the 5 border districts have been lobbying the 
central government for provincial status. This is unlikely to proceed (Arnold 2007; Pitch 2007). They have 
recently introduced an initiative for special administrative status, like Bangkok and Pattaya (see Chapter 7).  
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Figure 6: Thailand Map Highlighting Tak Province 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Thailand_Tak_locator_Figure .svg (last 
accessed July 17, 2010) 
 
of 46,341 in the (urban) municipality and 70,966 in rural areas.  To this number must be 
added migrant workers (both registered and un-registered), illegal immigrants, and 
displaced persons in the two major refugee camps in the border regions of Tak Province.  
Combined, these populations from Burma constitute the majority of the actual population 
of Mae Sot and may also constitute a majority of the total population of the five border 
districts.  There are 80,000-100,000 workers employed in Mae Sot municipality/district; 
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between 60,000-80,000 of these are employed in knitting and garment firms.
 8
  Of the 
total migrant population in Mae Sot in 2008, roughly 25,000 are ‗legal‘ registered 
migrant workers, a factor that has significance for the kinds of management regime to 
which workers are subjected (see Chapter 3).   
 
Figure 7: Map of Mae Sot and Myawaddy 
 
 
 
Source: Human Rights Watch (2010a) 
 
Cambodia: Border Industrialization and Bavet 
Bavet is emerging as one of Cambodia‘s key border industrial towns.  Five of 
twenty-one SEZs approved in Cambodia are in Bavet.  The first factories started 
                                                          
8
 There are garment firms in Mae Ramad and Phrob Phra, yet throughout this dissertation I refer to Mae Sot 
since it is the center of production.  
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operations in 2006, as of 2009 there were 10 factories in two Bavet SEZs employing 
roughly 4,000.  They get their raw materials from Vietnam, largely in transit from China 
and Taiwan and export overseas through HCMC (ADB 2008b).  Three additional SEZs in 
Bavet are under construction.  Bavet is considered one of the most important border 
nodes in the GMS framework due primarily to its location on the highway connecting Ho 
Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh, and further afield to Bangkok (Ishida 2008).  Together 
this comprises the ADB‘s Southern Economic Corridor.  Bavet is roughly 65km from Ho 
Chi Minh City and 160km from Phnom Penh.  The highway connecting these two cities 
was the first project implemented under the ADB‘s GMS program in 1998 (road 
renovation; the second project implemented was the East-West Corridor).   
Bavet is in Svay Rieng province and is situated in the south-east of the country.  It 
is a small city with a population of roughly 3,000.  After completion of the Phnom Penh-
Ho Chi Minh City Highway the population of Bavet increased by 70% (ADB 2008b).  
The provincial capital, also called Svay Rieng, is about 125 km from Phnom Penh and 
roughly 40km from Bavet.  The province has a total land area of 296,640 ha, comprising 
mostly flat plains. It is divided into seven districts, 80 communes and 690 villages 
(Chieng 2007).  Svay Rieng has a total population of 536,963 people or 111,611 families 
(Chieng 2007).  Ninety percent of them rely on farming for their livelihoods.   
Svay Rieng is bordered by Vietnam for 258 km and has five important border 
gates: the Bavet international border gate, the Prey Voa bilateral border gate, and three 
border crossings at Bos Mon, Sre Baraing and Samraong (ibid).  Bavet is the major 
‗legal‘ international checkpoint between Cambodia and Vietnam.  One informant from a 
Cambodian shipping company said that a majority of trade between Cambodia-Vietnam 
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is ‗smuggling‘ that takes place at a border in Kompong Cham province (interview, 
Phnom Penh, November 14, 2009).   
37.8% of Svay Rieng province‘s population are 14 years old or under, compared 
to 49% nationally.  95.5% of the population are own account workers or unpaid family 
workers; only 4.5% are paid employees.  Of this 91.3% work in the primary sector, 1.2% 
in secondary sector, and 7.5% in tertiary sector.  0.0% males are considered employers, 
and 0.1% of females are employers.  (National Institute of Statistics 2004).  
 
Figure 8: Cambodia Map Highlighting Svay Rieng Province 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cambodia_Svay_Rieng_locator_Figure .svg 
(last accessed July 17, 2010) 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
Figure 9: Cambodia Provincial Map  
 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/Figure /profile/cambodia.pdf (last 
accessed July 17, 2010) 
 
Internal migration rates are very high in Svay Rieng.  About 35% of the 
provincial population are considered migrants.  94% are internal migrants, and 4% 
migrate internationally.  39% were migrants in the province of enumeration and 29% had 
moved from a village in the same district of enumeration.  About 55% of total migrants 
had moved to different provinces in Cambodia.  85% of migrants are rural-rural; 6% 
urban-rural; 5% urban-urban and 4% rural to urban.  The most commonly cited reason for 
migration is repatriation or return after displacement (41.8%), or resettlement after the 
wars.  The next most common reason for migration is the family moved 29.6% and 
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marriage at 18.1%.  More men move due to repatriation and marriage, and more women 
migrate because the family moved. (National Institute of Statistics 2004).   
Education levels in Cambodia are alarmingly low, though Svay Rieng province 
fares slightly better than national averages. 19.1% of the Svay Rieng province are 
illiterate, with 27.6% of women illiterate compared to 9.6% for males.  National averages 
are 26.4% illiteracy, with 35.9% female illiteracy and 15.3% for males.  89% of Svay 
Rieng‘s population did not complete primary or completed primary education (65% and 
24% respectively).  This is higher than national averages of 82%.   
 
Bavet Economy 
Like much of Cambodia, Svay Rieng‘s economy is agrarian.  The factory workers 
interviewed in Bavet during fieldwork all come from farming families, as do a significant 
proportion of all garment workers in Cambodia.  There are attempts to diversify the 
economy in Svay Rieng, particularly through emerging border activities in Bavet.  A 
prominent example is casinos.  Bavet is host to eight casinos within walking distance of 
the border checkpoint (see Figure 10).  There are 32 licensed casinos in Cambodia, 
mostly in Poipet on the Thai border and along the Vietnam border.  The casino hotels are 
roughly 3-4 star range accommodation, and cater primarily to Vietnamese gamblers.  
Technically, it is illegal for Cambodian citizens to enter casinos with the exception of 
casino staff.  The casinos are primarily owned by Chinese from Macau and mainland 
China.  The town comprises a single, two-lane road that begins at the border checkpoint 
and ends a few kilometers before reaching the SEZs (see Figure 11).  There are several 
small scale guest houses and restaurants along the road serving budget gamblers (and 
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researchers among others).  Most guest houses are Vietnamese owned, as are several 
restaurants in town.  In the guest houses Vietnam Dong (VND) is the preferred currency, 
and VND and Cambodia Riel are accepted in the restaurants.  In the casinos US dollars 
and VND are accepted.  This is a common practice in Cambodia‘s border towns—on the 
Thailand border the Thai baht is the preferred currency, while in the majority of 
Cambodia the US dollar is most commonly used.   
Figure 10: A Bavet casino 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
In many ways Bavet is attractive to Vietnam-based business, whether 
manufacturers or those in service industries.  It is, as Peter Brimble noted, basically a 
Vietnamese community (interview November 7, 2009).  This is, of course, a very 
sensitive issue in Cambodia (see Chapter 6).  Bavet, unlike Mae Sot, has no NGOs or 
other civil society organization active.  Adhoc, a prominent human rights NGO in 
Cambodia, has an office in the provincial capital of Svay Rieng.  Thus, while Mae Sot is 
a globally prominent center of Burmese activists, attracting a wide range of researchers, 
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reporters, NGOs, activists and government officials, Bavet has virtually none of this 
taking place.  There are two trade unions with very small membership in the SEZs in 
Bavet, but as discussed more fully in Chapter 3, it is difficult for Phnom Penh-based 
unions to service their members at the border. 
 
Figure 11: Bavet and Highway 1 connecting Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
Bavet is different from many border industrial towns.  In Mae Sot, for example, 
there is a clear labor cost advantage as employers take advantage of Burmese moving 
across the border.  In the case of Maquiladoras on the US-Mexico border, industrial zones 
in Indonesia near neighboring Singapore and Malaysia, and China‘s coastal SEZs in the 
vicinity of Hong Kong and Taiwan there is also a very pronounced differential in labor 
costs.  Cambodia and Vietnam, however, have roughly equal wage rates, and productivity 
is higher in Vietnam and it is generally a far more competitive manufacturing base than 
Cambodia in most facets of a capitalist economy.   
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Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Throughout the process of creating a GMS geo-economy there has been increased 
interest in the development potential of border areas.  This does not entail a simple binary 
between the retreat or decline of state regulation and its expansion.  As a result, the 
dissertation does not provide a picture of powerful transnational corporations and 
international lending agencies making demands readily met by an eviscerated state.  
Instead, I present cases of states restructuring and adapting to regional and global forces 
in which administrative agencies, new governmental actors, and emergent discourses 
along the border are articulated with broader regional and trans-national development 
strategies.  By focusing on the sub-national scale I highlight a state that is not monolithic 
and globalized capital that– while undoubtedly footloose for the most part—is also 
deeply layered in the concrete specificities of an emerging border space.   
This dissertation conceptualizes the borders that demarcate nation-states as a 
complex network of social relations which can extend well beyond national borders 
(Perkmann and Sum 2002, Pickles 2004, 2006).  In doing so it takes nation-states and 
national societies as one of several scales on which changes are occurring and examines 
their articulation with other scales, including those on which cross-border activities and 
institutions are developing.  This entails recognition of the paradigm shift that privileges 
the multiplicity of scales on which social interaction takes place and the complexity of 
the interrelation among these scales (Perkmann and Sum 2002).  The convergence of 
regionalization and globalization are articulated in these spaces conducive to mobile 
capital and investment that, on the one hand, straddle and blur national boundaries, and 
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on the other re-define and reify borders, particularly in terms of flows of labor.  Within 
this framework local, national, regional and international actors are creating spaces 
conducive to domestic and foreign direct investment to secure footholds in national and 
international markets.  
There are objective limits to economic globalization due to capital‘s need not only 
to disembed economic relations from their old social integument but also to re-embed 
them into new supportive social relations (Jessop and Sum, 2006).  Economic 
globalization is a contradictory phenomenon that necessarily produces smooth spaces 
conductive to the circulation of capital, goods and labor, and a reinvigorated importance 
of place, as profitable investment destinations and sourcing locations are not equal.  It is 
in this realm that states are particularly important. States provide an important facilitative 
role for capital, but they also must assuage the excesses of globalization to maintain 
social cohesion and political legitimacy.
9
  
A fundamental assumption of this project is that capitalism is a political economic 
system whose own contours are not unitary or rigid (Rajan 2006).  Rather, capitalism is 
mutable and multiple, and full of metamorphoses and upheavals, which are local and 
global, technical and spatial, cultural and economic (Watts 1992).  In other words, the 
implications of capitalist expansion and deepening in the GMS cannot be assumed, nor 
can the composition of forms of participation in and/or resistance against it.   
I conceptualize changing labor regulation in the GMS through the ‗global 
factory.‘  Labor in the ‗global factory‘ is generally conceptualized as social labor to 
                                                          
9
 Politically, collective action problems occur in the conflict between the state‘s economic functions 
(especially for securing certain conditions for the valorization of capital and the social reproduction of labor 
power) and its overall political responsibility for maintaining social cohesion in a socially divided, 
pluralistic social formation (Jessop and Sum). 
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describe the contemporary condition under which the whole of society is permeated with 
the rule of value-producing capitalist labor (Hardt and Negri 1994, 2001).  Labor in the 
global factory is necessarily flexible, mobile, informalized or precarious and ready to 
adjust to the whims of capital.  Capitalist labor is becoming the common substance to 
peoples‘ livelihoods, but this does not create the basis for unified or united responses 
from workers (Chang 2009).  For instance, divisions along lines of nationality and race 
often become more pronounced, including the ‗3D‘ work of migrants vs. the work of 
nationals employed in these same industries.  There are also divisions among workers in 
the formal and informal economies.  ‗Factory labor‘ describes the partial domination of 
capital over social relations through the imposition of capitalist labor in the immediate 
labor process (Chang 2009).  Throughout the dissertation I focus primarily on feminized 
and migrant factory workers, but do not consider ‗factory labor‘ an ideal form of labor 
through which wage and other laborers engage in struggles.  This presents challenges to 
how organizing initiatives are conceptualized, particularly in contexts where ‗factory 
labor‘ is a fairly new kind of labor that is the primary focus of emerging trade unions and 
workers‘ associations.   
 
Geographies of Globalization & Global Production Networks 
In the past three decades, a major transformation has occurred in the global 
economy as supply chains originating in ‗core economies‘ have further expanded their 
sourcing networks into new frontier regions of production across East and Southeast 
Asia.  This expansion has been achieved, in part, by the opening of closed and partially 
closed economies and the expanded labor pools they represent.  One central element and 
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consequence of this ‗opening‘ has been the expansion of geographical circuits of labor 
recruitment and migration, the attendant migration of millions of workers across large 
distances to work in export processing zones and urban areas including coastal China, Ho 
Chi Minh City and Hanoi, Yangon and Phnom Penh.
10
  A second phase in the re-
organization of these geographies of production is now occurring on a national scale with 
China‘s new regional economic policies, the establishment of special economic zones 
(SEZ) in rural Cambodia, and expanding industrial areas along Thailand‘s borders with 
Burma, Lao PDR, and Cambodia.  This second overlapping and interdependent phase of 
restructuring entails the creation of new forms of regional production networks organized 
around decentralized and border economies aimed largely at export markets, with new 
mechanisms of governance and regulation to deal with the mobile, often transnational, 
workforces on which they depend.   
Efforts to build cross border regionalism in the Greater Mekong Sub-region, 
formally inaugurated in 1992, have coincided with major turning points in the global 
economy.  The opening and growth of China as a major producer for world markets and 
the rapid expansion of the SEZs located in Southern China have been particularly 
important.  Between 1979 and the early 1990s, large capital investments flowed into the 
coastal regions of China from Hong Kong and Taiwan, resulting in an unprecedented 
expansion of productive capacity across the Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas.  The 
consequence was the development of continental scale production networks increasingly 
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 Authors in Gainsborough (2009) offer compelling questions and analysis on the extent to which cross-
border flows have risen from behind formerly ‗closed‘ borders in the GMS.  They varyingly contend that 
the discourse of ‗opening up‘ distorts notions of how it was in pre- and post-colonial eras, and before and 
after the end of the Cold War.  
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dependent on the ability to mobilize and marshal massive migrant labor flows of young, 
primarily female, workers from the countryside and provinces.  
In newly industrializing economies in Asia and Latin America, transnational 
corporations accelerated outsourcing of lower cost production globally (Dicken 2003; 
Gereffi 2005).  One result was an expansion of infrastructural projects that were also 
dependent on large-scale labor migration, but that generated enormous tensions in local 
economies over the consequences of economic integration and the social transformations 
in the resulting labor markets (Harvey 2003).  These tensions emerged particularly 
clearly in China‘s new industrial export economy.  The ‗China price‘ – the lowest price 
possible – has been possible only because of low-cost labor migrations into the Yangtze 
and Pearl River Deltas, but their effects have recently rebounded in ways that now 
threaten to destabilize social and economic conditions across these regional production 
centers.  As a result, China has now embarked on a triple policy to weaken its 
dependence on the ‗China price‘ and reduce the dependence of regional economies on 
migrant labor flows.  (i) Low-wage assembly industries are being encouraged through 
subsidies, contracts, and infrastructural development to relocate or expand in Western 
and Northern Provinces from which migrant workers have traditionally been drawn (‗go-
West‘). (ii) Low-wage assembly work is also being outsourced to low-cost producing 
centers in southeastern Asia, particularly under the auspices of emerging large-scale 
Chinese manufacturers and network organizers (‗go-out‘).  And (iii) Chinese 
manufacturers are being encouraged to upgrade production and working conditions with 
the goal of branding Chinese goods for national and even international markets (‗go-up‘). 
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Each of these strategies responds to what David Harvey (2003:109) describes as 
―…a condition of surpluses of labor… and surpluses of capital… Such surpluses can be 
potentially absorbed by (a) temporal displacement through investment in the long-term 
capital projects or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the re-
entry of capital values into circulation into the future, (b) spatial displacements through 
opening up new markets, new production capacities, and new resource, social, and labor 
possibilities elsewhere, or (c) some combination of (a) and (b)‖.  In Southeast and East 
Asia such capital logics have produced regionally articulated economic and labor 
landscapes.  Comparatively low-cost large-scale export production has boomed in large 
urban and peri-urban factory zones.  These export platforms, once the main sites of 
workplace abuses, are increasingly regulated through central state institutions and 
international contractors, but are still problematic in terms of meeting minimum standards 
of health, safety, wages, and benefits.  As a result, in the larger urban producing centers 
in China, Thailand, and Vietnam competitive pressures, state regulation, worker demands 
and other factors have led to upward pressure on wages and benefits, along with changes 
in work and working conditions.
11
   
In rural and border areas, cost-minimizing, de-regulated, and flexibly organized 
industrialization has expanded through the agencies of state and private-sector-supported 
SEZs and industrial areas.  Geared to deepening competitiveness by extending export 
production to low-wage border areas, border industrialization programs across Southeast 
Asia are built with the explicit nominal intent of distributing the economic benefits of 
export production across the regions.  To do this, they depend on the management of 
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 On changing labor relations in China and Vietnam see Lee (2007); Clarke (2006); and Ngoc Tran (2007).   
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‗surplus‘ and low-cost rural workers and their employment in lower-value assembly 
work.  This places competitive pressure on any gains in work conditions and wages in 
urban and peri-urban areas.  The key general thrust of such a capital logic is that new 
territories ―should be continuously opened up‖ (Harvey 2003:139) leading to ―accelerated 
and expanded … accumulation [and] ending communal control of the means of 
subsistence, seizing land for debt, creating new mobile and migrant reservoir of labor 
power, destroying non-market social systems and imposing ecological predations…‖ 
(Dyer-Witheford 2002:6 citing Midnight Notes).  In the next section, I turn to the 
significance of cross-border regionalism within the context of these global factories. 
 
Sub-Regional Integration and Border Growth Strategies 
Throughout the GMS specific border and cross-border zones once seen as 
territorial boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly 
being re-articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.  Hence, they are emerging geo-economic regions requiring their own 
structures and practices of governance. 
Industrial development and more recent foreign direct investment in the GMS 
have been concentrated in a few favored large urban centers such as Bangkok, Phnom 
Penh and Ho Chi Minh City.  At the national and sub-regional level, investors have also 
heavily favored urban nodes in Thailand and Vietnam over those Laos, Burma and 
Cambodia, in turn deepening inter-regional inequalities.
12
  With competition intensifying 
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 Large scale industrial development in Asean has been limited to a few areas.  For example, Kuala 
Lumpur, Selangor, Johor and Penang in Malaysia, the Eastern Seaboard Area of Thailand (Chonburi and 
Rayong), and Bangkok and its neighboring prefectures (Ayutthaya, Pathumthani and Samutprakarn), 
Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi) area in Indonesia, and neighboring areas of Manila 
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in both low-cost labor intensive export-oriented and high-tech capital intensive sectors, 
GMS countries have initiated cooperative regional and trans-national policies aimed at 
more fully integrating these rural spaces into the regional and global economy.  The 
primary driver is seen to be foreign direct investment (FDI) from the broader Asia region, 
in many cases ‗go-out‘ capital from China.  These cross-border regional policies and 
initiatives have moved beyond a focus on industrial decentralization and sustainable 
urbanization prevalent in Thailand since the 1960s (Charoenloet 2002; Glassman 2003; 
Glassman and Sneddon 2003) in efforts to boost competitiveness with other countries 
including China, while concurrently offering incentives for investment from China and 
other competitors.
13
   
In this process, state and multi-lateral organization policies play an enormous role 
in shaping the geographical patterns of investment and social regulation.  In many cross 
border areas, sub-regional and international intergovernmental organizations have played 
key roles in implementing projects that promote cross-border economic activity.  These 
involve public and/or public supranational, national and/or sub-national agencies naming 
and Figure ping new types of space as sites of economic change and political ambition 
(Pitch 2007).  These are not regions in the conventional juridico-political sense, as is the 
case with the EU, and they are not governed in a conventional, territorial sense.  They are 
neither formal administrative units subordinate to a national state bureaucracy nor do they 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Cavite and Laguna) in the Philippines (Ishida 2008).  In more recent years the industrialization of Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi can be added to this list.  These industrial areas have a few common characteristics 
(Ishida 2008): The distance from a port or harbor is relatively short, and the procurement of the labor force 
is easy or the population is relatively large. In addition, these areas have benefited from development of 
infrastructure such as highways, electricity, and water for industrial use.  Finally, tax incentives were given 
to companies that invested in these areas.   
13
 For example, China is deemed to be the primary threat to Cambodia‘s textile and garment industry, but in 
2006 China was by far Cambodia‘s largest investor with $763 million in fixed assets approved (Russia 2nd 
at $278 million, Thailand 3
rd
 at $102 million (IMF 2007)). 
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have mechanisms that allow for building popular support.  Instead, they are governed 
through partial and irregular networks operating at a variety of scales (Perkmann and 
Sum 2002).  Some of these networks emerged in response to the failures of central state 
authorities, with local and regional actors exploiting the new opportunity structures 
created by regionalization and globalization.  Many emerged largely as a result of 
financial development incentives, for instance those coordinated by the Asian 
Development Bank in the GMS.  In other locations cross-border regions are effectively 
constituted by a complex array of economic and social interactions.  These are generated 
by local, national and/or regional networks, including state actors, but are largely 
unaccompanied by large-scale collective coordination and intervention by the central 
state.  In fact, typically, governmental cooperation is fragmented and limited in scope.  
For instance, the GMS is emerging as a cross-border region despite several instances of 
tension over border demarcation, most recently leading to military skirmishes at the 
Preah Vihear Temple on the Thailand-Cambodia border.   These and other factors limit 
the scope of centrally coordinated sub-regional integration.    
Instead of a withering or withdrawal of direct involvement of the state in the 
―borderless world‖ (Ohmae 2005), the border is increasingly becoming the site in which 
these new articulations of investment and spatial administration are emerging.  Where 
regional integration initiatives are related to inter-governmental projects, national 
governments are still dominant in defining the basic parameters of the border regimes.  
But, even in these contexts of strong central state action where national governments may 
create the initial conditions for the development of cross-border regions, both central and 
local governments and diverse state agencies, in many cases linked to major domestic 
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business interests, often re-interpret policies for their own economic benefit.  In both 
cases, complex structures of state administration are emerging at the border to regulate 
mobile populations and create new spatial and social imaginaries to do so (Pitch 2007).  
Throughout the Mekong sub-region, specific border zones once seen as territorial 
boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly being re-
articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.   
In fact, if one leaves behind the assumption of market self-regulation under the 
ADB‘s GMS, regional integration becomes more appropriately represented as a process 
by which a new regulatory regime emerges offering new opportunities for profit and 
power (Hughes 2011).  Hughes also contends that ―the activities of both state and private 
actors – and state actors acting in a private capacity – on these borders indicates both 
their sophisticated appreciation of this, and the level of contestation which their efforts to 
gain a share of the spoils entails‖ (Hughes 2011:forthcoming).   
 
State Practices 
The expansion of export production in border areas has occurred in conjunction 
with a deep re-territorialization of the nation state in order to accommodate and attract 
capital, enhance the competitiveness of producers, and manage labor by spatial means.  
The result is that institutions of national-cross-border governance and development 
infrastructure have emerged in ways that combine authoritarian and liberal economic 
features to manage the ways in which different production systems are able to compete in 
the global economy.   
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The political and economic processes building border economies in the GMS over 
the past 10-15 years shed light on the politics of scale and the ways in which states do 
and do not seek to link territories and citizens with the political dynamics, economic 
systems, labor and natural resources of neighboring countries (Walker 2009).   Doing so 
demonstrates a great deal about the territorial diversity and flexibility of state practices in 
the sub-region, including intra- and inter-state debates or power struggles on these 
policies, and its coupled integration with labor and regional trade and production 
networks.   One consequence of this analysis of economic and social restructuring is that 
it defies any easy designation as neoliberal space, as the product of a strong or weak state, 
or as an export-processing island driven by the needs of global production networks.  
Instead, the case studies demonstrate that the politics of scale plays out in important 
ways, particularly for populations of workers from Burma and Cambodia. 
It has been argued that the expansion of the global economy has demonstrated a 
governance deficit and has shown inadequacies in earlier theoretical paradigms, 
especially those grounded in the dominant conceptual trinity of market, state and civil 
society (Jessop and Sum 2006).  This has generated questions about the possibilities for 
states to regulate the practices of participants in global production networks.  Several 
studies have critically engaged the role of states in the cross-border strategy emerging in 
the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, and these have tended to focus on 
the broader implications for how neoliberalism is conceptualized (Ong 2000; Sidaway 
2007; Sparke et al 2004; see also Ong 2008; Sparke 2002; Walker 2009).  These studies 
have suggested that the ‗Growth Triangle‘ is not so much a question of market versus 
state, or a transition ―from state to market‖, but that the creation of markets is occurring 
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in settings where the state is sometimes very strong while in other areas it is nearly 
absent, creating a spatial variability in state powers and ‗reach‘ that is useful in 
maintaining flexibility for capital (Ong 2000; 2008).   
In the GMS border SEZs I find a slightly different arrangement, where the state 
plays a very prominent role in the zones as well.
14
  I contend that neoliberal practice in 
the GMS moves to reinforce and expand the state as a strong and autonomous subject that 
dominates the social field in realms including labor regimes and police activity (Hardt 
and Negri 1994).  In Chapters 6 and 7 I find the Thai and Cambodian states to be the 
most powerful actors impeding or facilitating the formation of border SEZs.   This is a 
clear shift in the case of Cambodia, a state that lacked autonomy in the social and 
economic fields in the 1980s-1990s (see Chapter 2).  These state insertions are largely 
due to the recognition that border SEZs provide important means for national economies 
to be favorably inserted into the emerging sub-regional and global economy, but that very 
insertion can fragment national economies and societies and create alternative foci of 
political legitimacy (Jessop and Sum 2006).  It is for this and other reasons that the reach 
of the state is so extensive.   
   
Outlining the Chapters 
Chapter 2, ―Low-cost Sourcing in the GMS: Comparing Policies in Cambodia and 
Thailand.”  This chapter focuses on two key issues in Cambodia‘s and Thailand‘s light 
manufacturing industries.  In the case of Thailand it is the ability to combine at the border 
                                                          
14
 See also Gainsborough (2007, 2009) for analysis on the provincial state in globalizing Vietnam.  Oehlers 
2006 provides critiques of ADB policies towards the GMS. 
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one of the lowest cost workforces in the region with relatively advanced logistics services 
and inputs for garment assembly.  In Cambodia it is rather more straightforward, the lack 
of competitiveness on cost, quality and speed to market are key factors driving border 
industrialization initiatives.  The other focus in the chapter is labor in these two countries.  
In many respects Cambodia/Bavet and Thailand/Mae Sot are opposites.  Cambodia is 
promoted globally as an ―ethical producer‖ and ―model of fair globalization‖ due largely 
to an International Labour Organization (ILO) factory monitoring that began in 2001.  
Mae Sot, on the other hand, is one of, if not the most notorious havens for poor labor 
practices in Southeast Asia.  However, Cambodia‘s labor monitoring program is losing its 
luster as a policy governing labor relations.  In this context border economies are part of 
broader trends that privilege productivity, factor costs and flexibility over ―fair 
globalization‖ initiatives.  Border areas are critical aspects of the pattern to embed low-
value, low-skill and low-productivity production networks and informalized labor 
relations in the national and sub-regional economy. 
Chapter 3, ―Policing Migrants and ‗Better Factories‘: Informalizing labor in 
Global Production Networks.‖ The focus of this chapter is different institutions and 
governance practices embedding and enabling the informalization of labor.  These 
processes are unevenly established in different national and sub-national contexts.  I set 
out to deepen analysis of one aspect of the labor regime in Thailand (Mae Sot) and 
Cambodia (Bavet), the state regulation of labor in terms of legislation on contracts, 
wages, collective bargaining, freedom of association and the like.
15
  In particular, the 
focus is the implementation of informalized labor practices in Thailand and Cambodia.  
                                                          
15
 I will not address another key aspect of Buroway‘s labor regime, the social reproduction of labor power.  
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While the two cases demonstrate certain trends in managing labor, they are not 
homogenized efforts on the part of states and capital.  Accordingly, there is no single 
response from workers and labor organizers.
16
  A result is different working classes that 
are neither pure combativity, nor pure passive dispersal, or a pure institutionalized 
apparatus (Lee C K 2007). 
This chapter analyzes the context for Burmese migrant workers and labor 
organizers in Mae Sot.  A central aspect is a broader state project in which migrant 
workers are racialized and their civic rights are peripheralized through the construction of 
a distinct policing regime of ‗partial border citizenship.‘  This means, in short, that the 
state, particularly the police, national security agencies, and border guards work together 
to regulate nearly every aspect of migrant workers‘ lives to create and sustain the 
conditions for a regime of flexible and informalized labor that enables labor intensive 
industries to survive in the region. 
The implementation of fixed duration contracts (FDC) in Cambodia is an example 
of the state‘s insertion in the social realm of labor regulation once defined by the ILO 
regulated tri-partite model in the garment industry.  The shift to FDCs, casualization, 
precarity etc follows trends throughout Asia, but is significant in Cambodia given the 
global prominence and ‗branding‘ of the ILO‘s efforts to create a model of ‗fair 
globalization.‘  Informalization is a part of neoliberal practice in the GMS which moves 
to reinforce and expand the state as a strong and autonomous subject that dominates the 
social field in realms including labor regimes and police activity (Hardt and Negri 1994).   
                                                          
16
 Both are deeply impacted by social and political histories of anti-modernism in Cambodia under the 
Khmer Rouge and the ensuing socialist era of the 1980s, and isolationism and self-sufficiency ‗socialism‘ 
of Burma from 1962-1988 and the ongoing dictatorship. 
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Chapter 4, ―The China Ripple Effect and Globalized Production in GMS 
Borderlands.‖  I focus the chapter on two manufacturing corporations‘ Asian sourcing 
strategies, Top Form in Mae Sot and Kingmaker in Bavet.  Top Form is the world‘s 
largest manufacturers of brassieres, and Kingmaker is one of the world‘s leading 
manufacturers of relatively high end branded footwear.  A complex set of relations are 
factored into manufacturers sourcing strategies.  China remains the manufacturing base 
for two major corporations in garments and footwear and this is certainly the case for 
most producers in these sectors.  Production networks of these companies are deeply 
intertwined with US/EU-China trade frictions, changes in production costs in coastal 
China, and the trend in ‗China+1(+1)‘ sourcing strategies.  Equally important, this 
chapter looks at corporations that are ‗upgrading‘ in global production networks, meaning 
they aim to capture more value in different nodes of the production process, evolving 
from simple assemblers to designers, brand manufactures, retailers and the like.  Despite 
this ‗upgrading‘ both companies continue to rely on surplus/informalized populations in 
labor abundant regions of Asia.  Thus, while offering employment to those in need due to 
lack of socio-economic opportunities in Burma and Cambodia (i.e. processes associated 
with primitive accumulation), there is no indication that value chain ‗upgrading‘ directly 
correlates with better work conditions.  
The purpose is to demonstrate Mae Sot and Bavet‘s links with the region and 
global production.  In doing so it shows capital that is mobile, but embedded in 
production networks within particular countries.  Localities such as Mae Sot and Bavet 
are competing to attract and maintain such mobile investments, and are being integrated 
into regionally extended production logics.  Previous chapters have demonstrated the 
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labor regimes deemed necessary for these mobile firms.  Going forward, there is another 
layered ‗necessity,‘ that of SEZs to ‗capture‘ producers who deem Thailand-Cambodia 
production sites as largely auxiliary to China-based production.  
Chapter 5, ―Economic Corridors, SEZs and Border Development Nodes.‖ In this 
and the following chapter I put forward a state, Cambodia, that is highly flexible, rather 
than strong or weak.  It is a case of a flexible state restructuring and adapting to regional 
and global forces in which regional agencies, new governmental actors, and emergent 
discourses are articulated with broader regional and trans-national development 
strategies.  In particular, the ADB‘s Economic Corridors are a new spatial practice that is 
a manifestation of the GMS Project‘s central discourse of the Three Cs: connectivity, 
competitiveness and community.  To tap into this framework the Cambodian state has 
created new government agencies, the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board, and 
‗One Stop Service Centers‘ in each of the new SEZs.  It has also agreed on a bi-lateral 
transport agreement with Vietnam for shipping between Ho Chi Minh City and the Bavet 
SEZs.  In the process firms including Kingmaker have initiated production and export 
from one of these border SEZs, thus connecting Cambodia with the new Asia regional 
division of labor identified in earlier chapters.   
On the surface it appears that Cambodia is following global SEZ trends.  Almost 
all SEZs in Cambodia are privately developed and they offer one-stop services to reduce 
bureaucratic and other state inefficiencies.  By locating near Vietnam and Thailand they 
address the problems of high electricity and logistics costs.  Furthermore, they offer an 
environment where employers implement a new spatial regulation of labor.  Broadly 
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speaking, the Cambodian state facilitating the expansion of sub-regional and globalized 
production. 
Chapter 6, ―Activating the Borderlands: Public-private dynamics of SEZs in 
Cambodia.‖  Throughout the GMS specific border and cross-border zones once seen as 
territorial boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly 
being re-articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.  Cambodia‘s recent history of border-based insurgencies and political 
opposition meant it was not in the interests of the central governments to allow border 
regions to gain economic autonomy, and this is still the case in the late 2000s.  The 
consolidation of the CPP‘s power between 2001 and 2008 is, in no small part, a critical 
component of the push to industrialize the borderlands.  In this chapter I argue that border 
SEZs represent a new regulatory regime offering new opportunities for profit and power.  
It is a process wherein the state is often acting in a private capacity and the private sector 
in a state capacity, and both are more deeply engaging the industrial economy, perhaps 
for the first time in Cambodia‘s history.  The result is that institutions of national-cross-
border governance and development infrastructure have emerged in ways that combine 
authoritarian political and liberal economic features to manage the ways in which 
different production systems are able to compete in the global economy. 
 Greater co-operation between national elites may contribute to lessening the 
specter of inter-state war, and the superpower-fuelled carnage of the Cold War (and 
Khmer Rouge) era are becoming or already are a distant memory (Hughes 2011).  But, 
economic development and sub-regional integration has changed the pattern of political 
contestation in border areas.  This suggests that in the short run at least, the 
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transformative potential of border development projects is limited: outcomes reflect 
rather than reshape national and regional orders of power (ibid).  It also means a 
newfound role for Cambodia‘s elites in border industrialization initiatives.  Therefore, 
SEZs are not a new industrial policy, rather it is part of the political-economic process of 
further consolidation of power in a few hands. 
Chapter 7, ―National Security State Capital and the politics of Scale at the Thai-
Burma Border.‖  The political processes building a border economy in Mae Sot over the 
past 10-15 years sheds much light on the politics of scale and the ways in which states do 
and do not seek to link their territories and citizens with the political dynamics, economic 
systems and natural resources of neighboring countries (Walker 2009).  Doing so 
demonstrates much about the territorial diversity and flexibility of state practices in the 
sub-region, and how this facilitates certain links with regional and global trade and 
production networks, while preventing other links.  The Mae Sot SEZ initiative, 
combined with the infrastructure development at Mae Sot, are part of realizations that 
local autonomy is crucial to promote economic growth in the area.  However, these ‗local 
realizations‘ are coupled with fractions of central state officials and national-regional-
global business interests, meaning simple local-central binaries obfuscate the important 
changes underlying these initiatives.   
The SEZ proposal has met resistance on the national and local levels for a number 
of reasons.  First, if implemented it would alter Thailand‘s constructive engagement 
policy with Burma by deepening economic and social links at the border.  Secondly, the 
proposal is highly politicized due to its sponsorship and association with the 
administration of former PM Thaksin.  Third, the new spatial administration of the 
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proposed SEZ would undermine the ‗traditional‘ military and police dominance of Thai 
borders and the hegemonic position of ‗national security state capital‘ both at the border 
and perhaps deeper into Burma.    
 
Research Questions and Methods 
Research Design  
This was a qualitative and quantitative mixed methods study.  Qualitative 
methods entailed collection of trade data from governmental and intergovernmental 
sources.  Qualitative methods included semi-structured interviews, focus group 
discussion and participant observation.  Fieldwork for the dissertation was conducted 
between December 2008 and November 2009.  I spent six months in Cambodia, working 
in Phnom Penh, Bavet and Koh Kong.  I was in Thailand for six months collecting data in 
Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Mae Sot and Sangkhlaburi.  I spent considerable time in the 
ADB‘s library in Phnom Penh collecting data.  In Cambodia and Thailand I met with 63 
different offices of regional and international organizations, government, the private 
sector, trade unions and non-governmental organizations, as well as individual 
academics, reporters and activists (for a full list, see Appendix 1).  During fieldwork I 
participated in or led two worker education workshops, and presented at one international 
conference.  
 
Approaching the empirical and conceptual issues 
The initial steps on my dissertation began in 2002 through work with a Thailand-
based labor NGO, the Thai Labour Campaign.  Through them I was engaged in the 
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formation of an Asia-regional network involving roughly 25 trade unions and labor 
NGOs from East, Southeast and South Asia.  It was coordinated by the Hong Kong-based 
Asia Monitor Resource Centre.  The network formed many of the initial questions 
guiding my dissertation, and it was through the network that a significant portion of my 
dissertation fieldwork was possible.  A central concern of the networks‘ collective efforts 
was (and still is) how to develop strategies that empower workers by challenging the two 
primary threats to both livelihoods and trade union organizing (as identified by the 
network): capital mobility, and neoliberalizing states implementing informalized, 
casualized, and/or precarious labor regimes. This is, needless to say, a daunting task.  My 
dissertation, while a continuation of these efforts, does not offer suggestions or any form 
of guidance on how to address these threats.  It does, however, offer a way of viewing 
governance structures and power relations in the subregion.  This approach, I hope, helps 
to identify strategic foci that lead to improvements for many workers in the subregion.  
The GMS is the focus of many studies, a majority look at the implications of the 
ADB‘s physical infrastructure projects, emphasizing trade-led development strategies.  
More recently a body of literature is emerging that, in general terms, takes a more critical 
approach to GMS development initiatives by focusing on uneven development, state 
power and violence, denigration of workers‘ rights, among numerous other issues (see, 
among others, Gainsborough (2006 and 2009), Glassman (2010), Hughes (2011), Oehlers 
(2006), Pitch (2007), Walker (2009)).  My dissertation seeks to contribute conceptually 
and empirically to these and other efforts that challenge practices and policies generating 
uneven development.  In particular, I want to better understand the contexts for workers 
in border areas and the trade unions/workers associations who seek to protect their socio-
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economic interests.  This dissertation is organized along the broad contours of four inter-
related areas of interest:   
 
1. Global Economy: What are the changing political economic contours of global 
capitalism?  How do different scales—local, national, regional, global—interact 
to create multiple and unique forms?  
 
2. State/Policy: How are aspirations to be competitive global free market players 
discursively and materially articulated in Cambodia and Thailand?  How do the 
political and economic aspects of creating spaces conducive to capital 
accumulation converge and diverge?  
 
3. Private Sector: Why do manufacturers choose to invest in border areas of the 
Greater Mekong Sub-region?  What are the infrastructural and labor regime 
requirements deemed sufficient to attract and maintain investment?  
 
4. Labor: What are the key structural and discursive impediments to promoting 
workers‘ socio-economic rights in border industrial zones of the GMS?  What are 
the different labor regimes and labor politics in the GMS borderlands, and what 
does this tell us of the changing Asia-regional division of labor?  
 
To answer these questions I engaged a combination of a) geographical 
interpretations of global production networks, space and political economy; b) Asian 
studies and understandings of labor movements in Asia; and c) an interdisciplinary 
ambition to both conceptualize and practice globalization.  The dissertation presents a 
reading of sub-regional articulations with globalization working through theoretical 
paradigms and practices grounded in the dominant conceptual trinity of capital, state and 
labor.  The dissertation understands capital-state-labor interactions through different 
contextual projections and they are structurally coupled and coevolving.  Throughout I 
seek to destabilize notions of scalar hierarchy and interests that varyingly seek to engage 
industry-led development primarily from a macro-economic perspective.  Each emerging 
border space has its own specificities.  They are not fixed or permanently defined by any 
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one capital formation, state practice or labor formation, but are part of open, constantly 
changing sets of social relations that are layered, mutable and multiple.   
 
Funding Sources and Host Organizations 
Funding for the fieldwork comes from the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation 
Research Abroad Program, and the Center for Khmer Studies Dissertation Fellowship.  
My host organizations were the Office of Human Rights and Social Development, 
Mahidol University (Thailand), and the Center for Khmer Studies (Cambodia).  Pre-
dissertation fieldwork was conducted in 2007 with support of the UNC-Chapel Hill 
Geography Department‘s Graduate Student Travel Fund.  In 2007 I completed an 
intensive Thai language course in Bangkok with support of a Title VI FLAS.  In 2008 I 
conducted a one month consultancy for Norwegian Church Aid and Diakonia on 
Burmese migrant workers‘ issues in Thailand.  I thank them and the consultancy 
participants for permission to use data from the study in my dissertation.  I collected trade 
and other data while working as a Graduate Research Assistant on the National Science 
Foundation-supported project, ―The Geographical Consequences of the End of Quota 
Constrained Trade in the Global Apparel Industry.‖ 
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Chapter 2  
Low-cost Sourcing in the GMS: Comparing Policies in Cambodia and Thailand 
Introduction  
Thailand and Cambodia are at very different stages of industrialization processes.  
Thailand has been one of the world‘s leading exporters since the 1980s.  For a period of 
10 years in the 1980s-1990s it was the world‘s fastest growing economy.  Industry is 
quite diverse, with clusters of auto parts producers and auto assemblers, electronics 
assemblers, chemicals, agro-industry, seafood processing and plantations.  Cambodia 
only began exporting in the mid-1990s, and it is still heavily reliant on a single 
commodity—garments, for roughly 75% of its export value.  Despite these differences, 
both countries rely heavily on low cost labor for economic growth strategies.     
I focus this chapter on two key issues in Cambodia‘s and Thailand‘s light 
manufacturing industries.  In the case of Thailand it is the ability to combine at the border 
one of the lowest cost workforces in the region with relatively advanced logistics services 
and inputs for garment assembly.  In Cambodia it is rather more straightforward, the lack 
of competitiveness on cost, quality and speed to market are key factors driving border 
industrialization initiatives.  The other and related focus of the chapter is labor in these 
two countries.  In many respects Cambodia and Thailand are opposites.  Cambodia is 
promoted globally as an ―ethical producer‖ and ―model of fair globalization‖ due largely 
to an International Labour Organization (ILO) factory monitoring that began in 2001.  
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Many parts of Thailand, particularly areas employing large numbers of migrant workers 
from neighboring Burma, Cambodia and Laos, are among the most notorious havens for 
poor labor practices in Southeast Asia.  In this chapter I focus on one such place, Mae 
Sot.  However, Cambodia‘s labor monitoring program is losing its luster as a policy 
governing labor relations.  In this context border economies are part of broader trends 
that privilege productivity, factor costs and flexibility over ―fair globalization‖ initiatives.  
This chapter demonstrates that border areas in both countries are critical aspects of the 
pattern to embed low-value, low-skill and low-productivity production networks and 
informalized labor relations in the national and sub-regional economy. 
 
Thailand‟s Industrial Structure and Sub-regional Policies 
Pitch (2007) divides Thailand‘s spatial economic development policy into three 
major periods.  The first was the urban-growth period that witnessed the centralization of 
resources into Bangkok from 1960 during the import substitution industrialization phase.  
The second period initiated in the late 1960s was growth pole driven, facilitating regional 
development in a new-town style.  This was marked by government led public projects in 
the key regional nodes (such as Chiang Mai and Lampang in the North, Khon Kean and 
Nakorn Rachasrima in the Northeast, Chonburi in the East, and Songkla in the South).  
The third period was the establishment of the industrial clusters and infrastructure zones.  
This policy was first established at the eastern corridor (east of Bangkok from Chonburi 
to Rayong—the Eastern Seaboard) in the 1980s, when areas boomed under export 
oriented industrialization polices.  The zone was designed to attract industry to utilize the 
newly found petrochemical source in the Thai gulf and the deep-sea port, Laem 
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Chaebang.  This is currently where nearly all of Thailand‘s capital intensive investment is 
located, including autos, petrochemicals and electronics.  A fourth period and more 
recent period is the targeting of Thailand‘s borders and neighboring countries as part of 
capital accumulation strategies, broadly conceived as cross-border regionalism.  This 
began from the early 1990s and is a central topic of this dissertation.  In general the 
principle behind these four phases is infrastructure-led development planning, in which 
the government has been the main contributor to the infrastructure investment.  
Keynesian multiplier effects and private investment were expected to drive growth.  To 
no small extent these infrastructure-led development policies are still prominent in 
Thailand and the GMS in general under ADB-led cross border development initiatives.  
The Thai government outlines three underlying steps for the establishment of the 
cross border regionalization policy.  They are 1) policy and infrastructure development, 
2) addressing regional development gaps and 3) re-engineering Thailand‘s industrial 
structure (MFA nd [no-date]-1).  The liberalization of border flows in capital and goods 
is combined with a re-territorialization that aims to limit or contain the flow of migrant 
workers to core economic zones and cities.  The policy and infrastructure development 
policy mirrors the ADB‘s neoclassical economic model for complementarily and 
comparative advantage of neighboring countries in the sub-region.  The contention is that 
these countries have different comparative advantages in terms of resources and 
production cost, and the establishment of new manufacturing bases in border areas will 
bring about mutual and complementary benefits (ADB 2007).  In particular, business is 
said to benefit from transport links, inexpensive raw materials and low labor cost as well 
as improved and direct market access.  In turn, this creates investment opportunities and 
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markets for goods produced in Thailand or by Thai firms in neighboring countries, 
including consumer electronics, automobiles, and processed food.   
The second step also mirrors the ADB‘s project for the GMS, and it seeks to 
address uneven development in the sub-region, in this case by creating new 
manufacturing bases to create employment, generate income and ease socio-economic 
problems (MFA nd-2).  In this case border areas are envisioned as incubators of enhanced 
regional competitiveness in trade, investment and tourism among neighboring countries 
(MFA nd-1).  Thailand‘s borders or its ‗frontiers‘ have also become increasingly 
important as destinations for (alleged) ‗sunset industries‘ including textile and garment, 
food processing and other light manufacturing industries, and are a way to maintain 
competitiveness.   
The third step of cross-border initiatives seeks to re-engineer Thailand‘s industrial 
structure.  It is expected that the establishment of border economic zones will support 
central Thailand‘s transition from a labor-intensive to a high-tech/capital-intensive 
industrial base, in part by facilitating the relocation of labor intensive industrial 
enterprises relying on raw materials from neighboring countries into those partner 
countries, or to Thai border towns such as Mae Sot.   
The broader context for this push to the border is the increasing pressure on 
Thailand‘s labor-intensive sectors.  In Thailand, labor intensive industries declined from 
20% of exports in 1995 to 10% in 2005, while the same period saw a rapid increase of 
electronics and automobile manufacturing as Thailand‘s economy increasingly 
diversified (Mounier and Charoenloet 2007).  The decision to set up production facilities 
in border towns, Mae Sot being the most industrialized, is also a reaction to the changing 
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competitiveness of Thai producers in global markets.  From the early to mid-1990s, profit 
rates for textile and garment and other labor intensive industries declined, manufacturer 
efforts to upgrade into original design or original brand manufacturing failed, and the 
hoped-for emergence of regional trading companies managing supply chains for global 
brands and retailers (as occurred in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea) did not materialize.  
Instead, to maintain competitiveness Thai manufacturers have adopted a series of 
strategies (Mounier and Charoenloet 2007).  They have:  
 Downsized operations by laying-off workers, regularly without compensation,  
 Informalized labor relations by employing workers on contracts through labor 
agencies, or by outsourcing production to home-based workers and smaller scale 
workshops (further entrenching a Thai-precarious workforce in garments),  
 Speeded up production processes utilizing various incentives, and  
 Relocated to border regions or produce in neighboring countries and export back 
into Thailand.  
 
Mae Sot and other border zones have, as a result, become important elements in 
the development of Thailand‘s economic strategy of fostering a ‗dual space economy‘.  
The government‘s goal is to become a ‗First World‘ economy in auto manufacturing, 
finance, real estate and other high-value sectors dominating Bangkok, the Eastern 
Seaboard and central regions, sustaining a vibrant middle-class consumer society, while 
its ‗Third World‘ labor intensive industries, including those employing large numbers of 
migrant workers in textile and garment, seafood processing and other labor intensive 
industries, continue to expand, absorb investment capital, and provide opportunities to 
maintain access to highly competitive export markets (see Brown and Hewison 2005).   
Thailand‘s economic growth depends increasingly on the large-scale influx of 
migrant workers.  There are currently some 3-4 million migrant workers in labor 
intensive industries such as seafood processing and fisheries, construction, manufacturing 
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sectors including textile and garment, agriculture and domestic work.  They comprise 
roughly one-tenth of the Thai labor force.
17
  Some 2.5 million come from Burma and 
500,000 from Lao PDR and Cambodia (Interview Mae Sot Department of Labor 
Protection and Welfare [LPD] June 20, 2008).
18
  Migrant workers tend to occupy lower-
paid jobs and are seen to be an integral part of Thailand‘s current development strategies 
outlined above.  Thailand is distinct from many labor receiving countries in Asia since a 
high proportion of Thais are employed in the same sectors drawing migrant workers 
including construction, light manufacturing and agriculture.  The exceptions are domestic 
work and fisheries—occupations almost totally lacking Thai workers.  This destabilizes 
notions that migrants only take jobs shunned by Thais, or strictly work in the ‗3Ds,‘ or 
dirty-dangerous-demeaning occupations.   For example, the Textile and garment industry 
employed roughly 1.4 million Thais in 2006 (including registered and unregistered home-
based workers), accounting for 22% of the manufacturing workforce, down slightly from 
roughly 25% of the industrial workforce in the 1980s (Virat 2007:4).  About 20% are 
employed in capital intensive textile firms and roughly 80% in garment factories (total of 
4,464 registered textile and garment firms in 2006) (Virat 2007:3).
19
  Garment factories 
regularly outsource work to home-based enterprises where workers lack job security, 
sufficient income, social security and the like.  Of course, this complicates contentions 
since the 1990s that textiles and garments is a ‗sunset industry.‘ 
                                                          
17
 Thailand‘s labor force is approximately 34.43 million (U.S. Department of International Affairs, Bureau 
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2008) 
18
 This contrasts sharply with official government statistics of 1.2 million migrants in Thailand (Huguet and 
Punpuing 2005). 
19
 In 2006 there were 1,069,560 registered workers employed in the textile and garment industry.  Of that 
total, 828,880 employees (77.6 per cent) were working in the clothing subsector.  The man-made fibre, 
spinning, weaving, knitting, and dyeing, printing and finishing subsectors accounted for employment rates 
of 1.4 per cent, 5.7 per cent, 5.2 per cent, 5.7 per cent and 4.4 per cent, respectively. (Virat 2007). 
51 
 
This highlights the very blurred distinction between the first and third worlds 
within Thailand.  For instance, roughly 68% of the Thai labor force is in the informal 
economy (Bundit et al 2008:196), meaning they are without protection under the social 
security law and are not protected by the labor relations acts.  In other words, roughly 22 
of 35 millions employed in Thailand are producing goods or services that generate 
income and employment outside of the management or supervision of governmental 
bodies (Bundit et al 2008).  Of those in the informal economy, about 42% work in 
agriculture and another 31% off farm.  Bundit et al (2009:197) found that the numbers of 
non-secure workers are increasing.  For instance, the number of motorcycle taxi drivers 
in Bangkok has increased from 16,000 in 1984 to 108,506 in 2003; the number of street 
vendors increased from 24,192 in 1986 to 25,653 in 1998; and the number of home 
workers has increased by about 80%, from 226,473 to 406,473 between 1999 and 2001.  
The majority of these home workers are women engaged in manufacturing, especially 
and garments.   
Table 1: Thailand's Employment by Sector 
Year Sex  
Total 
employment 
('000) 
Agriculture 
(%) 
Industry 
(%) 
Services 
(%) 
2000 M  18 070.8 49.5 18.5 31.9 
2000 F  14 762.0 47.3 17.1 35.5 
2002 M  18 872.1 47.8 20.5 31.6 
2002 F  15 390.8 44.0 18.9 37.0 
2004 M  19 698.8 43.9 21.6 34.4 
2004 F  16 012.8 40.3 19.2 40.4 
2006 M  19 638.4 43.6 22.0 34.2 
2006 F  16 706.2 40.5 19.0 40.3 
Source: ILO Key Indicators of the Labor Market (2009) 
A combination of these and other factors lead to contentions that Thailand is stuck 
in the ―middle income trap.‖  This means it has reached significant yet constrained levels 
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of capitalist development in terms of ―upgrading‖ the economy to higher value-added 
products at high levels of production efficiency with local inputs (Doner 2009).  For 
instance, Mournier and Voravidh (2010) find that economic growth in Thailand has 
shown an extensive pattern, meaning the quantity of productive factors has mattered 
much more than their quality and their productivity.  They contend that businesses tend to 
stick to an ―outdated view‖ of how to make profits and to past patterns of labor 
management which are embedded in the economic and social context of a ‗‗low skill, low 
productivity, low income‘‘ labor regime, or the ‗3Ls.‘  This means that although Thailand 
has been a critical component of the global shift toward export oriented industries from 
the 1980s it has failed to substantially generate a higher technology, knowledge intensive 
economic base.  Doner (2009:36-37) argues that the country‘s existing high technology 
exports reflect not real local competitiveness but rather simple, labor-intensive assembly 
of high-tech components imported from advanced industrialized countries (primarily East 
Asia).  He goes on to quote one analyst who finds that Thailand‘s auto sector has become 
the ―Maquiladora of Japan‖ rather than the ―Detroit of Asia,‖ as Thailand promotes itself.    
In summary, there is a difference between Thailand‘s discursive and policy 
ambitions of being a world-class manufacturing and services hub (like Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Korea etc) and the reality for a majority of the workforce and the economy in 
general.  A small ―labor aristocracy‖ exists in Thailand, particularly in the state 
enterprises and for a small proportion of workers in manufacturing, and to an extent Thai 
trade unions reflect this.  Thailand has among the lowest unionization rates in Asia, with 
less than 4% of workers registered as trade union members.  In the textile and garment 
industry, for instance, there are only some 20 enterprise-level unions registered in 2010 
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(interview, Bent Gehrt, Workers Rights Consortium, April 15, 2010), out of over 4,000 
textile and garment firms in the country.
20
  In autos a very high proportion of ‗regular‘ 
employees are union members, nearly 100% in the case of Toyota which has integrated 
union activities with the company‘s growth strategy (Arnold 2007), but only 50% of the 
employees are ‗regular,‘ and none of the fixed duration contract workers at the Toyota 
factories are trade union members.  
Border towns and regions have become an important aspect of the extensive 
manufacturing growth pattern in Thailand.  Clearly, it is a policy that extends throughout 
the country, with border policies and patterns reinforcing those in central areas.  This is 
not, however, merely a policy of the Thai state.  It also reflects the sourcing strategies of 
many large corporations involved in global production of labor intensive goods such as 
garments (see Chapter 4).   
 
Mae Sot and Global Production Networks: The „Low Road‟ of Labor Standards 
Export-oriented textile and garment production in Mae Sot was initiated in the 
early- to mid- 1990s, and expanded rapidly after the financial crisis of 1997-98.  It was 
and still is largely driven by low wage labor from Burma.  The growth in the industry in 
Mae Sot was influenced by several factors, including the decreasing competitiveness of 
the industry in Bangkok and Central Thailand, abundant reserves of Burmese migrant 
                                                          
20
 There are, of course exceptions to this.  Gina Form Bra and Triumph (both bra manufacturers, see 
Chapter 4) were two of the strongest garment unions in Thailand.  Unfortunately, both unionized factories 
terminated operations in the past 2 years.  Gina shifted operations to other locations including Cambodia, 
while Triumph laid off workers in the unionized plant and shifted many orders to a non-unionized plant in 
Central Thailand.    
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labor paid at a third to half of the prevailing minimum wage, tax incentives,
21
 
infrastructure investments in Mae Sot and between Mae Sot and Bangkok/ports, and 
loose to no enforcement of labor, occupational health and safety and environmental 
regulations.
22
  
Figure 12: A Mae Sot factory 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
Garment production has been concentrated in low-value added products where 
global competition for low cost is tight and profit margins are small.  These segments of 
the industry are often associated with nomadic buyers and producers who search for 
lowest cost contracts and informalized labor in countries that also offer attractive 
investment incentives (tax holidays etc), quality infrastructure and other trade facilitation 
features that lower total landed costs of products.  Mae Sot is a quintessential example of 
a garment producing center that attracts employers keen on squeezing or sweating labor 
rather than targeting higher quality apparel markets through investment in machinery, 
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 These include tax free exports and 10% reduction of corporate tax-at 20%. 
22
 In part lack of enforcement is due to insufficient personnel in relevant ministries (see Voravidh 2002). 
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improved production processes, and investing in human resources and workplace 
upgrading.   
In 2009 Mae Sot based companies comprise 300 out of 534 members of the 
provincial employers association, the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), Tak Chapter 
(all registered firms are required by law to be FTI members).  The provincial FTI is 
headquartered in Mae Sot, signaling that Mae Sot is the center of the provincial economy.  
90% of these Mae Sot firms are garment and knitting factories.  Mae Sot is also home to 
numerous unregistered, small scale sewing enterprises, bringing the total number of 
factories to an estimated 400 (interview, Min Lwin of Federation of Trade Unions-Burma 
(FTUB) June 19, 2008).  Information on the ownership of unregistered ‗sweatshops‘ is 
not available, though fieldwork interviews suggest that many are Thai owned and 
operated.  A majority of knitting and garments factories are subsidiaries of companies 
producing in Bangkok or central Thailand, and ownership is roughly 70-30 Thai 
(including joint ventures) and foreign invested, with foreign firms coming primarily from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea and Japan (interview, Chair of Tak FTI, October 28, 2009)
23
.  
Thai factory owners registered with the FTI are predominantly from the Bangkok 
vicinity.  Production is primarily for export, with the US/EU accounting for 60% of 
production, Japan/Africa/Asia 20% and the Thai domestic market comprising about 20% 
(interview, Chair of Tak FTI, October 28, 2009).  The largest factories in Mae Sot 
employ about 3,000 workers.  It is currently impossible to provide accurate figures of 
                                                          
23
 In a 2008 interview a Mae Sot Labor Protection Department official stated that factory ownership is 
roughly 50-50 Thai and foreign invested (June 20, 2008).  She stated that foreign owners come primarily 
from China (Guangdong and Hainan Provinces), Taiwan and Hong Kong, in addition to Japanese and 
Korean owned firms.   
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average factory size because nearly every factory reports only a fraction of its total 
workforce through the registration process.  
Over the years the structure of the industry has changed.  According to the Chair 
of the Tak FTI, in 2003-2004 almost all firms in Mae Sot were sub-contractors, who were 
only in Mae Sot ―for cheap labor‖ (interview, October 28, 2009).  In 2009, roughly 10% 
of factories are exporters, 60% are original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and about 
30% are sub-contractors.  Products in Mae Sot are mostly shirts, polo shirts, jeans and 
jackets.  The difference, in general terms, is exporters have marketing departments that 
obtain their own orders, source raw materials and manage logistics, while OEM 
companies‘ produce on a ‗made to order‘ basis, meaning they may source some 
materials, while sub-contractors have little if any engagement with the garment supply 
chain beyond sewing garments with inputs delivered to their factory.  This shift 
corresponds with increasing demand for more skilled workers in Mae Sot factories.  The 
FTI Chair said that roughly 70% of Burmese workers in Mae Sot factories are skilled.  
He also said that they can move more and with greater ease, suggesting worker turnover 
is a problem for employers.   
These changes correspond to other supply chain dynamics in Mae Sot.  Mr. 
Chaiyuth of the Tak FTI claims that lead time over the past five years has dropped from 
60 to 45 to 20 days for producers in Mae Sot.  Price for orders dropped by 10% in 2008-
2009.  Logistics/transport costs, or shipping inputs to Mae Sot from central Thailand and 
shipping finished goods to port, are quite high in Mae Sot at roughly 20% of total cost 
(interview, Tak FTI, October 28, 2009).  One container to Laem Chaebang port costs 
about 26,000 baht, compared to about 15,000 baht from Ayutthaya in central Thailand 
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and roughly 5,000 baht from Bangkok (interview, Tak FTI, October 28, 2009; Schenker 
(Thai) Co., November 27, 2009).  Roughly 70% of inputs are sourced within Thailand, 
with the remainder coming from China and Indonesia.  The ability to source within 
Thailand, as the case study in Chapter 4 demonstrates, is a critical component of the areas 
competitiveness in global production networks.  
Table 2: Thailand‟s Apparel Exports, 2005-2008  
Value (million US$) Growth % 
Major 
market 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
USA 2,111.1 2,083.5 2,026.8 2,026.8 1.48 -1.31 -2.72 -4.68 
EU 1,210.4 1,316.8 1,327.1 1,327.1 1.35 8.80 0.78 3.11 
ASEAN 770.1 803.2 924.8 924.8 17.23 4.29 15.14 10.73 
Japan 412.1 395.4 381.3 381.3 -4.09 -4.04 -3.57 23.37 
China 282.5 249.7 264.4 264.4 6.16 -11.61 5.88 -4.14 
Others 1,907.3 1,986.0 2,107.1 2,107.1 7.82 4.13 6.10 2.10 
World  6,693.5 6,834.6 7,031.5 7,031.5 4.66 2.11 2.88 2.39 
Source: Textile Information Center, Thailand Textile Institute (2009) 
Wage levels in Mae Sot are low and allow producers in Thailand to remain 
competitive with lower wage countries in the Asia region (See Table 3).  A worker who 
started work in Mae Sot in 2000 would have been paid 40 baht
24
 per day and would not 
have had fees deducted from that amount (interview, garment factory worker, June 10, 
2008).  In 2008, the daily provincial minimum wage was 147 baht per day but only one 
of some 400 factories in Mae Sot paid workers the provincial minimum wage (Interview, 
BLSO and FTUB, June 17, 2008).  In fact, average wages were roughly 70 baht/day 
including overtime (Interview, garment workers, June 8 and 10, 2008), but managers 
were also deducting money for accommodation and food, a widespread practice since the 
late 1990s, in addition to a 300 baht per month deduction for ‗security‘.  ‗Security‘ fees 
have become common in more recent years, especially for Mae Sot workers who do not 
                                                          
24
 US$1=34 Thai Baht (September 2008) 
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have a work permit.  They are used to pay bribes to local officials for maintaining 
unregistered workforces or they are pocketed by employers. (see Chapter 3)  As a 
consequence, the real wage is now significantly lower than it was in 2000.
25
  The 
Federation of Thai Industries Tak Chapter‘s policy is that all members must pay workers 
the minimum wage.  However, in practice all members deduct monthly fees from 
workers‘ salary for work permits, accommodation, food, electricity and other fees.  Under 
Thai law these fees are illegal, with the exception of those for work permits.
26
    
Low wages are certainly a key consideration in investors‘ decisions to produce in 
Mae Sot and for buyers to source there.  But, it is only one of many factors.  Thailand‘s 
trade and investment policy and infrastructure (such as time through port, quality of 
roads, tax incentives etc) are of higher standards than the lowest cost producers in the 
region (e.g. Cambodia, Bangladesh and Vietnam).  As a result, Thai border producers 
have additional competitive advantages.  These non-wage competitive factors are 
analyzed in the World Bank‘s annual Ease of Doing Business2010 report, which ranks 
Thailand # 12 out of 183 countries surveyed globally in terms of select indicators 
including the ease of dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, 
getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing 
contracts, and closing a business (China #89; Vietnam #93; Bangladesh #119; Cambodia 
#145).   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 Paying a monthly security fee of 300 baht is, over a year, roughly the same amount as a work permit.  
26
 In this regard the FTI is becoming much more organized among its members compared to years past. 
Despite the illegality of these deductions, they have achieved a degree of legitimacy for these policies.  
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Table 3: Comparative Wages in Asia, 2008 
Country/region Daily Minimum 
wage 
Monthly minimum 
wage 
Local 
currency 
US$ Local 
currency 
in US$ 
Thailand  
Bangkok 203.00 6.42 6,090.00 192.63 
Chiang Mai 168.00 5.31 5,040.00 159.42 
Khon Kaen 150.00 4.74 4,500.00 142.34 
Tak 147.00 4.65 4,410.00 139.49 
Mae Sot (real wage) 70.00 2.19 2,100.00 65.62 
Cambodia 7,475.88 1.87 224,276.36 56.00 
China  
Guandong Province     
Guagzhou City 28.67 4.03 860.00 120.76 
Provincial High (outside  
Guangzhou) 
25.67 3.60 770.00 108.12 
Provincial Low 17.67 2.48 530.00 74.42 
Shanghai 32.00 4.49 960.00 134.80 
Qingdao 25.33 3.56 760.00 106.72 
Indonesia   
Jakarta 32,400.00 3.58 972,000.00 107.44 
Jawa Barat (Purwakarta) 25,433.33 2.81 763,000.00 84.34 
Banten  27,900.00 3.08         837,000  92.52 
Philippines   
Metro Manila 343.50 8.44 10,305.00 253.20 
Cavite/Southern Tagalog 262.00 6.44 7,860.00 193.12 
Vietnam  
Metropolitan core  33,333.33 2.05 1,000,000.00 61.61 
Provincial urban or metropolitan 
suburban 
30,000.00 1.85 900,000.00 55.45 
Rural 26,666.67 1.64 800,000.00 49.29 
Notes: 
Source: Respective government web-pages, unless otherwise noted  
Exchange rate: Oanda.com, average of March 3 & 10, 2008  
Daily wage calculated using 30 days  
Cambodia: Minimum wage is $50 with a $6 'allowance raise' implemented in April 2008  
Philippines: Manila and Cavite based on average daily non-agricultural minimum wages  
Thailand: Bangkok and Chiang Mai wage increase as of May 2, 2008; Khon Kaen and Tak as of Jan 2008 
Indonesia and Cambodia: Minimum wage figures are for textile and garment industry 
 
This section has analyzed changes taking place in garment production networks 
and more generally Thailand‘s labor-intensive industries.  It can be read in a number of 
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different ways.  One conclusion is that Thailand is strategically situated to gain from both 
lower and higher value added processes of the global garment industry.  Namely, it has 
backward and forward linkages (with a noted weakness in design), advanced logistics, 
strong presence of leading textile and garment companies, a sizable consumer market 
(enough for it to be a major consideration for auto producers such as Toyota, GM and 
others), a relatively well educated labor force and many decades of learning from 
industrialization and engaging global production networks.  Despite these ‗advantages,‘ 
Doner (2009) and Mournier and Voravidh (2010) and other analysts contend that 
Thailand has failed to take advantage of its position in global production networks and 
capture higher value added.  In this context borders are not peripheral to the national 
economy.  Rather, they are the product of and reinforce the national and increasingly sub-
regional economies.  I now turn to a section on Cambodia‘s export economy and the 
implications for labor.   
 
Cambodia: The „High Road‟ of Labor Standards? 27 
In recent years Cambodia‘s foothold in the global economy and the most 
prominent aspect of its labor movement has been the textile and garment industry.  In the 
mid-1990s export-oriented garment production became a central component of 
Cambodia‘s economic transition.   Though it employs a small proportion of the labor 
force, the garment industry has been a major focal point of  this transition.  There are 
                                                          
27
Portions of this section draw on Arnold, D and Toh H S (2010) ―A Fair Model of Globalisation? Labour 
and Global Production in Cambodia,‖ Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 40, No. 3, forthcoming; and  
Arnold, D (2008) ―Street Vendors, Factories and Family Workers: Informalising Labour in Cambodia,‖ in 
D. Lee, A. Leong, R. Ofreneo and A. Sukumaran (Eds.)  Asian Labour Law Review2008: Rights for Two-
thirds of Asia, Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, pp. 107-124.    
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several reasons for this.  Income generated in the industry supports an estimated 20% of 
the population.  Its workforce is roughly 85% women and this is changing Cambodia‘s 
patriarchal society.  Also, it is a focal point for the labor movement.   
Textile and garment exports comprised about 70-75% of Cambodia‘s annual 
export volume from 2001 to 2008.  Roughly 70% of these exports are destined for the US 
market, making Cambodia the US‘s eight largest apparel supplier in 2008 measured by 
import value.
28
  This accounts for 90% of export revenue and 16% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 2008.  The garment industry directly employed 350,000 workers in 
2008 (see Table 4).  The Economic Institute of Cambodia (2007) estimates that direct 
production-related employment accounts for only 53% of employment generated, 
meaning total employment related to this sector may exceed 600,000, significant for a 
country of some 14 million people.
29
  Over 80% of textile and garment workers are rural-
urban migrant women who contribute a significant proportion of their earnings to their 
families in rural areas. (Roughly 85% of the country‘s population lives in rural areas).  In 
2003 the informal economy accounted for 62% of GDP and 85% of the total workforce.  
The remaining 15% of the workforce was employed by ―formal‖ sectors, especially in the 
garment industry (230,000), the tourism sector which employed 70,000, and public 
administration with 350,000 employees (Economic Institute of Cambodia, 2006). 
Table 4: Statistics on Cambodia‟s Garment Industry (US$ Million unless noted) 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006 2007 
Exports to the US  0.1 106.8 512.2 792.6 953.3 1,548.0 1,873.0 1,978.0 
Exports to the 25.6 112.3 137.8 308.8 407.0 489.0 571.0 630.0 
                                                          
28
 Total exports increased from $1.5 billion in 2001 to $4.1 billion in 2007, including garments, shoes, 
cigarettes, natural rubber, rice, pepper, wood and fish. 
29
 Food sellers represent almost 40% of indirect jobs, housing 25% and transportation 5%. Another 30% 
include small traders, clothing shops and other supporting businesses (Economic Institute of Cambodia, 
2007:16). 
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EU  
Other exports  0.6 4.8 0.0 18.4 72.0 132.0 177.0 231.0 
Total garment 
exports  26.2 223.9 653.0 1,198.8 1,601.0 2,169.0 2,622.0 2,839.0 
% of total visible 
export 3.0 23.9 57.9 71.2 76.7 74.5 70.9 69.4 
US market as % 
exports 0.2% 47.7% 78.4% 66.1% 59.5% 71.4% 71.4% 69.7% 
Job generation 18,703 51,578 96,574 188,061 233,969 283,906 334,063 349,367 
Operational 
factories 20 67 152 188 188 224 289 291 
 
Source: US Embassy (2008) 
Currently, Cambodia‘s four economic ―growth pillars‖ are textiles and garments, 
tourism, construction and agriculture (World Bank, 2009a).  In recent years Cambodia 
has experienced significant economic growth coupled with income disparity among the 
highest in Asia.  In 2007 GDP growth stood at 9.6%, which is below the average of about 
11% in the three previous years.  Lower levels of growth in 2007 were largely due to 
decreases in garment exports (ADB 2008a).  Cambodia‘s lack of economic 
diversification and heavy dependence on the garments sector for export earnings has 
made it particularly vulnerable to external shocks or fluctuations.  For instance, during 
the global economic crisis garment exports dropped 21.6% in the first 9  months of 2009, 
with 70 factories closing and approximately 70,000 workers laid off (Kang and Liv 
2010:26).  
 
Initiating Cambodia‘s Textile and Garment Industry 
The first factories producing textiles and garments for export opened in Cambodia 
around 1994, with investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore.  The 
industry remains dominated by foreign investors, with Cambodian investors accounting 
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for only 7% of ownership in 2008.  The largest investors are from Taiwan (accounting for 
25% of factory ownership), Hong Kong (20%), China (15%) and Korea (12%) (Kang et 
al., 2009:12).  Management and line leaders can also be brought in, often from the 
investors‘ home country or mainland China.  This means Cambodians are generally 
employed in the lowest wage, least skilled aspects of the production process (Yamagata, 
2006).  Employment in the industry grew from about 19,000 in 1995 to nearly 100,000 by 
1999 and the US quickly became the primary importing country for Cambodia‘s 
garments (see Table 4).  This is due to two factors. First, rules of origin clauses under the 
EU‘s ―Everything but Arms‖ program limits EU exports since nearly 100% of 
Cambodia‘s garment inputs are imported.  This is also a factor for the Japanese market. 
Second, Cambodian-produced garments are of lower quality than generally required by 
EU and Japanese markets (interview, Larry Kao, GM, Manhattan Textile and Garment 
Corp., 19 May 2009). 
In the early days of Cambodia‘s garment industry, working conditions were poor. 
Workers had to pay brokers‘ fees to get jobs and were then kept in a form of debt 
bondage (Pastor, 2005).  Forced overtime, illegal pay deductions and child labor were 
common, and many workers were paid below the minimum wage (Pastor, 2005; Polaski, 
2004).  In 1996 the first independent and opposition-oriented textile and garment sector 
union was formed, the Free Trade Union of Workers of the Kingdom of Cambodia 
(FTUWKC, or FTU).
30
  The FTU not only began organizing heavily exploited workers, 
but also communication with the international labor movement.  This, among a number 
of other factors, led to a more widespread understanding of the often abusive nature of 
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 Chea Vichea was the union‘s president. He was murdered in 2004, and the FTU continues to call for a 
thorough investigation of the case (see the FTU‘s website, http://www.ftuwkc.org/). 
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employment in Cambodia‘s nascent textile and garment industry, leading to anti-
sweatshop campaigns in the US and EU targeting prominent brands and retailers whose 
suppliers were found to be violating basic labor standards in Cambodian factories 
(Polaski, 2004; Wells, 2007). 
 
US-Cambodia Trade Agreement and ―Ethical Production‖  
The question of why the US is interested in pursuing a bilateral trade agreement 
with Cambodia is an important question with political implications.  Cambodia is a 
unique political, economic and social context following years of war and destruction, and 
with the opening to massive aid and technical assistance to rebuild the country.  The 30 
years of war in Cambodia from the late 1960s to late 1990s left Cambodia‘s state and 
society uniquely eviscerated and without a clear center of political gravity or autonomous 
development agenda.  Cambodia‘s specific history of social struggles, war and political 
disintegration is a key factor in understanding why Cambodia entered the global economy 
from a position of weakness. Cambodia had few domestic sources of resistance to 
international and/or neo-liberal policies that can hold sway in pushing for a selective 
insertion in the global economy.  
Given that Cambodia‘s economy was a relative blank canvas, this provided 
‗exciting opportunities‘ in developmental experimentation for foreign governments, 
international organizations and non-governmental organizations who were granted wide 
latitude to operate.  This created much dependency and lack of autonomy in the socio-
economic development process, a situation few other countries have been willing to 
accept.  (This situation is changing, as addressed in Chapters 5 and 6). 
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In June 1998, labor groups in the US petitioned their government to review the 
alleged abuse of workers‘ rights in Cambodian factories (Polaski, 2004).  Cambodia 
provided an opportunity for the Clinton administration to prove that trade and export-
oriented policies could reduce poverty and play a central role in the development process. 
Cambodia became a ―showcase‖ for other least-developed countries entering the global 
economy.  Bilateral quota negotiations became an avenue for this approach. The 
negotiations were concluded in 1999, and the 3-year US-Cambodia Textile and Apparel 
Trade Agreement (TATA) was signed. It was extended for another three years, ending on 
the same day as the phase-out of the multifibre arrangement (MFA) on 31 December 
2004.
31
   
The TATA specified that if the US made a positive determination that working 
conditions in Cambodia‘s textile and garment sector ―substantially comply‖ with 
international labor standards, then annual quota limits could increase by 14% through 
2001 and up to 18% annually through 2004.  The TATA was unique in that it linked 
annual increases in market access to improvements in labor rights.  This policy was an 
experiment creating positive incentives for such improvements, rather than negative 
incentives which are the norm under the GSP and free trade agreements (Wells, 2007).  
Also in 1999, a 42-month EU-Cambodia Textile Agreement was signed, which gave 
Cambodia duty- and quota-free access to EU markets for textile and garment products 
subject to rules of origin requirements being met under the EU‘s Everything But Arms 
GSP (Bargawi, 2005). Quota restrictions to Canada were also removed in 2002. 
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 The MFA, also known as the Agreement on Textile and Clothing, governed the world trade in 
textiles and garments from 1974 through 2004, imposing quotas on the amount developing countries could 
export to industrialized countries, particularly the US and EU.  It came under the jurisdiction of the WTO 
with the Uruguay Round.   
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Along with TATA, an independent but complimentary factory monitoring project, 
later named ―Better Factories Cambodia,‖ was established in 2001 involving the ILO, the 
Cambodian government, garment manufacturers (through the Garment Manufacturers‘ 
Association of Cambodia or GMAC), and trade unions.
 
 Its initial purpose was to inform 
ongoing US quota allocation decisions.  This was deemed necessary, as Miller and 
colleagues (2007) point out, since in the early years of TATA, US decisions on quota 
allocation were based on very limited data and reporting.  This leads to the conclusion 
that implementation of the labor rights component of the project was secondary to the 
politics of ensuring continuation of the program (Miller et al., 2007; also see Kolben, 
2004).
32
 The ILO leads the project and it has been funded by the US Department of 
Labor, USAID, Agence Francaise de Developpement, the GMAC, the Cambodian 
government and international buyers including Gap and H&M.  The ILO Better Factories 
Cambodia monitoring program is the first and only project of its kind.  The scope of the 
ILO project has expanded beyond monitoring to creating services to help the industry 
improve working conditions, whilst at the same time enhancing quality and productivity.  
A range of trainings and resources are offered, from simple good practice sheets to an 
intensive 12-month modular training program.  The topics covered include workplace 
cooperation and dispute resolution, occupational health and safety, working conditions, 
globalization and change processes (ILO, 2005b).
 33
 
Since the implementation of TATA it has been upheld as a model of sustainable 
development via trade and garment manufacturing (see Chiu, 2007; Polaski, 2004, 2009; 
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 For a more thorough analysis of the Better Factories Program, see Arnold and Toh 2010; Polaski 2004 
and 2009; Miller et al 2007; Wells 2007.  
33
 See the Better Factories Cambodia website at http://www.betterfactories.org/ilo for details. 
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Wells, 2007; World Bank, 2009), and it is a model expanding to 12-14 other countries 
including Vietnam, Jordan, Haiti, Indonesia, China, Egypt and Bangladesh under the 
ILO‘s global Better Work programme, which started in 2008 (Interview, Conor Boyle, 
ILO Better Work Programme, 24 February 2009).  Sally Paxton of the ILO notes that, 
―The experience of Cambodia is one example of a successful strategy, the underlying 
principles of which could provide inspiration for the elaboration of a global strategy to 
promote fair globalization in the post-MFA environment‖ (ILO, 2005a).  But, with more 
direct exposure to the demands of mobile capital in the textile and garment industry a 
more pronounced layering of interests is occurring, in which Cambodia‘s discursive 
―labor advantage‖, in terms of compliance with international standards, loses its lustre.  
Under TATA and the Better Factories Cambodia model the competitive edge for 
Cambodia is its gradual implementation and compliance with international labor 
standards.  This is a unique arrangement in at least two ways. First, the Cambodian state 
defers regulation of labor relations to international institutions, particularly the ILO, to 
attract international investors as a competitive advantage.  As such, Cambodia is 
promoted as an ―ethical sourcing option‖ for global buyers and consumers. In many 
countries basic labor rights are regularly suppressed in order to increase competitiveness 
and investment, for example through regulations prohibiting rights to freedom of 
association, as is clearly the case in Mae Sot.  Other examples include China‘s and 
Vietnam‘s restricting trade union activity to a single, state controlled organization to 
promote political stability.  
Second, the initiation of TATA promotes a transition to deregulation of export 
and import barriers, while at the same time the model promotes the regulation of 
68 
 
production under tripartite functions – engaging government, employers and trade unions. 
Although some analysts argue that the Fordist modality has finished in the production of 
commodities (Negri, 2008), in the case of Cambodia this ―neo-Fordist‖ TATA-ILO 
arrangement is being implemented as a hegemonic mode of social organization.  
Accordingly, TATA opened the opportunity to foster economic trade unionism based on 
Western models that discourage political or social movement unionism in favor of co-
operative economic arrangements between capital and labor.  Under this arrangement, 
formal employment in the factory became the dominant form of work in Cambodia under 
the labor law.  Furthermore, the terminology of industrial relations, such as collective 
bargaining, collective agreement, workers‘ council, arbitration council, and tripartite 
committee, developed on the basis of the particular historical arrangement of capitalist-
labor relations in the West, were embedded in Cambodia‘s newly formed industrial 
relations system (Chang, 2009).  
These initiatives can also be seen as contradictory to neo-liberal trends of the 
1990s.  The ILO-led Better Factories Cambodia program is in some respects an instance 
of creating rigidities in labor relations which capital has reduced or eliminated in 
numerous other countries under the pressure of neo-liberal reform (see Harvey, 2003).  
Despite this, I find that promoting trade unions and state involvement in regulating labor 
relations does not necessarily entail empowered workers.  Rather, textile and garment 
firms are embedded in structures and institutions which allow much flexibility in terms of 
labor relations, largely due to co-opted trade unions which struggle against independent 
workers‘ movements (see Chapter 3).  In addition, there are numerous legal loopholes 
that facilitate union busting and other efforts that reduce the potential for a united labor 
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movement promoting social interests both inside and outside of the factory.  This process 
is enhanced by the informalization of labor through the use of fixed duration work 
contracts (see Chapter 3).  Hence, within the ―neo-Fordist‖ structures established in the 
Better Factories program and the TATA are highly atomized trade unions and 
disempowered workers with low wages and insecure jobs.  I now turn to post-MFA trade 
trends and the implications for Cambodia‘s position in global production networks. 
 
Implications for Garments in Cambodia 
From 1999 through 2004 Cambodia‘s garment exports were largely shielded from 
direct international competition due to quotas that restricted exports to major markets 
from China, Vietnam and other major producing countries. US‘ and EU‘s WTO 
safeguard quotas on many of China‘s top garment exports extended Cambodia‘s 
‗protection‘ through 2008.34  This helped dampen the fact that Cambodia‘s textile and 
garment industry is not deemed competitive in terms of price, quality and speed to market 
(USAID, 2007), and China and Vietnam are considered primary competitive threats to 
Cambodia‘s industry.  With the elimination of quotas and more direct exposure to global 
competition Cambodia is relying less on its labor monitoring for a competitive advantage 
and increasingly on managing more generalized competitive factors such as productivity, 
reducing transaction time and cost, streamlining regulatory burdens and the like (Amin, 
2004; EIC, 2007; USAID, 2005, 2007).   
Table 5: US Garment Import Value, Top Ten, Million US$ 
Country 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
World 56,963 64,768 68,713 71,630 73,923 71,568 
                                                          
34
 See Arnold and Toh 2010 for  more thorough analysis of the implications of safeguard quotas.  
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China 5,594 8,928 15,143 18,518 22,745 22,923 
Vietnam 895 2,562 2,725 3,222 4,359 5,223 
Indonesia 2,042 2,403 2,875 3,670 3,981 4,028 
Mexico 7,424 6,685 6,078 5,297 4,523 4,015 
Bangladesh 1,883 1,978 2,372 2,914 3,103 3,442 
India 1,902 2,217 2,976 3,187 3,170 3,073 
Honduras 2,440 2,673 2,622 2,440 2,511 2,604 
Cambodia 1,042 1,429 1,713 2,136 2,425 2,376 
Thailand 1,719 1,799 1,808 1,840 1,766 1,668 
El Salvador 1,675 1,720 1,619 1,408 1,486 1,534 
Source: Compiled from US OTEXA (2010) 
Note: Figures are for ―Notional Category 1: Total Apparel Imports (MFA).‖ Figures including textiles 
differ significantly. 
 
The global recession that began in late 2008 hit Cambodia‘s garment industry 
particularly hard (see Table 5).  Commonly cited reasons for Cambodia‘s export 
downturn are not different from the so-called non-competitive factors regularly discussed 
since the end of quotas, including: poor infrastructure, low workforce productivity, high 
frequency of strikes, high utility costs, high costs at customs and other ―administrative‖ 
costs (usually referring to corruption), a small domestic market (meaning nearly 100% of 
garment products are exported), insufficient trade facilitation and access to credit, and 
―dollarisation,‖ where a rising US dollar hurts competitiveness.  Cambodia‘s garment 
factories also have a structural disadvantage as 60% are cut-make-trim (CMT) or 
assembly factories, usually subsidiaries of corporations with operations in other countries 
(Kang et al., 2009; Yamagata, 2006).  This means that nearly all inputs must be imported 
and factories do not engage in higher value added nodes of value chains. Combined, these 
factors lead to higher prices in Cambodia. Table 6 shows that average prices for 
Cambodia‘s exports to the US are significantly higher than ―competitors‖ relying on 
CMT orders, including Bangladesh and Honduras. Together with the heavy concentration 
on the US market in a few product categories, these factors mean declining orders in 
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2008-2009.  In this context SEZs are emerging as an alternative manufacturing base to 
address these and other issues (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Table 6: Three Tiers of US Textile and Apparel Suppliers, US$ per Square Metre 
Equivalent (sme), 2008 
High price  
(over $4 per sme) 
Italy ($7.96 per sme) 
Medium price 
(between $2.50 to $4.00 per sme) 
Vietnam ($2.99 per sme); Indonesia ($2.63 
per sme); Cambodia ($2.62 per sme) 
Low price 
(under $2.50 per sme) 
Pakistan ($1.05 per sme); China ($1.59 per 
sme); Honduras ($1.93 per sme); 
Bangladesh ($2.13 per sme) 
 Source: Textile Outlook International (2009: 143). 
In summary, producers in Cambodia are generally lagging in price, delivery time 
and quality demanded by buyers.  Labor compliance problems, or implementation of 
basic labor standards, are also becoming more pronounced, particularly with the 
increasing use of fixed duration contract workers and prevalence of industrial disputes 
(see Chapter 3).  Combined, these factors complicate notions that Cambodia is taking the 
―high road‖ to improving work conditions and applying labor standards to maintain a 
competitive advantage (ILO, 2005a; World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2009a).   
 
Conclusions 
In Southeast Asia comparatively low-cost large-scale export production has 
boomed in urban and peri-urban factory zones, including the Bangkok vicinity and 
Phnom Penh.  These export platforms, once the main sites of workplace abuses, are 
increasingly regulated through central state institutions and international actors, but are 
still problematic in terms of meeting minimum standards of health, safety, wages, and 
benefits.  Border areas have, or are, emerging as cost-minimizing, de-regulated, and 
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flexibly organized industrial zones expanding through the agencies of state and private-
sector-supported SEZs and industrial areas.  One consequence is the development of 
production networks increasingly dependent on the ability to mobilize and marshal large 
labor flows of young, primarily female, workers from Burma and rural Cambodia.   
This chapter demonstrated that the regulation of industrial relations in 
Cambodia‘s textile and garment industry has evidenced a unique ensemble of state, trade 
unions, private sector and international institutions.  A prominent aspect of the industry 
was the US-Cambodia Textile and Apparel Trade Agreement (TATA, 1999-2004).  
TATA bound increasing quotas to the US market with improvements in labor standards, 
and from 2001 the ILO began monitoring factories to inform these decisions.  TATA and 
the ILO‘s Better Factories Cambodia program are significant political-economic 
experiments for several reasons.  Perhaps most importantly they promote Cambodia‘s 
textile and garment industry‘s niche as an ―ethical producer‖ in a highly competitive 
global industry.  The ILO program embeds tri-partite structures and in the process 
attempts to embed ‗factory labor‘ as the ideal form of labor, particularly in terms of law 
and state administration of labor regulations.   
Despite these efforts, the Cambodian state and private sector are struggling to 
maintain investment in basic nodes of the textile and garment industry after rapid growth 
over a ten year period.  Costs in the Phnom Penh vicinity are considered high from a 
global production network perspective.  This includes high costs of electricity (due to the 
lack of a power grid in Cambodia), corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy and a high 
proportion of trade unions that complicate industrial relations.  In this context the ‗clean 
labor advantage‘ of Cambodia is waning in prominence.  Industrial and economic 
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diversification is taking on a sense of urgency with the loss of garment orders in 2008-
2010.  One reaction to this situation is the promotion of special economic zones along 
Cambodia‘s borders with Vietnam and Thailand and near Cambodia‘s major port in 
Sihanoukville.  These zones both link Cambodia to the GMS, and address some of the 
‗competitiveness‘ issues facing industry.   
It is in this area that Thailand‘s ‗migrant economy‘ converges with general 
patterns in Cambodia.  One of the most prominent hubs for manufacturers seeking 
migrant workers is Mae Sot.  It emerged in the mid-1990s as a low-cost sourcing option 
due primarily to the abundant supply of labor from Burma.  It is a quintessential 
sweatshop and it allows many producers in Thailand to maintain globally competitive 
production networks in-country.  This chapter has demonstrated that border areas in 
Thailand and the sub-region in general are critical aspects of the pattern to embed low-
value, low-skill and low-productivity production networks and informalized labor 
relations in the economy.  Rather than looking at Mae Sot and the borders as an exception 
to Thailand‘s national trends, I find in the border economies a reflection of the broader 
national and sub-regional economy.  Going forward, rather than portraying migrants as a 
threat to Thais job security, I instead suggest that informalized labor arrangements are 
being introduced and reinforced in many sectors of the economy.  This has important 
implications for how we conceptualize ‗peripheral‘ areas like Mae Sot in the regional and 
global economy.  In other words, I move toward a conceptualization in which mobile, 
flexible, informalized and feminized wage laborers and peripheral geographic borders are 
no longer at fringes of the expanding global economy, but increasingly at its heart (Hardt 
and Negri 2009). 
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Chapter 3  
Policing Migrants and „Better Factories‟: Informalizing Labor in Global 
Production Networks
35
 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter demonstrated that there is no single political economy in the 
GMS.  This gives rise to diverse local labor regimes and labor politics.  This chapter turns 
to institutions and governance practices embedding and enabling the informalization of 
labor.  These processes are unevenly established in different national and sub-national 
contexts.  I deepen analysis of one aspect of the labor regime in Thailand (Mae Sot) and 
Cambodia (Bavet), the state regulation of labor in terms of legislation on contracts, 
wages, collective bargaining, freedom of association and the like.
36
  In particular, the 
focus is the implementation of informalized labor practices in Thailand and Cambodia.  
While the two cases demonstrate certain trends in managing labor, they are not 
homogenized efforts on the part of states and capital.  Accordingly, there is no single 
response from workers and labor organizers.
37
  A result is different working classes that 
                                                          
35
Portions of this chapter draw on: Arnold, D and Toh H S (2010) ―A Fair Model of Globalisation? Labour 
and Global Production in Cambodia,‖ Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 40, No. 3, forthcoming; and 
Arnold, D. and J. Pickles (2010) ―Global Work, Surplus Labor, and the Precarious Economies of the 
Border,‖ Antipode, forthcoming. 
36
 I will not address another key aspect of Buroway‘s labor regime, the social reproduction of labor power.  
37
Both are deeply impacted by social and political histories of anti-modernism in Cambodia under the 
Khmer Rouge and the ensuing socialist era of the 1980s, and isolationism and self-sufficiency ‗socialism‘ 
of Burma from 1962-1988 and the ongoing dictatorship. 
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are neither pure combativity, nor pure passive dispersal, or a pure institutionalized 
apparatus (see Lee C K 2007).    
 This chapter first describes the context for Burmese migrant workers and labor 
organizers in Mae Sot.  A central aspect is a broader state project in which migrant 
workers are racialized and their civic rights are peripheralized through the construction of 
a distinct policing regime of ‗partial border citizenship.‘  This means, in short, that the 
state, particularly the police, national security agencies, and border guards work together 
to regulate nearly every aspect of migrant workers‘ lives to create and sustain the 
conditions for a regime of flexible and informalized labor that enables labor intensive 
industries to survive in the region.  Indeed, precisely because the dependence of the 
regional economy on migrant labor is so large, the mechanisms of control and the 
deployment of state apparatuses are ‗necessarily‘ extensive.  It is, in short, a context 
where workers‘ organizations are suppressed, often violently.  Despite this, Mae Sot is 
arguably the center of the Burmese migrant workers‘ movement to promote their rights in 
Thailand.   
The second part of the chapter focuses on Bavet and Cambodia.  Unlike Mae Sot 
Cambodia has witnessed the promotion of trade unions and tripartitism under the Better 
Factories Cambodia program.  One of the results of the TATA and ILO program is a 
proliferation of trade unions.  ILO statistics count 440 active unions in 314 factories in 
2008.
38
  In 2008 there were 24 union federations in the garment sector for its 350,000 
workers, compared to one in all of Thailand for over one million registered employees in 
the textile and garment industry.  (Including unregistered, home-based workers the 
                                                          
38
 Conor Boyle from the ILO points out this discrepancy results since GMAC statistics tally every union, 
active or inactive, from the date factories open operations, while the ILO counts active unions (interview, 
24 February 2009). 
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numbers in Thailand are roughly 1.4 million).  Sixty percent of garment workers in 
Cambodia are union members and this is usually considered to demonstrate high levels of 
worker representation.  However, in the Cambodia context the effectiveness of having so 
many unions is questionable, leaving many unions weak, under-funded, competing with 
one another, and subject to corruption and political interference by the ruling Cambodia 
People‘s Party.   
There are other important shifts in Cambodia.  The implementation of fixed 
duration contracts in Cambodia is an example of the state‘s insertion in the social realm 
of labor regulation once defined by the ILO regulated tri-partite model in the garment 
industry.  Since 2005 many jobs in garments and other light manufacturing industries are 
being informalized, meaning contracts are increasingly on a short-term basis resulting in 
lower levels of job security.  Thus, there are a number of internal changes occurring in 
the Phnom Penh-centered garment industry and labor movement.  These changes are part 
of an external push to border industrialization led by SEZs.  Here labor relations are 
apparently informalized, trade union activity is restricted in ways that are similar to Mae 
Sot, but play out differently in important ways.  
        
Race and Regulation on the Border 
Mae Sot‘s modern economy is closely linked with labor recruitment along the 
Thai-Burma border to take advantage of the abundance of workers generated by the 
political and economic hardships in Burma.  Profitability in Mae Sot depends to a large 
extent on these reserves of migrant workers.  Mae Sot has been the focus of numerous 
studies over the past five years, and the difficulties facing Burmese migrant workers are 
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fairly well documented.  These studies range from technologies of control in maintaining 
low cost, disciplined workers in a regime of ‗partial border citizenship‘ (Pitch 2007) to 
studies focusing on migrant workers‘ struggles and attempts at empowerment in global 
supply chains (Arnold 2004, 2007; Arnold and Hewison 2006; Khun Aung and Soe Lin 
Aung 2009; Yimprasert and Hveem 2006), to studies which document forced and child 
labor, trafficking and other extreme forms of exploitation and human rights abuses 
(Federation of Trade Unions-Burma 2007; Human Rights Watch 2010a, Pearson 2005).  
A common thread in these studies is that egregious labor rights violations are often the 
norm in Mae Sot.  Another commonality is specific tactics and mechanisms are utilized 
by both employers and state officials to maintain a highly vulnerable and disempowered 
workforce at the border.   
Work conditions for Burmese in Mae Sot factories are, in general, extremely 
poor.  Pay is well below the minimum wage, work hours are between 12-16 hours and 
more in peak periods, a majority of workers living in factory dorms are not allowed to 
leave the compound, sexual abuse is common and there are a myriad of other problems.  
Even under these conditions, migration from Burma to Thailand has expanded 
considerably since 1988.  Prior to 1988, Burma‘s economy declined under the ‗Burmese 
Road to Socialism‘, with uprisings in 1988 and again in 2007.  After refusing to 
recognize election results in 1990, the Burma Socialist Program Party reformulated into 
the State Law and Order Reconciliation Council, which led to a thawing of tensions with 
Thailand and an opening of its economy and borders to foreign investment.  Burma 
ceased to be considered a military and communist threat.  Instead, it was deemed a 
strategic source of natural resources including hydro-electric power, teak, gems, natural 
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gas and oil, and a source of low-cost workers throughout Thailand.  However, attitudes 
towards migrant workers from Burma have changed only slowly, particularly where they 
are based on much longer-standing national traditions of antagonism. 
 
The ―Evil and aggressive neighbor‖ 
Migrant workers face xenophobia and nationalism in many countries, the 
Burmese in Thailand are no exception, and are subject to deeply embedded historical 
perceptions of them being an evil and aggressive neighbor.  For example, the Thai state 
began to view neighboring countries as areas of economic opportunity for Thai capitalism 
(Thongchai 2005), with Thailand as the center of the GMS.  However, the ‗Burma as the 
traditional enemy trope‘ remains abundant in current discourse (ibid).  If racialization 
describes a social process of categorization which makes group relations appear as if they 
were natural and unchangeable, the political project of racialization in Thai history has 
represented Burmese people through a singular national identity as having negative social 
and personal traits.  Through historical texts such as ―Thai Rop Phama‖ (Our Wars with 
the Burmese) by Prince Damrong Rajanubhab (first published in 1917) these national 
characteristics have been reprocessed and studied by Thai students at nearly every level 
of education.  Sunet and Than Tun (1995) contend that: 
Through school textbooks nationalist governments, especially military regimes, 
successfully instilled in the minds of the young the image of the Burmese as an 
enemy of the Thai nation…the political purpose underlying this nationalist 
propaganda relates to an attempt of the government to stir up a sense of 
nationalism and at the same time legitimize their ruling authority by claiming that 
they, like their brave ancestors who fought against the Burmese, take as their 
primary concern the task of protecting the nation, religion and monarchy from 
external invasion…  [This is an] outcome of political maneuvers by the Thai 
government to stabilize their power and authority and secure their own interests.  
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One consequence has been the easy justification of intolerable conditions for 
migrants, and especially for those working in low-skilled, low-wage labor intensive 
industries.  Thus, in the recent 2006 provincial decrees in Phuket, Samut Sakhon, Surat 
Thani, Ranong, Pang-Nga and Rayong ‗the migrant‘ found herself subject to further 
regulation and racialization through group-specific curfews and prohibitions on the use of 
cell phones, on migrant workers owning or riding motorcycles, and on five or more 
migrants from gathering for activities that are not for the express purpose of religion, 
tradition or custom.
39
  On 26 October 2007, Mr. Veerayuth Yeamampar, Governor of 
Samut Sakhorn Province, stepped up the restrictions by circulating a letter stating that all 
employers in his province must forbid migrants from holding cultural events, stating 
that:
40
   
…They [migrant workers] are also now trying to organise cultural performances 
at all occasions and fairs, which is not suitable.  These activities should not be 
supported because it will make the community feel that these people are the 
owners of the community, and could create security problems.  Also, it is 
contradictory to the government‘s objective for them to be just temporary 
workers…Hence we would like to ask every place of employment and factory to 
control and monitor those foreign workers who are under your responsibility to 
see that they behave and work according to the law strictly.  If they violate the 
law, they will be seriously punished.  We should not allow them to organise 
cultural ceremonies at any event at all. 
 
A particular challenge for numerous Thai government officials has been how to 
balance these longstanding traditions that denigrate the Burmese while at the same time 
acceding to the demands of employers.  In 1992-94, the Thai state began formally 
registering migrant workers from neighboring countries.  From 1992-2000 migrants were  
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 http://www.mapfoundationcm.org/Eng/PDF%20File/provincialdecree.pdf (accessed 29 November 2007). 
40
 A significant proportion of migrant workers in Samut Sakhorn are ethnic Mon.  There are also large 
populations of Mon in Eastern Thailand who are Thai citizens and perform many of the same cultural 
ceremonies as the migrant Mon.   
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Figure 13: A funeral procession for a murdered Burmese migrant in Mae Sot 
 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
allowed to register in select industries and provinces and from 2001 all industries and 
provinces were included.  Officially, migrants are registered with a single employer and 
are thus bound to a particular workplace, with Province/District work permits being 
renewed on a 3, 6 or 12 month basis.  Those with work permits are considered 
temporarily ‗legal‘.  After the permit ends workers must register again or they will be 
considered illegal and subject to deportation.  In practice, registered migrants have 
comprised a minority of the total migrant labor force since the inception of registration 
systems.  Few if any factories register all of their workers, if they register any.
41
   
For workers in this border region work means work is without clear-cut 
employment contracts or social protections, or informalized.  This has direct implications 
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 Over the past decade registration numbers have varied between roughly 90,000 in 1998 to the 2008 level 
of 700,000, peaking at about 850,000 in 2004. 
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for how workers organize to challenge these arrangements, and on the strategies of labor 
organizations.  These informalized working and legal conditions for Burmese migrants in 
Mae Sot have led to the emergence of distinct groups of local actors and associated 
power dynamics.  One such group is organized labor and the trade unions that represent 
them.  Migrant workers lack legal rights to form trade unions and illegal and unregistered 
workers have few social or civil protections.  Under the Labor Protection Act only Thai 
nationals may form unions, but migrant workers may only join unions formed and led by 
Thais.  However, less than 4% of Thai workers are members of trade unions and a small 
number of migrants are members of only one dock-workers trade union.  The situation 
for migrant workers is exacerbated by the official position of Thai trade unions.  As 
recently as the early 2000s most fractions of Thai labor were united by anti-migrant 
sentiment, seeing in the migrant worker a threat to job security and national security (i.e., 
influx of drugs, disease, violence, etc.).  However, in recent years addressing nationalist 
and racialized sentiments has become a priority for many in the Thai labor movement 
who are interested in promoting the rights of migrants (interview June 17, 2008, Thai 
Labour Campaign, Centre for Aids Rights and Map Foundation).  According to Professor 
Voravidh Charoenloet (interview June 5, 2008), one of the leading labor economists 
working in Thailand, the perception among organized labor groups that migrants are a 
threat to jobs are changing, as many organizations, particularly trade unions, NGOs and 
others, now argue that migrants should have the same rights as Thais (in terms of pay, 
freedom of association, collective bargaining, etc.) and that the trade unions need to move 
beyond their traditional organizing strategies to speak to migrant problems and desires.  
That said, it is difficult for Thai unions to negotiate on behalf of their own members, 
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much less migrants who are outside of the tri-partite framework.  Given migrants 
mobility between jobs and through different sectors, it is difficult to imagine Thai unions‘ 
efforts to go beyond lobbying the central government for equal rights.  
Figure 14: Burmese migrant workers filing compensation claim forms 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
Policing Migrants  
In Mae Sot migrant workers must also deal with the local police, border police 
and other state authorities such as the National Security Council who are vigilant in 
enforcing the fact that workers often lack registration rights or have the proper 
identification.  In fact, the local police, border police and military are the most powerful 
actors in the region.  With a preponderance of illegal and unregistered workers, and with 
few actionable rights protecting them, workers fall ready victims to the police who are 
able to extort money from them and from the factory owners who employ ‗illegal‘ or 
unregistered workers.  Annual registration fees are 3,980 Thai baht (roughly $117).  
Workers cannot afford this, so the fee is paid by employers and deducted throughout the 
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term of employment, usually one year in garments with three to six month permits for 
seasonal employment such as agriculture.  This has several implications.  Employers do 
not want to lose the workers before they have repaid the fee, so most keep the permit and 
give a photocopy to workers.  When these workers are outside the facility in the 
community they are, as a result, particularly vulnerable to local police.  Workers found 
without their permit (whether a photocopy or those not registered) must pay a bribe, 
between 100-200 baht (Interview, garment workers, June 8 and 10, 2008).  Those not 
able to pay the bribe may be taken to jail.  From there the worker is either released to 
employers or to someone who can produce the registration card.  If no registration can be 
produced, they are deported to Myawaddy, Burma.   
Figure 15: Burmese migrants waiting to return to factory work 
 
Photo: Junya Yimprasert 
In this regime of policing managers are able to exercise despotic management 
controls over workers, they are easily able to constrain their daily movement, and illegal 
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or unregistered workers can – as a result – be readily locked in factory compounds and 
allowed to move about the community only at certain times like days off or the monthly 
pay-day.  Their difficult situation is furthermore compounded by the Federation of Thai 
Industries-Tak Chapter which has prevented the local Department of Labor Protection 
and Welfare from exercising its legal responsibilities of oversight and workplace 
compliance (Arnold 2007 and Arnold and Hewison 2006).    
Taken together, factories and workers constitute a form of trans-border production 
system that constantly fluctuates between what is legal and what is illegal.  Few if any 
factories report and register their full workforce to the Ministry of Labor, making them 
vulnerable to investigation or raids by the police.  A significant proportion of Mae Sot 
factories are on the fringes or bottom of global production networks, well beyond the 
scope of CSR and monitoring initiatives prevalent in certain supply chains of the global 
garment industry.  Several cases in Mae Sot of unauthorized production for major brands, 
including Tommy Hilfiger, have received public attention in recent years (Arnold and 
Hewison 2006; Junya and Hveem 2005), and one consequences has been that authorized 
producers of branded apparel that outsource production to Mae Sot must keep this 
unauthorized production ‗hidden‘.  Reputation conscious brands do not want their names 
associated with exploited migrants from Burma.  This means that certain levels of 
production in Mae Sot are ‗illegal‘ and are not part of brand and retailer compliance 
programs.
42
   
These conditions mean that migrant workers in Mae Sot, with a work permit or 
not, enjoy few if any political or social rights.  But they also suffer in terms of their 
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 That said, the links between work conditions, corporate compliance and labor monitoring programs are 
tenuous at best, as I demonstrate in the Cambodia section of Chapter 2 and in more detail below. 
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inability to access even basic services, including basic health care.  Access to state 
medical facilities is included with a work permit.  Since a majority of workers do not 
have a permit or only have the photocopy issued by their managers, access to health care 
in hospitals is difficult.  Roughly 80 percent of workers in Mae Sot garment factories are 
women.  One major concern of these women is unwanted pregnancy.  According to Dr 
Cynthia Maung, ―Most women factory workers live on the premises the entire time, 
forbidden from venturing out.  They have no family or social life and enjoy little access 
to medical services or education programs‖ (Aye Chan Myate 2008).  Workers who do 
become pregnant are generally not given maternity leave (Interview, garment workers, 
June 8 and 10, 2008).  As their pregnancy advances they are replaced by another 
worker.
43
   
Figure 16: A dormitory for Burmese migrants at a Mae Sot factory 
 
Photo: Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association 
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 This is a violation of the law that stipulates 3 months maternity leave, lighter work for pregnant women 
in later phases and other benefits 
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The Mae Sot social economy thus combines an extreme form of authoritarian 
control of labor at the factory level and at the border with everyday uncertainty for 
workers in the town itself.  The result is a unique ensemble of border regulation, 
incentive strategies, and citizenship regimes and the emergence of what Pitch (2007: 189) 
terms ‗partial border citizenship‘: 
[border partial citizenship is]… the most flexible form of labor formation in 
contemporary Thailand.  It is the actualization or the concretization of the 
abstract labor into the registered illegal migrant worker,
44
 rather than 
proletariat or the modern industrial worker.  It is a process in which the lived 
political, economic, and social relations take place in the form of the 
registered illegal migrant worker rather than the modern form of citizen or 
immigrant that still has relatively better protection from the state and the 
economy in terms of welfare and the length of stay.  It is the process that 
makes possible labor as a real productive factor which is close to, if not 
identical to, the abstract labor in the production theory; ie, the labor is 
actually kept in the gated factory to work because they do not have any legal 
immigration category and they have to be registered with the employer 
only.
45
  
 
Challenging Employers 
Interviews conducted between 2003 and 2009 indicate that this situation may be 
changing and that workers are increasingly able to make small gains when negotiating 
with employers, including small pay raises and compensation claims.  This is a 
significant improvement on conditions from the early to mid-2000s.
46
  At that time nearly 
any form of negotiation was met with dismissal and regularly deportation.  In the past, 
physical violence and murders of activists were not uncommon (Arnold 2007).  
                                                          
44
 Pongsawat terms it ‗registered illegal migrant worker‘ since all migrants who enter Thailand outside of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with sending governments are technically ‗illegal‘. A work permit makes 
the ‗illegal‘ migrant temporarily legal.  To date Thailand has not implemented an MOU of this kind with 
Burma. 
45
 A shortcoming of Pitch‘s analysis is the failure to analyze the un-registered  migrant workers in Thailand, 
who comprise an over-whelming majority. 
46
 See Arnold 2004, Arnold and Hewison 2006, Arnold 2007, Pitch 2007, Junya and Hveem 2005). 
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Negotiations and/or confrontations with employers are for the most part livelihood 
struggles in which migrants appeal to local courts for owed wages, compensation claims 
or reinstatement.  Mae Sot was the first place in Thailand where migrant utilized the legal 
system to confront employers and it has spread both within Mae Sot and to other parts of 
Thailand.  For instance, one Burmese worker in Mae Sot who had recently begun 
participating in the activites of one migrant labor organization said that he heard workers 
got compensation, that it was a rumor going around among workers.  He said that he later 
found out it was true and realized it is possible for migrants to improve their conditions 
(interview, November 21, 2009). 
One Mae Sot based labor organization that has been most active in court cases 
and organizing workers more generally, the Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association, has 
used this recognition to scale up its efforts to other parts of Thailand.  They now have 
‗offices‘ in Bangkok and other parts of Thailand and are cooperating with Thai and other 
Burmese labor organizations in several other cities and regions of Thailand.
47
  
Importantly, it is an organization led by a leader of the 8-8-88 generation and is bringing 
migrant worker concerns into Burma‘s exile democracy movement.  In the past migrant 
workers had largely been viewed as passive victims of the regime rather than active 
agents in ongoing processes of social and economic change in the country (Maung 2008).   
In response to the unique needs of their members some Mae Sot labor organizers 
have adopted non-traditional strategies.  For instance, the organizers primary ‗members‘ 
are industrial workers, but their time in each factory and the Mae Sot area are often 
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 The organizations offices are based in the homes of members of the workers association.  
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Figure 17: The Mae Sot Labour Protection Department and the Federation of Thai 
Industries offices in 2003 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
limited.  Accordingly, theirs is a movement that includes industrial workers, but the 
strategy moves away from in-house unionism toward an approach that is network based 
and flowing rather than fixed in space.  The primary ‗containers‘ of the labor movement 
are migrants‘ social organizations that are generally based in a housing complex, or 
organized around cultural events.  Workers can now negotiate with and even confront 
employers with the assistance from Burmese workers associations, Thai and Burmese 
NGOs, and increasingly Thai trade unions.  After several years of pressure, dialogue, and 
confrontation, the Mae Sot Labor Protection Department is now more open to 
negotiations and less committed to acting in the interests of the employers (interview, 
BLSO and LPD, June 17 and 20, 2008). 
Despite these gains for migrants and their organizations, there are serious limits to 
the opportunities for migrant workers to make demands on either their employers or state 
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authorities such as the Labor Protection Department.  Moe Swe, perhaps the most 
prominent labor activist in Mae Sot and Secretary General of the Yaung Chi Oo Workers 
Association concluded that ―The problems in the factories haven‘t changed.  Workers 
still have the same problems over pay, work permits, unjust dismissal etc‖ (interview, 
October 27, 2009).  Employers seem willing to allow collective action so long as it does 
not jeopardize profit margins, excessive working hours or claim additional freedom to 
move in the community and between jobs, in other words three of the primary concerns 
for most workers.  Consequently, negotiations are usually over very small increases in 
pay, compensation claims, and other issues that do not seriously challenge the regional 
powers that employers enjoy.  Perhaps more importantly, and not surprisingly, 
negotiations among workers and employers do not address local and national state 
policies and mechanisms that maintain conditions of a vulnerable workforce in the 
region.    State authorities, including police and the border army, who are the real power 
brokers in the Mae Sot industrial area, continue to pose serious risks for Burmese 
workers and activists.  However, Mae Sot employers‘ associations and local/provincial 
political leaders are challenging the police/military national security dominance of the 
border in attempts to forward a liberal trade agenda through implementation of an SEZ 
(see Chapter 7).   
 
Cambodia: Changing Labor Relations, Beyond the Better Factories Model  
From the late 1990s garment workers became part of a new social force emerging 
from the process of economic change in Cambodia, who were a prominent part of the 
upsurge of protest of discontented groups in Phnom Penh (Hughes 2003).  The immediate 
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causes of most demonstrations and walk-outs were to do with violence or threats of 
violence against individuals, forced overtime, or, most commonly, racist slurs uttered by 
foreign managers (particularly ethnic Chinese), not issues of pay (Hughes 2007: 842).  
The opposition Sam Rainsy Party became a regular backer of workers‘ demands.  The 
Cambodian People‘s Party (CPP), recognizing the political significance of this group, 
came to form or support numerous trade unions.  
Since the upsurge in strikes and protest in the late 1990s there has been a 
proliferation of trade unions in Cambodia, largely a result of the TATA and ILO program 
discussed in Chapter 2.  While the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia 
(GMAC) counted 892 trade unions in 270 GMAC-member factories in mid-2006, the 
ILO statistics count 440 active unions in 314 factories in 2008.
48
  The ILO figure equates 
to 1.4 unions per factory, with total membership accounting for roughly 60% of the 
workers in the industry; roughly 84% of factories have at least one union. In 2008 there 
were 24 union federations in the sector for its 350,000 workers.  The number of unions 
and federations increased sharply after TATA was initiated, a majority of them 
considered aligned with the ruling Cambodian People‘s Party (CPP).  Sixty percent union 
membership is usually considered to demonstrate high levels of worker representation.  
However, in the Cambodia context the effectiveness of having so many unions is 
questionable, leaving many unions weak, under-funded, competing with one another, and 
subject to corruption and political interference by the CPP.  
From the perspective of the handful of independent federations, the Coalition of 
Cambodian Apparel Workers Democratic Union (CCAWDU) and FTU the most 
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 Conor Boyle from the ILO points out this discrepancy results since GMAC statistics tally every union, 
active or inactive, from the date factories open operations, while the ILO counts active unions (interview, 
24 February 2009). 
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prominent over the past 10-15 years, their activities promoting workers rights are 
inhibited by four factors: first, government (which often directly or indirectly supports 
―friendly‖ unions); second, employers and the GMAC; third, the numerous pro-capital 
unions that contend with independent and other unions for representation in factories; and 
fourth, the mafia-unions that extort money from both employers and members.
49
  
The implications of this situation are several.  First, despite high union 
membership, basic rights are often neglected or abused.  For example, pay is often not 
transparent and below the official minimum wage, set at $56 per month in 2009, freedom 
of association is regularly denied, and, since 2005, employers more regularly use daily or 
short-term workers, who are reluctant or unable to promote their rights whether 
individually or as union members.  Second, and related, the high number of federations 
and plant-level unions makes it difficult for ‗genuine‘ unions to promote the rights of 
their members.  Competition and conflict among the unions and the national federations 
limits their effectiveness.  Third, the proliferation of unions and federations is associated 
with the rise unions as businesses.  Running a union can be lucrative as corrupt unions 
can seek kick backs from employers and ―fundraise‖ in other ways. Fourth, an atomised 
and corrupted labor movement loses political effectiveness.  Such unions and federations 
do not pose a serious challenge to the ruling CPP; an important consideration as textile 
and garments is the most highly organized sector in Cambodia.  CCAWDU, has claimed 
that the CPP is also encouraging the formation of friendly federations to prove that 
opposition/independent federations are a minority and do not represent the workers 
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 The ILO has categorized unions as ―A‖ and ―B.‖ A unions are considered pro-CPP while the B category 
are opposition unions, even though most of the B unions are not active supporters of the opposition Sam 
Rainsy Party or the CPP, such as CCAWDU.  In reality, however, there are other categories that I have 
listed. 
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(interview, CCAWDU, May 2006).  In addition, unions are used during elections to 
garner support for political parties. 
For activist workers and trade unionists, there are several other problems faced 
that inhibit their daily activities.  Most serious has been the murders of three FTU trade 
union leaders, including FTU President Chea Vichea, since 2004.  Activists also face 
violence including assault and intimidation. Such threats are often associated with 
collective bargaining.  For example, in June 2007 the president of a union federation was 
threatened by thugs during high-profile negotiations over labor rights violations at a 
factory producing for a major European buyer (interviews, June 2007).  Employers will 
also use legal threats against unions.  For example, in 2007, an employer pressed criminal 
charges against CCAWDU for ―inciting workers to go on strike‖ (Gregoratti and Miller, 
2009). 
In summary, despite high levels of unionization, trade unions largely struggle to 
maintain representation at the factory level.  Union leaders are also overwhelmed with 
court cases, arbitration, disputes, in addition to participation in a host of trainings, 
workshops and related matters.
50
  This is a critical factor preventing them from dedicating 
time and resources toward becoming more prominent social and political forces 
representing the interests of their members both inside and outside of the factory.  In 
cases where union activists become prominent political opposition forces they are more 
susceptible to violence or even death, as was the case with Chea Vichea.  
 
Informalizing Work 
                                                          
50
 I (half-jokingly) told one friend, the vice-president of a garment federation, that his union needs to take a 
training on how to implement all the trainings he and his colleagues undertake. 
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Under Cambodian labor law there are two main categories of employment 
contract: undetermined duration contracts (UDCs) and fixed duration contracts (FDCs) 
(BFC, 2006b).  As their names suggest, UDCs are valid for an unlimited time, while 
FDCs are valid for a specific period of time, usually 3-6 months, that can legally extend 
indefinitely if workers and employers ―agree‖ on the terms.  Kang and colleagues (2009: 
18) find that FDC terms have shortened since the onset of the global recession in 2008, 
generally from 6 to 3 months.  CCAWDU stated in an interview (June 2007) that from 
2001 until 2005, a majority of workers in registered textile and garment factories were 
UDC workers with associated benefits such as sick leave and maternity leave, regular 
wages, holidays and the like.  Implementing this was a central aspect of the ILO-TATA‘s 
legitimacy.  Since the end of the quotas one of the significant changes in factories has 
been the increased use of FDCs.  According to an unpublished preliminary investigation 
conducted by the Workers‘ Rights Consortium in 2009, only one of 60 factories surveyed 
exclusively used UDC workers, while most of the remaining 60 factories surveyed either 
exclusively use FDCs or since 2005 employ all new workers on FDCs.  This indicates a 
rising tendency for work and workers to become increasingly ―informalized.‖  In this 
sense work and labor relations in Cambodia are converging with trends in much of Asia 
after a period in which, at least discursively, Cambodia was an exception to trends 
breaking down the rigidities of organized labor (Chang 2009). 
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Figure 18: Cambodian workers at a training with a local NGO 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
According to CCAWDU, the use of flexible labor began in larger knitting 
factories, employing 3,000 to 10,000 workers, primarily in Kandal Province where 
unionization rates have been highest.  FDCs have now spread to both smaller knitting 
factories and garment assembly factories of all sizes (interview, CCAWDU, January 
2009).  CCAWDU reports that if these workers on FDCs are hired as regular employees 
their time as temporary workers is not factored into their seniority and benefits.  FDCs 
have become the biggest challenge for trade union organizing and workers livelihoods, 
exacerbated by unions that are close to factory management that encourage workers to be 
on FDCs.  They do so to maintain the union‘s good relations with employers to maintain 
―competitiveness‖ in garment sourcing networks (Interview, Chea Sophal, Better 
Factories Cambodia, 12 November 2009).  Many workers wish to be on FDCs because it 
is a way to get cash in hand. For instance, FDCs are entitled to 5% severance pay for 
completion of contracts.  Also, if a 6-month contract is terminated prior to the end of the 
contract, workers are entitled to the basic wage for the duration of the contract.  
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Employers are increasingly using FDC and daily labor as part of efforts to 
maintain or increase profits and, not coincidently, to avoid the demands of organized 
workers.  Commenting on this trend to FDCs, Anne Ziebarth, legal advisor for Better 
Factories Cambodia stated that this was ―… troubling because it may indicate that they 
[employers] misunderstand the appropriate use of the different types of contracts, or that 
they are using FDCs to undermine workers‘ employment security‖ (BFC, 2006b). 
The ILO confirms that employers prefer workers on FDCs to those on UDCs 
―...because they believe that it is easier to terminate workers‖ (BFC, 2006b).  Employers 
are under no obligation to renew a flexible worker‘s contract after it has expired, but they 
are prohibited from firing FDC workers for illegitimate reasons, including anti-union 
discrimination.  Cambodia‘s labor law is clear that all workers have the right to join and 
form a union, regardless of the type of contract (Arnold, 2008).  Employers are expected 
to have a valid reason based on the worker‘s aptitude in deciding whether to terminate a 
flexible worker‘s contract.  Without a valid reason an employer is liable to pay damages 
to the worker in addition to legally mandated 5% salary compensation.  Many factories 
will not allow male workers to become regular, out of fear that they will become union 
leaders, as men are perceived to be more likely to be union activists.  Some only allow 
workers to become regular if they fulfill certain requirements, such as not asking for 
leave during their first three months of work or being unmarried (interview Womyn‘s 
Agenda for Change, March 2009).  
The expansion of FDCs is a major factor in the increase in plant level strikes in 
Cambodia since 2005 (see Figure 19).  In 2006 the ILO confirmed that, ―We are seeing 
more disputes arising over the type of contract used to employ permanent workers, with 
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workers in some factories complaining that they lack security of employment because 
they are working under repeating short-term FDCs‖ (BFC, 2006b).  Other factors 
prompting strikes include disputes over wage and entitlement payments, non-
discrimination against union activists, firing and rehiring retrenched workers and sexual 
harassment.
51
  Increasing frequency of strikes is, as noted in Chapter 2, considered a 
detriment to Cambodia‘s ―competitiveness‖ vis-à-vis China and Vietnam.  These claims 
overlook fairly widespread and often large scale strikes in China and Vietnam over the 
past five years (Clarke 2006; Lee 2006; Lee 2007).  
Figure 19: Workers at the 2009 May Day rally in Phnom Penh 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
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 It is worth noting that ―cultural issues‖ or racist slurs uttered by foreign managers, identified as a 
common reason for strikes in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Hughes 2003) are now rarely cause for 
strikes.  That being said, I have interviewed numerous Cambodian workers over the years who have said 
that cultural differences cause discomfort and tensions in the workplace. 
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Figure 20: Number of Strikes in Cambodia, 2002-08 
 
Source: Compiled from GMAC Labour Support Office (2006) and Kang et al. (2009) 
CCAWDU‘s response to FDCs is to organize them as they would other factory 
workers and negotiate with management for them to become UDCs.  FDCs pose a 
challenge to Cambodian trade unions‘ strategies given the model of in-house unionism 
that dominates the organizing landscape.  Organizing is, not surprisingly, taking place 
outside of factories as well.  CCAWDU was central in forming an informal economy 
workers association in 2006, the Independent Democratic Informal Economy Association 
(IDEA).
52
  Despite this recent initiative, CCAWDU and IDEA have not yet developed a 
coordinated strategy for organizing informalized factory workers and those in the 
informal economy (such as moto taxi drivers, street vendors etc).
53
  They have noticed 
that it is fairly common for IDEA members to have been former CCAWDU members, 
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 IDEA‘s president is a former garment factory worker and CCAWDU member who after having left 
factory work was a motorcycle taxi driver, a common informal economy occupation for men in Cambodia.   
53
 CCAWDU and IDEA along with four other federations in food and services, farming, civil servants and 
hotels/tourism formed the Cambodian Labour Confederation (CLC).  The vast majority of CLC members 
are from textile and garment factories and the food and service sector. 
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though these members generally did not know that the two organizations are connected 
prior to joining IDEA.  
The patterns described above embed – for Cambodia, this may be seen as a re-
embedding – the informal nature of labor and changes its social form in Cambodia as 
mobile capital requires flexible and disposable forms of labor (Chang, 2009).  The 
increasing prevalence of FDC workers signifies a break from the ―decent work‖ 
principles of the Better Factories Program such as job security, benefits and rights to 
freedom of association, and is one of many factors throwing the sustainability of the 
―ethical niche‖ into question, regardless of its validity.  In particular, an objective of the 
ILO program is to encourage bureaucratic solutions attained by professional negotiators 
to decrease the likelihood of disputes disrupting industrial production (Hughes, 2007).  
Use of FDC workers appears to be a strategy by employers to compete in global markets, 
yet it produces discontent among workers and independent trade unions who increasingly 
take to the streets to make demands not met through institutionalized channels.  
 
Labor and Border SEZs in Cambodia 
Of the six factories in the Manhattan SEZ in Bavet (one of five SEZs in Bavet), 
five employ workers on FDCs (interview, Kingmaker workers, November 3, 2009).  The 
one employing workers on UDCs, Kingmaker (see Chapter 4), was attempting to 
transition workers into FDCs in November 2009.  Workers at Kingmaker were resisting 
FDCs because they wanted seniority severance pay factored into the new contract, which 
Kingmaker would not accept.  The fact that Kingmaker has negotiated with workers over 
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the contract terms is likely the result of past trade union activity in the Kingmaker factory 
in Bavet.   
The Cambodian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (CFITU) is the first 
trade union to organize in the Bavet SEZs and any SEZ in Cambodia.  In the 1980s the 
CFITU was the state sanctioned trade union during Cambodia‘s Socialist era, the 
Association of Kampuchean Trade Unions.  In the early 1990s it became a governmental 
institution named the Center for Labor Development and Training.  On July 1
st
, 1999 
CFITU was founded as an ‗independent‘ trade union, formally separating from the 
government (interview, Tep Kimvannary, President of CFITU, April 22, 2009).  It still 
maintains close relations with many government officials and ministries and is 
categorized as a pro-CPP trade union.  These links proved to be critical in their efforts to 
organize in Bavet SEZs, yet it was not sufficient to maintain members.   
CFITU organizers utilized connections with Svay Rieng provincial Ministry of 
Labor and Vocational Training officials to gain access to workers in the Manhattan SEZ.  
The President of the CFITU noted that ―even with a permission letter from the provincial 
governor it was difficult to get access [to workers in the SEZ]‖ (interview, April 22, 
2009).  This political support, in addition to accessing the SEZ during an ILO supported 
training led to their organizing a union in 2008.  At its peak the union represented about 
700 of the 1,000 workers in the Kingmaker factory at the time.  Workers from Kingmaker 
said that there were a number of problems in the factory, particularly forced over-time 
and dismissal without valid reason (referring to the union leaders).  Other demands from 
workers were to increase the number of toilets in the factory.   
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The newly formed union took these complaints to the management who refused to 
negotiate.   The first union president was fired by Kingmaker shortly after the union 
election.  The union secretary left shortly afterwards due to ‗pressure‘ from the 
employers.  Remaining union leaders then consulted the Ministry of Labor official 
stationed at the SEZ is in the One Stop Service Center.  He, workers claim, pressured the 
workers to repeal their demands.  One worker noted that ―there are clear violations of 
workers‘ rights but the [labor protection] officers don‘t do anything‖ (interview, 
Kingmaker workers, November 3, 2009).  This should not come as a surprise given that 
the labor protection official‘s salary is paid by the zone administrators (see Chapter 5).  
The Kingmaker union then asked the CFITU in Phnom Penh for assistance.  On their visit 
to Bavet the CFITU members were refused access to the SEZ, despite having ‗political 
connections‘ and support from provincial officials.  In the process the union was not able 
to address the workers‘ problems, workers became increasingly fearful of union activity 
since it had led to dismissal for others, and the union ended up losing its members who 
―saw no reason to be members…since the union could not address their problems‖ (ibid).  
At the time of the interview in November 2009, only the union leaders and core activists 
remained, leaving it with less than 10 members.  They said that the situation is similar in 
Sheico, another factory in the Manhattan SEZ, where a union exists in name but does not 
function.   
In many ways this process has played out many times in factories throughout 
Cambodia.  Two things make the situation at the border different: political connections 
did not help the union organize in the factory as is common in the Phnom Penh vicinity, 
and the distance to Phnom Penh leaves the workers and unions isolated and more 
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vulnerable without support of the federations, which are all based in Phnom Penh.  
CCAWDU, for example, said that they have no intention to organize in Bavet due to the 
difficulties associated with the distance.  CFITU had an office in Bavet for a short time 
but was not able to maintain it due to costs.  
As of November 2009 the ILO‘s Better Factories program had no formal 
mechanism in place with SEZ administrators.  A Better Factories official explained that 
its monitors made one unannounced monitoring visit to the Sheico factory in the 
Manhattan SEZ which is standard protocol in the program.  The monitors were denied 
access to the SEZ by security guards and the SEZ administrators, but after some 
explanation of the Better Factories role they were allowed inside the zone (interview 
Chea Sophal, Better Factories Cambodia, November 12, 2009).  Of course, this raised 
concerns that laws are being applied differently inside the SEZs (ibid).  It was concluded, 
not surprisingly, that if this is the case then it is detrimental for industrial relations and 
would undermine any progress made nationwide under the Better Factories monitoring.   
For decades export processing zones have been no union zones, often by law but 
often through union busting practices similar to those outlined above.  From this 
perspective what is happening in Bavet is not new.  It is, however, noteworthy in a 
context such as Cambodia where trade union rights have been both discursively and 
materially prominent throughout the 2000s.  It appears that SEZs are becoming a means 
for employers to block trade union activity altogether, even those with support from the 
CPP and/or provincial officials.  In Cambodia the increasing use of fixed duration 
contract workers is an example of government-mandated lowering of labor standards to 
maintain competitiveness with lower cost sourcing options in the region. 
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Conclusions  
The implementation of fixed duration contracts in Cambodia is an example of the 
state‘s insertion in the social realm of labor regulation once defined by the ILO regulated 
tri-partite model in the garment industry.  The shift to FDC, casualization, precarity etc 
follows trends throughout Asia (Chang 2009), but is significant in Cambodia given the 
global prominence and ‗branding‘ of the ILO‘s efforts to create a model of ‗fair 
globalization.‘  Informalization of migrant and feminized labor is a part of neoliberal 
practice in the GMS which moves to reinforce and expand the state as a strong and 
autonomous subject that dominates the social field in realms including labor regimes and 
police activity (Hardt and Negri 1994).  In Mae Sot the regime of policing nearly every 
aspect of migrants‘ life both inside and outside of the factory creates and sustains the 
conditions for a regime of flexible or precarious labor that enables labor intensive 
industries to survive in the region.   
Mae Sot is a clear example of strategies to manage labor by spatial means.  
Because the dependence of the Mae Sot economy on migrant labor is so large, the 
mechanisms of control and the deployment of state apparatuses are ‗necessarily‘ 
extensive in the border area.  In Cambodia this process is only in beginning phases, at 
least in relation to SEZs.  Workers in these contexts move among different forms of 
labor, but the factory and tri-partitism are still dominant as ‗containers‘ of organizing 
strategies.  In Cambodia the TATA and Better Factories program are parts of a process 
whereby Cambodia is pulled onto the global assembly line, and ‗factory labor‘ and the 
‗formal economy‘ become ideal types for workers and the economy.  Going forward, this 
process must be broadened and deepened with enhanced ―reforms‖ in order for Cambodia 
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to maintain its position in global production networks.  The medium and longer term 
implications of these processes are not clear, yet the push for SEZs along borders and 
Cambodia‘s coastal area is gaining momentum.  
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Chapter 4  
The China Ripple Effect and Globalized Production in GMS Borderlands 
Introduction  
In late 2010 the New York Times, AP and other sources reported on the end of 
the low-cost manufacturing era that came to define popular perceptions of China‘s 
position in the global economy for nearly 30 years, examples include:  
 
―Companies brace for end of cheap made-in-China era‖ (Kurtenbach 2010) 
―Bangladesh, With Low Pay, Moves In on China‖ (Bajaj 2010)  
―Cheap labour pays dividends‖ [Phnom Penh Post] (Kunmakara 2010)  
―As China‘s Wages Rise, Export Prices Could Follow‖ (Barboza 2010)  
 
The gist of many of these and other articles is:  
 
―As costs have risen in China, long the world‘s shop floor, it is slowly losing 
work to countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam and Cambodia — at least for cheaper, 
labor-intensive goods like casual clothes, toys and simple electronics that do not 
necessarily require literate workers and can tolerate unreliable transportation systems and 
electrical grids‖ (Bajaj 2010). 
 
The previous chapter analyzed the local labor regimes required by manufacturers 
in Mae Sot/Thailand and Bavet/Cambodia.  This chapter focuses on two corporations 
from an Asia regional perspective, including changes in production costs in coastal 
China, and the adaptation of a ‗China+1(+1)‘ sourcing strategy.  I also look at 
implications of US/EU-China trade frictions.  Equally important, these are corporations 
that are ‗upgrading‘ in global supply chains, where they aim to capture more value in 
different nodes of the production process, evolving from simple assemblers to designers, 
brand manufactures, retailers and the like.  Despite this ‗upgrading‘ both companies in 
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this study continue to rely on surplus/vulnerable labor in peripheral Asia.  Thus, while 
offering employment to those in need due to lack of, or in many cases elimination of 
socio-economic opportunities in Burma and Cambodia, there is no indication that it 
means work conditions for workers employed in more recently opened factories has 
improved from conditions in longer established facilities.  
This chapter looks at global production patterns for two major corporations Top 
Form in Mae Sot and Kingmaker in Bavet.  In the early 2000s Top Form became the 
world‘s largest manufacturers of brassieres.  Kingmaker is one of the world‘s leading 
manufacturers of relatively high end branded footwear, producing for the likes of 
Clarke‘s, Skechers, Timberland and others.  The purpose of these case studies is to 
demonstrate Mae Sot and Bavet‘s links with the region and global production.  In doing 
so it shows capital that is mobile yet often embedded in production networks within 
particular countries.  For instance, in this case of Top Form China and Thailand are 
among the world‘s leading sources of brassieres, and Top Form‘s strategy for growth is 
to maintain production in these countries.  Kingmaker‘s production is concentrated in 
China and Vietnam, and the Cambodia factory is a satellite of its Vietnam operations.   
In many ways Top Form and Kingmaker are mirror images of one another.  Both 
have, to varying degrees, concentrated much of their production in coastal China since 
the 1990s to early 2000s.  More recently both have shifted production further inland to 
Jiangxi province of China due primarily to increasing costs and labor shortages in the 
Pearl River Delta.  At the same time both have expanded production to GMS border areas 
as part of their growth strategies.  Due to these and other similarities the chapter will 
focus primarily on Top Form to demonstrate the strategies of these two corporations.  
106 
 
The Top Form section is followed by a section focusing on Kingmaker to demonstrate 
some key differences that inform their decision to source from Cambodia rather than 
another GMS country or region.   
Analysts have long portrayed developing countries in Asean and other regions as 
losing out to China in manufacturing.  For instance, Walden Bello (2010a) recently 
wrote,  
Despite brave words from [Philippines president] Arroyo and other Asean leaders, 
it is much less clear how their countries will benefit from the Asean-China 
relationship. Certainly, the benefits will not come in labor-intensive 
manufacturing, where China enjoys an unbeatable edge by the constant downward 
pressure on wages exerted by migrants from a seemingly inexhaustible rural work 
force that makes an average of $285 a year. 
 
This chapter affirms Bello‘s contention that trade and economic relations among 
China and Asean are unequal, particularly in terms of production for global markets.  It 
also shows that China has come to dominate many labor-intensive, light manufacturing 
industries based largely, though certain not solely, on its low cost labor advantage.  That 
said, a central point I forward is that China‘s rural workforce is exhaustible, particularly 
those who migrate to coastal urban areas (see Lee C K 2007).  This has rebounded in 
ways that is changing the sourcing strategies of many manufacturers in China.  
Combined, the Chinese state is attempting to break its dependence on low value added 
light manufacturing industries.  Wage rates have increased significantly since 2006, value 
added tax (VAT) rebates for foreign manufacturers have decreased, and labor intensive 
manufacturers are encouraged to ‗go-out or go-west.‘  China‘s ‗unfair labor advantage‘ 
has also generated protectionist measures in two of its primary markets, the US and EU, 
in ways that have led many manufactures to adopt a China + 1 sourcing strategy, i.e. 
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production is concentrated in China plus another country, such as Vietnam, Cambodia 
etc.  These and other processes explored in this chapter induced tens of thousands of 
manufacturers to leave China since the mid-2000s.  GMS borderlands have become one 
destination for the ‗+1‘ strategy of several major Asia-based transnational manufacturers.   
 
Thailand and Top Form 
A majority, if not all past studies on garment and knitting production in Mae Sot 
have characterized factories there as sub-contractors who are ‗fly-by-night‘ or 
‗sweatshop‘ producers searching for cheap, easily controlled labor.54  Top Form is 
certainly attracted to Mae Sot for many of the reasons identified in Chapters 2 and 3.  
This section offers a more nuanced picture of Mae Sot supply chain dynamics through a 
case study of Top Form Co. ltd, a Hong Kong-based original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) manufacturer of women‘s lingerie.   
Top Form should not be considered a model or typical manufacturer in Mae Sot.  
It is likely among the 10% of exporters in Mae Sot, identified in Chapter 2, though it is 
also involved in OEM.  It is the only company, to the author‘s knowledge, that offers 
public corporate information since it is a publicly traded company.  Top Form‘s 
customers are prominent globally, and Top Form does not try to hide its production in 
Mae Sot.  The manager of Top Form Mae Sot, Michael Lurer, has been quoted in 
international media many times over the past 3-4 years, something only top officials in 
the local FTI seemed willing to do in the past.  According to Burmese activists 
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 See Arnold 2004, Arnold and Hewison 2006, Arnold 2007, Arnold and Pickles 2010, Junya and Hveem 
2005, Pitch 2007. 
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interviewed between 2004-2009, Top Form‘s work conditions are better than the norm in 
Mae Sot.  That said, Top Form follows many of the same patterns identified in previous 
chapters.  Workers‘ pay is deducted for accommodation, which as noted, is illegal and 
deflates the real wage.  According to one source ―Beds [provided in Top Form‘s 
dormitory] are in a ramshackle temporary shelter made of metal sheets until builders 
finish a big new dorm‖ (Higgins 2007).  Top Form has been taken to court in Mae Sot at 
least twice for rights violations by its workers (unjust dismissal); it lost one case.  Top 
Form also witnessed a protest by over 2,000 of its workers in December 2009.  The 
protest occurred on a Friday and included nearly all of the Top Form workers.  It began 
due to workers‘ claims that four security guards beat the relatives of two Top Form 
workers.  Initially they feared the two were dead but this proved untrue.  The following 
Monday the protest continued, but this time workers were demanding that Top Form 
rehire sacked workers and provide all workers with benefits entitled to them under the 
law (Bangkok Post 2009).   
 
Background Information on Top Form 
Top Form International Ltd is a Hong Kong based company that is mainly 
engaged in design, manufacture, distribution, wholesale and retail of ladies‘ intimate 
apparel, mainly brassieres.  Its main OEM customers include VF Corporation, Vanity 
Fair and Sara Lee in the US and Van de Velde in Europe.  In the past it sold products 
under its own brand names, Meritlux and It's me, in Hong Kong and China through 
department stores, such as Wing On and Jusco, and China through Gujin.  In 2009 during 
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the global economic crisis Top Form‘s Brand business was eliminated.55  Its production 
peaked at 61.6 million units in 2005 (Top Form 2006:5), down to 49.4 million units in 
2008 and 45.8 million units of brassieres in 2009 (Top Form 2009:5).  Average selling 
prices showed modest increases throughout this period, reflecting the changes in product 
mix to higher work content products, which also explains the general decrease in 
production unit output on a per machine basis (Top Form 2007: 5).  The number of 
employees peaked in 2008 at 12,836, up from 8,500 employees in 2003 (SBI 2003b), and 
down again to approximately 10,692 employees as of June 30, 2009 (Top Form 2008, 
2009:42).  
In the early to mid-2000s it seemed that Top Form was positioned to keep 
expanding as one of the top bra/lingerie producers in the world.  In 2003 the SBI E2-
Capital Group, a Hong Kong based brokerage house, noted that ―Top Form‘s production 
accounts for almost 10% of the US market‖ (SBI 2003a:2), and 
Top Form has unparalleled muscles when dealing with some of the largest 
brassiere brand owners in the world. Top Form‘s bra production satisfied 8% of 
Sara Lee‘s total worldwide sourcing (the world‘s largest bra/under-garment 
company) and 25% of Vanity Fair‘s total requirement (the world‘s second 
largest). By contrast, these two US companies (together representing 50% of the 
US market) accounted for roughly 10% and 58% of Top Form‘s total sales. In 
fact, Top Form is the only bra OEM manufacturer (and the largest) in the world 
that is on both US giants‘ supplier list thanks to its unrivalled production scale. 
Top Form‘s scale is almost 2 times larger than its next 2 unlisted competitors, 
Acestyle and Clover.  (SBI 2003b:3)  
 
Top Form‘s Strategy: OEM to ODM to OBM 
In 2005, the Wall Street Journal (Fong 2005) ran a story on Top Form with the 
byline ―Chinese manufacturer goes premium.‖  It centered on the notion that ―…Top 
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 Branded business remained an insignificant amount of Top Form‘s portfolio.  It accounted for less than 
2% of the Group‘s sales turnover through 2008.  
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Form has evolved from primarily making cut-and-sew brassieres -- simple designs easily 
put together by China's nimble and low-cost seamstresses. Now, its bra production is a 
process more akin to car assembly…‖  The article concluded by noting Top Form‘s 17% 
growth in annual net profit that year.  This section briefly outlines this process and 
strategy.  
Top Form was founded in 1963 in Hong Kong as a bra sub-contractor, and has 
since expanded considerably.  Its first overseas factory was established in the Philippines 
in 1979, followed by Thailand in 1988 and China in 1999.  These three sites are/were 
positioned as top bra/lingerie producing countries for the US market from the late 1980s 
through 2010 (see Tables 8, 9 and 10 below).  Namely, the Philippines was the top source 
of US bra imports from the late 1980s to 1993, Thailand has been among the top sources 
since the mid-1990s and in 2008 was the fourth largest supplier for the US.  China‘s bra 
production since 2001 has been explosive, dominating the market in the 2000s.  In short, 
Top Form has been positioned among the ‗bra migration‘ from Asia (the Philippines) in 
the late 1980s to early 1990s, witnessed the predominance of bra sourcing in the 
Americas from the early 1990s through the early 2000s, and took part in the resurgence 
and near total dominance of Asia-based producers from 2001-2002.  As demonstrated in 
Tables 8 to 11 below, Top Form was riding, and in no small part generating, a wave of 
bra production expansion in China and Asia more generally.  This is largely the result of 
the lifting of quotas on two categories of undergarments under the WTO in 2002 and 
China‘s entry into the WTO in December 2001.  This was also, perhaps, the peak of 
OEM producers filling massive orders to feed the rapidly expanding US bra market (see 
Table 7 on US bra imports from 1990-2008).   
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Table 7: US Imports of Bras, Dozens (millions), MFA Categories 349 and 649 
(Cotton and Synthetic, respectively) 
 
Source: US OTEXA (2010) 
 
Table 8: US Imports of Bras, Dozens (millions), MFA Categories 349 and 649 
(Cotton and Synthetic, respectively) 
  
Source: US OTEXA (2010) 
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Table 9: US Imports of Bras, 1990-1999 Dozens (millions), MFA Categories 349 and 
649 (Cotton and Synthetic, respectively) 
 
 Source: US OTEXA (2010) 
 
Table 10: US Imports of Bras, 2000-2008, Dozens, MFA Categories 349 and 649 
(Cotton and Synthetic, respectively) 
 
Source: US OTEXA (2010) 
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Table 11: US Imports of Bras, 2000-2008, Dozens (excluding China), MFA 
Categories 349 and 649 (Cotton and Synthetic, respectively) 
 
Source: US OTEXA (2010) 
 
Top Form‘s business strategy is summarized by the company as (Top Form 2008:4): 
 
At Top Form we followed our game plan laid down more than a year ago and 
made strategic adjustments with the objectives not only to navigate through this 
storm of changes [in China, see below], but to reposition ourselves for further 
growth with new business approaches: we continued the effort to build our EU 
business which resulted in the sales increase in both percentage and absolute 
dollar terms to partly offset the shortfall in the US business; we enhanced our 
product development functions to support the growth of our ODM [original 
design manufacturing] business, particularly with those retailer customers in 
Europe; we trimmed our output by downsizing our most expensive capacities in 
China and Thailand and at the same time started to replace the lost capacity by 
expanding in the low cost areas in both regions.   
 
In 2007 Top Form noted that more retailers are sourcing directly from Asia 
through local buying offices, and this requires a strengthening of design capabilities and 
thus branching out from its primarily OEM business model (Top Form 2007).  In 2008 
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Top Form enhanced its product development functions to support the growth of ODM 
business (Top Form 2008).  Also in 2008 Top Form noted that its markets are changing. 
The 2007 economic downturn in the US impacted demand, particularly evident in the 
mass markets.  In response to the prevailing market trends, they continued efforts to 
expand EU business. The EU accounted for 23% of Top Form‘s total global sales during 
the 2007 fiscal year, an increase of 39% in absolute dollar terms, from 15% in the 
previous year, while US sales by comparison represented 62% in 2008, down from 75% 
in 2007 (Top Form 2008:6).  This also reflects Top Form‘s strategy of targeting high 
value business, particularly in the EU market where demand is less price-sensitive than 
the US.  Furthermore, it is a reaction to trends in which retailers are globalizing and 
sourcing directly from Asia through local buying offices.  Finally, it noted that ―cost is 
increasingly a major factor in sourcing decisions and frequent changes in fashion 
contribute to short production cycles and small order sizes‖ (Top Form 2008:6).  
Combined, this points to the necessity to change its business model and move beyond 
OEM.   
Looking ahead, the steep deterioration in the operating environments in China and 
other regions in Asia [see below] presents unprecedented challenges to business, 
and manufacturing companies must respond to such challenges with 
corresponding changes in structure and business approach. At Top Form we are 
glad that we have, at an early stage, put in place the right strategy and that we 
have embarked on our action plans... We will continue to migrate our OEM 
operations from expensive locations to low cost and labor abundant areas. We 
will develop direct sales to retail customers, especially those in Europe and 
continue our investment of resources in product development and sales support 
functions. Last but not least, we will accelerate the growth of our brand business 
by rolling out an additional 45 point-of-sales in the next twelve months while 
continuing to look for strategic or equity relationships with other compatible 
products and brands companies, notwithstanding the M&A opportunity we 
recently reported. The process may take longer than we would like, but we are 
confident that our Group is heading in the right direction through the sea of 
changes.  (Top Form 2007:4). 
115 
 
 
Top Form‘s merchandizing departments are based in Hong Kong and Shenzhen, 
and provide vertically integrated services through sourcing of fabrics, product 
development, purchasing and liaising with production sites through to final delivery.  In 
Shenzhen Top Form has two R&D centers for product development.  There designers, 
pattern makers and graders create and produce samples.  In short, this means that they 
can design, test and produce in house with relatively quick turnaround.  These are 
prominent examples of their efforts to move beyond OEM into ODM and full-package 
service.   
A part of this expansion is the brand business.  From 2004 to 2008 Top Form‘s 
brand business was an important element in their strategic plan, they intended to roll out 
45 new point-of-sales in the in 2008, mostly sales counters in department stores in 
Guangdong (Top Form 2008).  Externally they planned to continue to develop strategic 
and equity relationships with companies with compatible products and brands in order to 
enhance their presence and sales in the China market (Top Form 2008).  The most 
notable shift into branding was the September 2008 shareholders‘ consent to 
conditionally acquire ACE Style Intimate Apparel Limited and three of its fellow 
subsidiaries. ACE Style is a  
―$1.1 billion sales company founded by Andrew and Mimi Sia, is a highly 
respected company in the brassiere trade known for its strengths in marketing and 
product development. This acquisition when completed will mark a breakthrough 
in the Group‘s pursuit of growth and new distribution channels in all markets.  
Top Form and ACE Style have different and complementary competitive 
advantages. In meshing the strengths, expertise and capacities of the two 
companies, it will solidify the enlarged Group as the leading supplier in the 
brassiere trade in terms of size, product capabilities, value-added services and 
diversity in global operations‖ (Top Form 2008: 4). 
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From this perspective, Top Form‘s strategy is a reaction to market trends, 
demands from buyers and the perceived need to enter retail sales.  In summary, Top Form 
has what can be summarized as a two pronged strategy: to move into higher value added 
nodes of bra supply chains, or upgrading, combined with a production shift to new 
‗frontiers‘ of low cost production in north-western Thailand and inland China.  Viewed 
separately, Top Form is an example of a firm upgrading its capacity in global production 
networks, with a horizontal shift to labor abundant areas that could easily be considered 
‗sweat-shopping‘ for low cost, unorganized and more vulnerable labor.  This complicates 
notions that upgrading entails better conditions for labor, confirming Mayer and Pickles 
(2008) claim, and suggesting a need to rethink the kinds of production regimes emerging 
along the border.   
 
Quotas and New Markets  
Production networks in the textile and garment industry have been heavily 
impacted by global quotas and trade frictions.  Top Form‘s strategy to spread production 
in China, Thailand and Philippines is, among other reasons, part of an effort to address 
trade frictions among China and the US-EU.  In November 2003 the US imposed a 7.5% 
quota growth limit on Chinese brassieres, knit fabrics, dressing gowns and robe imports 
above the levels reached between September 2002 and September 2003 (Hufbauer et al 
2006:29).  Safeguards are a protectionist measure initiated by US textile associations, 
117 
 
often in cooperation with US trade unions, that seek to protect production in the 
Americas using US inputs.
56
     
It is important to note that throughout the quota period (through 2002 for certain 
product categories, and again from 2005 through 2008) production schedules for Top 
Form were largely determined by the availability of quotas rather than the production 
capacity of their different factories in China (Top Form 2006:5).  With the expiry of 
brassiere quotas in 2005, it was expected that operating margins would jump from 9.9% 
to 13.9% mainly due to fully utilized capacities that helped to share fixed costs (Top 
Form 2007).   
Trade frictions resulting from US-China and EU-China anti-dumping measures 
initiated in 2005 complicated Top Form‘s business model, and in 2005-2006 this caused 
major losses for Top Form.  Particularly, the vast majority of Top Form‘s EU production 
was scheduled to be manufactured in China factories but, despite their Nan Hai plant 
being one of the largest EU quota holders in the country, they were unable to utilize any 
of the quota due to the ―chaotic implementation of the trade agreement in which allocated 
quotas were negotiated away in settlement of the unexpectedly high level of backlog held 
at the various customs points in Europe‖ (Top Form 2006:5).  This, together with the 
threat of an imminent embargo under the safeguard mechanism imposed by the US, 
meant that they were compelled during the second quarter of 2005 to reshuffle production 
loadings between plants in China, Thailand and the Philippines.  The differing product 
capabilities between the plants impacted efficiency and thus output, compromising ―not 
only our ability to make sales but also resulting in a domino effect of production delays‖ 
                                                          
56
 As demonstrated in Tables 9 and 10 the steep rise in China‘s production, and Asia more generally, 
displaces third country production primarily in the Americas, not necessarily assembly work in the US 
(Hufbauer et al 2006: 32). 
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(Top Form 2006:5).  Compounding the losses were ―hefty airfreight expenses incurred 
during the second half of the fiscal year in clearing up the shipments delayed from the 
first half‖ (Top Form 2006:3).   
The decision to diversify investment locations relates primarily to their China+1 
strategy that has become a norm in the apparel business (ref).  In 2005 the International 
Herald Tribune (Greenlees 2005) ran an article on Top Form‘s strategy of westward 
expansion in China and its China+1 strategy, noting Top Form‘s dominant position in the 
bra market.  It stated that ―Top Form's aim to balance the trade risk of relying too heavily 
on its Chinese factories - a strategy it has pursued for some years - illustrates a pattern 
that is helping to prop up the textile and apparel industry outside China, particularly in 
South Asia and Southeast Asia.‖   
 
Top Form Production Networks: ‗Going West and Going Out‘ 
―The biggest challenge confronting us…is the rapidly deteriorating operating 
environment in China especially for those manufacturing companies operating in 
the Pearl River Delta.  The steep rise in labor costs, reduction of VAT refund on 
exports, shortage of labor, shortage of energy supply, stepping up of 
environmental requirements etc., are all heavy burdens to our cost efficiency‖ 
(Top Form 2006:4).   
  
In 2008 Top Form operated four factories in China.  One of its two Shenzhen 
factories primarily produced for Top Form‘s original brand, MX Lingerie.  The other 
Shenzhen factory, the first one established in China, produces mainly for the European 
market.  The Nan Hai, Guangzhou factory counts about 50% of its output for the US 
market.  The largest and newest China factory is in Jiangxi province (See Figure 20 
below), established in 2002 coinciding with the elimination of two quota categories for 
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bras under the WTO; in 2009 the Jiangxi factory contributed 23% of total global output.  
Most of the orders from this factory are for the US market.  In Thailand Top Form had 
three factories in 2008, two in the Bangkok vicinity (Ayutthaya), one of which closed in 
2009, and one in Mae Sot, established in 2004, which has been expanding.  The Thailand 
factories produce primarily for the US market.  In the Philippines Top Form has one 
factory, the smallest in its production network, with 20% of production for the European 
market.  In 2009, 58% of production is in China, 35% in Thailand (up from 31% the 
previous year) and 7% in the Philippines.  This has changed from 50:42:8 in 2002 (SBI 
2003).  
Figure 21: Location of Jiangxi Province in the People's Republic of China 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:China_Jiangxi.svg (last accessed July 17, 2010) 
Orders requiring short lead time and more complex designs are generally 
manufactured in China, while larger orders with simpler designs are manufactured in 
Thailand and the Philippines (SBI 2003).  In terms of production output costs, ―Thailand 
is approximately 20 percent higher and the Philippines is approximately 30 percent 
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higher than China," according to Michael Austin, chief financial officer of Top Form 
(Greenlees 2005).  Furthermore, productivity is higher in China.  Workers at Top Form's 
factories in China produce approximately 30 to 35 units each per day, compared with 25 
in the Philippines and 20 in central Thailand (SBI 2003a).  Meanwhile, minimum wages 
in China are substantially lower than either central Thailand or the Philippines (Greenlees 
2005).  Low wages in Mae Sot help make their Thailand operations feasible, even when 
accounting for higher transport costs.   
Lower costs in China are enabled primarily by Top Form‘s move from coastal 
Shenzhen and Guangzhou to Jiangxi province beginning in 2002, where minimum wages 
are roughly half that in coastal cities.  In Thailand, Mae Sot became a part of Top Form‘s 
strategy to continue to move "from expensive locations to low cost and labor abundant 
areas" (Higgins 2007), through ―the expansion of existing facilities in the low cost 
regions of both China and Thailand…”  (Top Form 2009:2).  Mae Sot operations 
commenced after the Jiangxi plant was running at full capacity.
57
   
Brassiere manufacturers require skilled workers with little automation.  It usually 
takes approximately six months to train a worker, so low worker turnover rates and a 
steady supply of labor is important in maintaining high operational efficiency.  As 
opportunities for employment in higher wage sectors and segments of the textile and 
apparel industry increased in Guangzhou and Shenzhen, labor turnover tended to be 
higher for companies like Top Form (SBI 2003a).  Thus, the shift to Jiangxi and Mae Sot 
was strategic for its low cost and perceived lower labor turnover.  Wage in bra assembly 
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 This is also phrased as ―We continue the repositioning of our production facilities to lower cost areas 
where people need employment and the operating environment is favorable for future growth‖ (Top Form 
2009:5).   
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is significant, accounting for up to 16% to 25% of production cost with material cost 
representing another 50-60% of the total (SBI 2003a, Top Form 2007).  Benefiting from 
the improved scale and cheaper labor costs in the Jiangxi plant (40% of that of Shenzhen 
at c.RMB400-450 per worker per month), Top Form management expected gross 
margins would improve by an additional 3 to 5 percentage points.  
Top Form‘s operations in the Pearl River Delta, and to a lesser extent the 
Bangkok vicinity, became problematic by the mid-2000s.  Top Form was fairly well 
prepared for these changes with its expansion to Jiangxi and Mae Sot beginning in 2002, 
yet there were a number of negative impacts on their business model.   In 2006 minimum 
wages in Guangdong Province  
―have recently surged again by approximately 20% above the scheduled statutory 
increases over the previous eighteen months. A reduction in export tax rebate on 
textile and garment products will almost certainly be implemented in the near 
future which in effect will elevate our China cost. The continuing weakness of the 
U.S. dollar against many Asian currencies remains a concern and we are mindful 
of the effects that an economic downturn, particularly in the U.S., could have on 
consumer confidence and thus our business in that market‖ (Top Form 2006: 7).58    
 
Specifically, statutory minimum wages in Top Form plants in Shenzhen increased 
by 17% on July 1, 2006, in Nan Hai by 20% on September 1, 2006, and by 36% on 
January, 1, 2007 in the Longnan plant located in Jiangxi Province (Top Form 2007:3).  
Minimum wages in their Nan Hai plant increased again by 12% on April 1, 2008, in 
Longnan by 7% on January 1, 2008 and in Shenzhen by 8% on July 1, 2008 (Top Form 
2009:7).  Top Form stated that ―Significant increases in minimum wages in our 
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 Top Form found the operating environment in the region stabilized as a result of governmental initiatives 
in China aiming to help its industries in the global economic crisis, including a freeze on minimum wage 
levels and an increase in the tax rebate on imported materials for processing and exports of textile and 
garment products. The currency appreciation of the RMB and Thai Baht against the US dollar eased during 
the year, most notably during its second half of 2008. (Top Form 2009).   
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manufacturing locations in China, labour and power shortages, currency appreciation 
and, from 1 July 2007, a 2% reduction in export tax rebate
59
 have all contributed to the 
ongoing deterioration of the operating environment in the Pearl River Delta.
60
  
Combined, the RMB appreciated by some 10% against the US dollar from 1 July 2007 to 
30 June 2008‖ (ibid).  In Thailand, the military coup which took place in September 2006 
and subsequent civil unrest had virtually no impact on the operations of their plants, but 
the strong Thai Baht resulted in virtually a 20% year-to-year increase in operating cost in 
Thailand in 2006-2007 (Top Form 2007:3).   
These changes led to a reshuffling of their production locations and a number of 
layoffs.  In China, the workforce of their two plants in Guangdong was trimmed down by 
about 15% through layoffs.  At the same time, they increased the workforce in the Mae 
Sot plant.  In Thailand, ―labour shortages in the vicinity of Bangkok resulted in labour-
intensive operations being highly inefficient and uncompetitive‖ (Top Form 2008:6).  
Top Form also found ―the dense clusters of manufacturing industries around Bangkok‖ to 
be problematic (Top Form 2005:6).  In 2008 they closed down one plant in Thailand 
completely (in Ayutthaya) and reduced the workforce of the remaining plant in central 
Thailand to 700 workers.  At the same time, they continued expansion of the new factory 
in Mae Sot ―where labor supply is more accessible‖ and increased the workforce from 
1,400 in 2007 to 2,100 in mid-2008 (Top Form 2008:6).  Mae Sot is part of the strategy 
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 This refers to a reduction in the tax rebate from 13% to 11% on imported materials for processing and 
export of textile and garment products.  
60
 SBI (2003a:page#) reports that the existing manufacturing facilities are in Shenzhen and Nanhai while 
the new plant is located in Jiangxi for several strategic reasons: The monthly wage in Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen ranges from RMB700 to RMB1,300 per worker whereas wage in Jiangxi only costs around 
RMB450 per worker. Most workers in Guangzhou and Shenzhen come from other provinces and require 
accommodation while workers in Jiangxi are locals and do not require accommodation. Thus, setting up a 
new plant in Jiangxi can save staff costs and other related expenses. 
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to ―provide fall back in case our production capacity in the PRC is compromised due to 
the trade disputes between the PRC and her trading nations‖ (Top Form 2005:6). 
In China, their most cost effective plant in Jiangxi accounted for 26% of global 
output in 2007, up from 24% the previous year due to our cutting back the capacities of 
the more expensive plants in Guangdong province.  In Thailand, as a result of the 
retrenchment and factory closure in central Thailand, the operations in Mae Sot 
accounted for 16% of global output in 2008, up from 14% in 2007. (Top Form 2008:7).  
Combined, the Mae Sot and Jiangxi factories, or those located in areas with surplus labor, 
accounted for 42% of Top Form‘s total global production by mid-2008.  This shift took 
place over the course of five years, with the Jiangxi plant opening in 2002 and fully 
operational in 2004, and the Mae Sot plant opening in 2004, reaching full production in 
2007.   
The global economic crisis beginning in late 2008 led to Top Form‘s scrapping its 
venture into branding and retail.  In the 2006 and 2007 Annual Reports, Top Form noted 
that ―The mounting challenges in our OEM trade prompted the need to accelerate the 
Group‘s strategic move to expand the brand business through M&A (Top Form 2007:3).‖  
However, during the crisis it was decided by all parties to terminate the Share Acquisition 
Agreement with ACE Style Intimate Apparel Limited (Top Form 2009: 2).  This was part 
of a decision to terminate its Brand division altogether (Top Form 2009).  This decision 
leaves Top Form positioned as an OEM producer with design capacity and a production 
base increasingly concentrated in Mae Sot and Jiangxi.  This is well short of ambitions 
for ‗upgrading‘ initiated in the early 2000s, but it is clear that the horizontal or downward 
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move to labor abundant provinces has been a central part of their strategy from at least 
2002 through 2009.   
 
Kingmaker Footwear Co Ltd in Bavet 
 Kingmaker Footwear is a shoe manufacturer, as such it is currently outside the 
scope of the ILO‘s Better Factories program in Cambodia.  In 2009 Better Factories had 
one pilot project in footwear underway (interview, Chea Sophal, Better Factories 
Cambodia, November 12, 2009).  Mr. Chea said that it is possible to extend the project 
beyond garments, especially as a way to promote the Better Factories and bring in new 
members as part of the self-sustainability initiative leading up to the ILO‘s leadership 
withdrawal at the end of 2010.
61
      
Kingmaker is a Taiwan-based publicly-traded corporation.  Kingmaker was 
founded in 1980 as a two-production line operation near Taichung, Taiwan.  It initially 
specialized in footwear for the U.S. discount market.  In 1994 it was producing branded 
footwear on eight production lines for North American trading companies.  By 2009 it 
had 40 production lines in China, Vietnam and Cambodia, with subsidiaries in Hong 
Kong.62  Over the years the company has shifted to higher quality, branded products.  It‘s 
main customers are Skechers, Clarks, Stride Rite, Elefanten and G-Star, which in 
aggregate comprise approximately 94.65% of revenue (Kingmaker 2009:17).  Revenue 
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 At the time of the interview it was not yet clear what form the Better Factories program would take after 
the ILO steps out of the leadership role.  Stakeholders were considered defining it as a public-private 
partnership, or as a foundation, depending on the legal status and source of funding.  It was clear that the 
project would run on a cost-recovery basis, essentially charging buyers for assessments, while receiving 
core funding from GMAC, the government, trade unions, buyers and international agencies.  
62
 In 2007 the Group operated 38 production lines of which 11 were located in Vietnam, 2 in Cambodia, 9 
in Zhongshan and 16 in Zhuhai (Kingmaker 2007:12). 
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contributed by the US market increased slightly to approximately 50.37% in 2009 (from 
2008: 49.59%; 2007:53.78%), and shipments to European countries dropped to 
approximately 41.90% of total revenue in 2009 (2008: 44.78%; 2007:41.0%) (Kingmaker 
2009:16).  The Group, including its subsidiaries in Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, Vietnam 
and Cambodia employed approximately 14,000 people as at March 31, 2009, down from 
roughly 15,000 in March 2008 (Kingmaker 2009:22; Kingmaker 2008:12), and far from 
its peak of 20,000 in 2005 (Toh 2006).
63
  In November 2009 Kingmaker-Cambodia 
employed 1,200, down from its peak of 2,200 (interview, Kingmaker line workers, 
November 3, 2009).  Following is a brief summary of Kingmakers production structure:   
In 1988 Kingmaker opened its first offshore manufacturing site in Zhuhai, 
Guangdong, China and an office in Hong Kong.  An additional production facility 
was established in Macau in 1993.  The Group currently manages facilities in 
China, Vietnam and Cambodia to cater for the US and European markets.  In the 
PRC, the Group operates a total of 26 production lines in Zhuhai, Zhongshan and 
Jiangxi, turning out a total of approximately 14 million pairs of shoes annually. In 
order to maintain its comparative advantage, the Group has moved forward with 
its expansion plan to establish facilities further inland, the new manufacturing 
facilities in Jiangxi Province commenced operations in the first half of 2009. With 
the new facilities in place, the Group‘s annual capacity will increase by 
approximately 7.89%, or approximately 1.6 million additional pairs, by 2010. 
(http://www.kingmaker.com.cn/about_01.html, accessed March 11, 2009) 
 
 
In 2000 production commenced in Vietnam, coinciding with the closure of a 
factory in Macau.  In January 2007 its newest operation began in Bavet.  The Vietnam 
and Cambodia plants produce primarily for the EU, with limited production for Japan, 
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 There are several explanations for the steep decrease in employees.  One is the imposition of anti-
dumping measures as discussed later in the chapter.  The other is the Kingmaker Group‘s implementation 
of lean manufacturing systems in the mid-2000s.  Kingmaker (2007:13) claims:  ―Apart from diversifying 
production bases to locations of cheaper operating costs, the Group will continue to improve upon the 
already proven lean manufacturing system that have been implemented to improve production efficiency 
and shorten the production leadtime to reduce transportation cost.  In addition, the upgrading of facilities 
will help the Group retain skilled experienced labor and improve their productivity in a better working 
environment.‖  Essentially, lean production systems require fewer workers due to higher productivity.   
126 
 
while US production is primarily in the China factories. According to Kingmaker line 
workers interviewed in 2009, 100% of production in Cambodia in 2009 is for Clarks.   
In many ways Kingmaker‘s geography of production reflects that of Top Form.  
Both companies have moved further inland in China, due primarily to rising wages and 
labor shortages in coastal regions.  Kingmaker finds  
―Labor remains an important cost factor in footwear production…the upward 
trend in staff salaries and wages in the PRC, amid increasing minimum wage 
requirements, has dragged down the Group‘s profitability…The Group has moved 
forward with its plans to set up facilities in Jiangxi Province, the PRC, and 
Cambodia in a bid to make the necessary advance investments to enhance supply 
reliability and economies of scale‖ (Kingmaker 2009:13).  
 
Kingmaker, like Top Form, frequently reaffirms its stakeholders that ―…the 
Group can maintain its competitiveness by moving up the value chain while adopting 
stringent cost-control measures‖ (Kingmaker 2009:9).  Another similarity is that 
Kingmaker is seeking inroads to China‘s consumer market through acquisition of trading, 
distribution and retailing businesses in Hong Kong and the PRC.  In summary, both 
Kingmaker and Top Form are among the most globally prominent manufacturers in their 
respective product categories.  Both have shifted their production base away from coastal 
China, in large part due to increasing costs of labor.  Both have a strategic focus on 
capturing more value added in value chains and to do this has shifted production to 
border areas in the GMS.   
There are important differences among the two companies.  The geographies of 
sourcing of both companies demonstrate how particular products become differentially 
embedded in certain countries.  Whereas bra production for the US market is dominated 
by suppliers based in China, Indonesia and Thailand, footwear manufacturing is 
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overwhelmingly Chinese dominated, with rising exports from Vietnam (See Figure 12).  
China accounts for an 86.8% share of total US footwear imports during 2008 (Kingmaker 
2009:19; see Figures 12, 13).  In the EU China holds a lower proportion of market, yet it 
is still significant at roughly 60%.  Kingmaker has followed and generated these patterns, 
producing almost exclusively in greater China from the 1990s up to 2000 when it opened 
its first facility in Vietnam.  The Vietnam plant is part of the China+1 strategy, already 
elucidated in the Top Form case, yet this proved insufficient for Kingmaker.  In October 
2006 the EU imposed anti-dumping measures on footwear from both China and Vietnam, 
leading to Kingmaker investing in a facility in Cambodia.  The factory in Bavet is, 
essentially, a satellite of the factory in the HCMC vicinity.  This has become an important 
aspect of Kingmaker‘s strategy to diversify, with factories in Vietnam and Cambodia 
complementing rather than replacing the Mainland factories.
64
 
With production bases in the Mainland, Vietnam and Cambodia, the Group now 
enjoys a much greater flexibility that is essential for the management to plan 
strategically and mitigate potential political and market risks, including taxes and 
quota restrictions. This multi-location manufacturing strength also enables the 
Group to tweak more sharply its market penetration initiatives into the US and 
Europe. The facilities in Vietnam and Cambodia are particularly instrumental in 
tapping the European market.  (Kingmaker 2008:10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64
 The EU-oriented Vietnam and Cambodia factories are geared toward ―tailormade manufacturing 
solutions for high-end products to branded customers‖ (Kingmaker 2008:PAGE).  These capacities are ‗in 
addition to‘ Kingmaker‘s provision of its more established ODM and OEM services.    
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Table 12: US Footwear Imports, Top 10 sources, US$, Millions 
 
Source: USITC (2010), data for product category 64 (all footwear) 
 
Table 13: US Imports of Footwear, Top 10, Excluding China and Total Imports, 
US$, millions 
 
 
 
Source: USITC (2010), data for product category 64 (all footwear) 
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Table 14: EU-27 Imports of Footwear, Top 10, in Million Euros 
 
Source: Eurostat (2010), data for product category 64 (all footwear) 
 
Table 15: EU-27 Footwear Imports, million Euros 
 
Source: Eurostat (2010), data for product category 64 (all footwear) 
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Anti-dumping Measures and Cambodia 
In October 2006 the EU imposed 10% and 16.5% duties on footwear imported 
from Vietnam and China, respectively.
65
  This followed initial duties of 4.8% on 
mainland products and 4.2% on Vietnamese goods earlier in the year.
66
  The European 
Commission (EC) was acting on complaints from European manufacturers who argued 
they were unable to compete with shoes from low cost producers in Vietnam and China.  
The latest complaint was filed in 2008 by the Italian footwear producers' body.  Table 15 
demonstrates that footwear, unlike many garments including bras, are still produced and 
assembled in relatively large quantities and for high values in the EU.  Thus, protectionist 
efforts are critical factors in global sourcing.  In December 2009, after an over year-long 
review, the EC decided to extend the tariffs for another 15 months.
67
  In march 2010 a 
European court rejected appeals against the tariffs from Hong Kong and China-based 
shoe manufacturers, while Beijing launched a dispute at the WTO in February 2010, 
saying the tariffs are illegal (Reuters 2010).
68
     
                                                          
65
 EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson proposed anti-dumping duties of 19.4 per cent on Chinese 
shoes and 16.8 per cent on Vietnamese shoes (Toh 2006). 
66
 Customers agreed to increase product prices 4.5 percent to compensate Kingmaker's start-up costs in 
Cambodia (Ho 2006). 
67
 An October 2008 ruling by the European Commission found that the legal conditions for opening the 
review on anti-dumping measures were met, according to the basic antidumping Regulation. Thus, the 
Commission found that it had an obligation to open a review.  Member States were consulted during the 
advisory anti-dumping committee in September 2008; 15 opposed the proposal by the Commission while 
12 supported it.  However, despite this advisory vote, the Commission's legal obligations remain, and it 
went ahead with the renewal of duties on footwear from China and Vietnam.  (European Commission 
2008) 
68
 European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said that a free trade agreement with Vietnam, which he 
was visiting to discuss opening negotiations, would "greatly contribute to resolving once and for ever this 
pending matter" (Agence France-Presse 2010).  Having failed to launch negotiations on a free trade 
agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a whole, the European Commission is now 
seeking bilateral talks with the 10 members of the bloc. 
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Adding to export costs from Vietnam is the EU‘s 2008 decision to remove 
Vietnamese footwear from the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) as of January 1, 
2009.
69
  Under the GSP certain developing countries qualify for lower import tariffs.  The 
result is higher EU import duties that are added to the existing anti-dumping duty of 10% 
on 33 categories of Vietnamese leather-upper footwear.  Under the GSP duties were 3.6% 
for most footwear.  With the removal of GSP footwear duties will increase by 3.5-5.5% 
on average.  Duties on leather shoes went up to 8 percent while those on canvas footwear 
went up to 17 percent (VOV News 2009).   
In 2006 Kingmaker closed two factories in China due to the imposition of duties 
(Toh 2006).  This was primarily the result of loss in orders from its biggest customers at 
the time, Timberland, who accounted for 37% of Kingmakers turnover through half of 
2006 (Toh 2006).  Kingmaker and Timberland did not reach a deal to share the cost of the 
duties.  Rather, Timberland, like many other companies, pulled orders from China and 
Vietnam and shifted them to countries without anti-dumping measures, including 
Indonesia and Thailand.  These anti-dumping measures led to the opening of the 
Kingmaker plant in Bavet.  In mid-2006 Kingmaker announced its plans for a HK$30 
million (~$3.8 million) investment to set up a new factory in Cambodia and so avoid 
European Union anti-dumping measures (Ho 2006).   The Group opened the new factory 
in Cambodia near to the existing plant in Vietnam for more efficient logistical support 
and arrangements of orders to Europe.  This logistical efficiency is largely possible due to 
                                                          
69
 ―The European Commission's office in Vietnam explained that if GSP-covered imports from a country 
such as Vietnam represent 15% of all imports into the EU from the total number of GSP beneficiaries, then 
that country's sector is competitive enough not to need preferential treatment. Vietnam's GSP-covered 
exports of shoes represent an average of 19.9% of all EU GSP shoe imports for the two years to 2006. 
GSP-covered footwear represents an average of 49.1% of Vietnam's GSP-covered exports, marginally 
within the framework that the EU uses when deciding whether to remove a country from GSP status.‖  
(Xinhua 2006). 
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the special economic zone where Kingmaker is located in Bavet (the Manhattan SEZ), 
and a bi-lateral border crossing agreement between the Cambodian and Vietnamese 
government on shipping in and out of the SEZ to and from Vietnam (see Chapters 5 and 
6).  It is based on these quite tenuous set of circumstances that the Manhattan SEZ has 
managed to attract investment from Kingmaker.   
 
Conclusions  
The ‗China price‘ – the lowest price possible – has been possible only because of 
low-cost labor migrations into the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, but their effects have 
recently rebounded in ways that now threaten to destabilize social and economic 
conditions across these regional production centers (Arnold and Pickles 2010).  As a 
result, China has embarked on a triple policy to weaken its dependence on the ‗China 
price‘ and reduce the dependence of regional economies on migrant labor flows— ‗go-
west, go-out, go-up.‘  A result is another phase of restructuring that entails the creation of 
new forms of regional production networks organized around decentralized and border 
economies aimed largely at export markets.  Mae Sot and Bavet are both participating in 
these new geographies of low-cost production in Asia.  
This chapter has demonstrated that a complex set of relations are factored into 
manufacturers sourcing strategies.  It shows that China remains the manufacturing base 
for two major corporations in garments and footwear and this is certainly the case for 
most producers in these sectors.  But, localities such as Mae Sot and Bavet are being 
integrated into regionally extended production logics.  Previous chapters have 
demonstrated the labor regimes deemed necessary for these mobile firms.  Going 
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forward, there is another layered ‗necessity,‘ that of SEZs to ‗capture‘ producers who 
deem Thailand-Cambodia production sites as largely auxiliary to China factories.  
The two cases show two very different degrees of embeddedness in global 
production networks.  Mae Sot offers producers in Thailand an opportunity to maintain 
garment assembly in (at least partial) full-package production networks within the 
country, due to more established sourcing networks and its many years experience in the 
country.  That Thailand has maintained a top position in global brassiere sourcing over 
the course of several decades reinforces these patterns.  Thus, I offer a slightly different 
picture than Doner (2009), in that backward links are maintained in country.  Despite 
Thailand‘s perceived competitiveness in certain factors, it is still struggling to maintain 
basic garment assembly production.  Labor productivity is lower in Thailand than China, 
and costs are higher.  Due to these and other factors producers such as Top Form have 
relocated to migrant labor abundant areas such as Mae Sot where wages are a fraction of 
those in central Thailand. 
In the case of Cambodia maintaining investment in footwear is even more 
tenuous.  Kingmaker‘s operation in Bavet is a satellite of its production base in Vietnam.  
It is a production strategy based almost entirely on tariffs from the EU market.  In this 
sense Bavet is emerging as a ‗true‘ cross-border production network, in which all inputs 
are shipped in from Ho Chi Minh City, assembled in Bavet, then shipped back across the 
border and to sea from the Saigon port.  In this scenario the ADB‘s economic corridors 
take on a more immediate role.  Clearly, if Cambodia continues to industrialize in export 
sectors it will never be a major player like Vietnam and Thailand.  It must, according to 
the sub-regional framework or division of labor, cooperate with neighboring countries to 
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share excess or tariff/quota driven spill offs from the sub-region.  How the Cambodian 
state is managing these transitions in border SEZs is the focus of the following two 
chapters.   
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Chapter 5  
Economic Corridors, SEZs and Border Development Nodes 
Introduction 
Several studies have critically engaged the role of states in the cross-border 
strategy emerging in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle, and these have 
tended to focus on the broader implications for how neoliberalism is conceptualized (see 
Ong 2000; Sidaway 2007; Sparke et al 2004; see also Ong 2008; Sparke 2002; Walker 
2009).  In their work on the ‗Growth Triangle‘ Ong, Sparke et al, and others interpret 
SEZs as zones of exception in which the strong state withdraws to allow forms of 
economic autonomy that enhance profitability.  These studies have suggested that the 
‗Growth Triangle‘ is not so much a question of market versus state, or a transition ―from 
state to market‖, but that the creation of markets is occurring in settings where the state is 
sometimes very strong while in other areas it is nearly absent, creating a spatial 
variability in state powers and ‗reach‘ that is useful in maintaining flexibility for capital 
(Ong 2000; 2008). 
This notion of neoliberal exception is an important contribution to understanding 
the geographies of Asian production.  In this and the following chapter I analyze a state, 
Cambodia, that is highly flexible, rather than strong or weak.  It is a case of a flexible 
state restructuring and adapting to regional and global forces in which regional agencies, 
new governmental actors, and emergent discourses are articulated with broader regional 
and trans-national development strategies.  In particular, the ADB‘s Economic Corridors 
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are a new spatial practice that is a manifestation of the GMS Project‘s central discourse 
of the Three Cs: connectivity, competitiveness and community. To tap into this 
framework the Cambodian state has created new government agencies, the Cambodia 
Special Economic Zone Board, and ‗One Stop Service Centers‘ in each of the new SEZs.  
It has also agreed on a bi-lateral transport agreement with Vietnam for shipping between 
Ho Chi Minh City and the Bavet SEZs.  In the process firms including Kingmaker have 
initiated production and export from one of these border SEZs, thus connecting 
Cambodia with the new Asia regional division of labor identified in earlier chapters.   
On the surface it appears that Cambodia is following global SEZ trends.  Almost 
all SEZs in Cambodia are privately developed and they offer one-stop services to reduce 
bureaucratic and other state inefficiencies.  By locating near Vietnam and Thailand they 
address the problems of high electricity and logistics costs.  Furthermore, they offer an 
environment where employers implement a new spatial regulation of labor.  Broadly 
speaking, the Cambodian state is facilitating the expansion of sub-regional and globalized 
production.   
The chapter begins with analysis of the ADB‘s framework for how states ‗should‘ 
act as facilitator of national and sub-regional development.  Focus then shifts to how 
Cambodia implements SEZs and the implications for Bavet.  In Chapter 6 I show that 
Cambodia, acting in the same realm, SEZs, is capable of playing a very different role to 
pursue interests of profit and power.   
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The ADB‟s GMS: Economic Corridors and Border Development Nodes 
 The first two projects under the ADB‘s GMS were the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi Minh 
City highway construction and the East West Economic Corridor (interview, Ronald 
Butiong, ADB, August 21, 2009).  Yushu Feng of the ADB said that the East-West 
Economic Corridor was the first implemented because in 1992 the Southern corridor was 
not possible due to Cambodia‘s political problems (interview, date, 2009).  Additionally, 
the ADB wanted to support Laos and connect it with Da Nang in Vietnam because it is a 
landlocked country.  This relates to the ADB‘s focus on poverty reduction.  The East-
West corridor, from the perspective of business, is largely useless.  One person noted ‗it 
connects nowhere to nowhere,‘ compared to the Southern corridor that connects major 
economic and industrial centers Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City.  In short, the East-West 
corridor is a political decision to bring Laos into the project. 
Researchers at the ADB, Institute of Developing Economies-JETRO (Japan 
External Trade Organization), the Asean Research Institute for Asean and East Asia, 
ADB and others have conducted in depth studies on the economic corridors and their 
objectives, expected and current outcomes, and what is preventing them from becoming 
‗fully-fledged‘ economic corridors.  These studies utilize theoretical frameworks that 
mark a clear delineation between the market and state by maintaining that the ‗correct‘ 
role of the state is economic facilitator.   
 A central purpose of the GMS Program is to implement institutional conditions 
which facilitate the economic growth of the area and to foster geopolitical stability.  ADB 
programs do require the active participation of member countries in implementing 
projects and, as a result, the ways in which specific projects are implemented are 
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importantly shaped by the structures of state power and the specific conditions in each 
place.
70
  The ADB‘s GMS is largely a physical infrastructure development project (see 
Figure 21).  It is also about integrating the GMS in Asean and Asia regional trade and 
production networks.  This is particularly important for Cambodia, Laos, Burma and 
Vietnam, the more recent Asean member states.  More broadly, it is one component of 
the ‗new Asian Regionalism‘ promoted by the ADB among other interests (ADB 2008c), 
that envisions greater intra-Asia trade and investment, thus overcoming dependence on 
US/EU exports, while facilitating deepening liberalization, trade and investment with the 
other regions.   
 
Figure 22: GMS Road Transport Network, 1992, 2006, 2015 
 
Source: ADB (2007) 
Economic Corridors 
                                                          
70
 In 2003 Burma, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Thailand agreed to establish an economic cooperation 
initiative called the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy.  It is a sub-regional 
economic cooperation program complimentary to the ADB‘s GMS Program.   
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The economic corridors were first adopted in 1998 at the 8
th
 GMS Ministerial 
Meeting.  The economic corridors are aimed at:  
1. Extending the benefits of improved transport links to remote and landlocked 
locations in the GMS, which have been disadvantaged by their lack of integration 
with more prosperous and better located neighboring areas;  
2. Providing a spatial focus to GMS activities, with the backbone, growth centers 
and nodal points serving as catalysts to the development of surrounding areas 
[including border growth nodes such as Mae Sot and Bavet];  
3. Opening up many opportunities for various types of investments from within 
and outside the GMS;  
4. Enhancing the impact of sub-regional activities through the clustering of 
projects;  
5. Serving as a mechanism for prioritizing and coordinating investments among 
neighboring countries; and  
6. Generating tangible demonstration effects.   
 
When the economic corridors were first implemented in 2001 there were five 
corridors, by 2007 there were nine (see Figures 22, 23).  Following is a list of the five 
original corridors:  
a. North-South Economic Corridor connecting Kunming, China and Bangkok, 
Thailand.  This has now been extended through southern Thailand to the Malaysia 
border.  
b. North-South Economic Corridor connecting Kunming with Hanoi, Vietnam. 
c. The East-West Economic Corridor connecting Da Nang, Vietnam and 
Mawlamyine, Burma.  
d. The Southern Economic Corridor71 connecting Ho Chi Minh City and Bangkok 
via Phnom Penh.  (Plans are underway for this to connect to Yangon, Burma via 
the deep sea port planned for Dawei, Burma).  
e. The Southern Economic Corridor connecting Quy Nhon, Vietnam and Bangkok 
(via Siem Reap, Cambodia).  (This has been extended to Dawei, Burma). 
 
If one looks at the boxes designating economic corridors in the 2007 Map below, 
it is clear that little territory in the GMS is left outside of the economic corridors.  The 
ADB has since stopped using rectangles to designate corridors, instead using solid lines 
as shown in Figure 23.  However, there is little difference between this recent economic 
                                                          
71
 In the past year, the SEC scope has expanded to connect Ho Chi Minh City with Yangon, Burma via 
Phnom Penh and Bangkok, and from Yangon to India.  Accordingly, it is now labeled the Southern 
Industrial Corridor or the Mekong-India Corridor.    
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corridor map and the Map of the GMS road network above (Figure 21).  This highlights a 
central dilemma for the ADB, that the economic corridors have not progressed beyond an 
infrastructure project.     
The economic corridors are a primary means for Thailand, Cambodia and other 
GMS member states to gain control of border regions, particularly ‗illegal‘ border trade 
that has long been the lifeline of border-based insurgent groups.  Trade facilitation and 
infrastructure development programs implemented under the auspices of the ADB‘s GMS 
program have assisted states‘ efforts to gain control of ‗vague‘ areas.  They are also key 
elements addressing uneven development within national boundaries and more broadly in 
the sub-region.   
The economic corridors are promoted as ‗bounded‘ ways of expanding sub-
regional cooperation stemming from infrastructure projects to fully fledged economic 
corridors.  To date, road networks are largely complete (with the important exception of 
Burma, see Chapter 7), and are complimented by ongoing implementation of the Cross-
Border Transport Agreement and the Strategic Framework for Action on Trade 
Facilitation and Investment.  These projects facilitate the movement of goods, people, 
and vehicles along the corridors.  For instance, goods can now be shipped from Mae Sot 
on the Thai-Burma border to Vietnam with a single customs inspection in less than four 
days.  A few years ago the same trip would take several weeks.  These projects 
have helped to establish an operational transport corridor.  In summary, the development 
of an economic corridor is a complex and long-term process for the ADB and member 
states, and the transformation into fully-fledged economic corridor are at beginning 
stages.   
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Figure 23: Economic Corridors and Border Growth Nodes in 2000; Economic 
Corridors in 2007 
 
Source: ADB (2002); Stone and Strutt (2009)  
The Cross-border Transport Agreement 
The primary policy framework of the economic corridors is the cross-border 
transport agreement (CBTA).  The CBTA is a comprehensive multilateral instrument that 
covers relevant aspects of cross-border transport facilitation, including single-stop/single-
window customs inspection; exchange of traffic rights; and transit traffic regimes 
(Goswami 2009).  Ishida (2008) summarizes the delays in implementing the CBTA.   
First, the CBTA documents are known to government officials who participated in 
negotiations, but officials at border check points do not understand them.  Second, the 
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CBTA was signed by the ministers of transportation, but sectionalism has arisen since the 
process excluded ministries such as taxation, health, agriculture and homeland affairs.   
Figure 24: Economic corridors in 2007 
 
Source: ADB  
143 
 
 
 
Third, there are numerous contradictions between the CBTA and domestic regulations.  
Seemingly simple facilities such as common control areas, a physical space used by two 
countries at the border for inspection, have not been set up throughout most of the 
economic corridors.  To date the only single-stop and single-window inspection 
established are at the Lao Bao, Vietnam—Dansavan, Laos border (single-stop) and the 
Mukdahan, Thailand—Savannakhet, Laos border (single-window) along the East-West 
Economic Corridor.     
Shipping from Bangkok to Hanoi is a primary interest for many Japanese 
corporations, in particular auto companies who wish to transport Thailand-produced auto 
parts for vehicle assembly in Hanoi.  It is a primary reason the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) focuses attention on this and other corridors.  Since the opening of 
the Second Friendship Bridge over the Mekong at the Thai-Laos border, travel time from 
Bangkok to Da Nang has been reduced to between three and three-and-a-half days 
(JETRO 2008).  In contrast, shipping by sea from Bangkok to Viet Nam takes between 
five and ten days since there are few direct cargo lines from Bangkok to Hanoi (ibid). For 
example, a ship loaded in Laem Chabang, Thailand‘s largest port, is usually un/re-loaded 
in Hong Kong, and then another ship from a feeder line conveys the cargo to Hai Phong, 
Vietnam.  Despite the time advantage of shipping by road from Bangkok to Hanoi, the 
costs are much higher than the traditional sea-route.  Table 16 below shows that shipping 
costs by land are nearly double those of sea transport.  Sea transport including 
transshipment cost represents about 30 percent of the transport cost but represent more 
than 70 percent of transit time (JETRO 2008). Trucking cost represents around 15 percent 
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of the total transport cost.  JETRO found that administrative formalities take up to 36 
percent of total transport cost from Bangkok to Hanoi via the maritime route. 
Table 16: East-West Economic Corridor vs. Maritime Route (between Bangkok and 
Hanoi) 
 EWEC Maritime 
Distance (km) 1,649 2,742 
Time (hrs) 74 213 
Cost (TEU) $5,500 $2,500 
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (2008) 
Note: TEU – twenty-foot equivalent unit 
 
JETRO (2008) found several reasons for the high land shipping costs from 
Bangkok to Hanoi.  First, at present the movement of transit goods along the EWEC is 
only in the direction of Vietnam for goods originating in Thailand; there is little or no 
movement of goods originating in Vietnam destined for Thailand.  According to a 
representative of Schenker (Thai) Company, this adds 50% to the cost (interview 
November 27, 2009), while JETRO contends that moving empty containers nearly 
doubles shipping costs (JETRO 2008).  In addition, right-hand-drive vehicles are used in 
Thailand, and left-hand-drive vehicles are used in Laos and Vietnam.  This means that 
trucks must be trans-loaded or swung over
72
 at the Mukdahan-Savannakhet border to left-
hand driven trucks. The Thai trucks must then return to their origin without cargo, while 
those that arrive from Vietnam must return empty to the Mukdahan-Savannakhet border 
after delivery of the goods to their destination (JETRO 2008).  Mutual entry is permitted 
into Lao PDR for Thai and Vietnamese trucks, but truck entry is prohibited between 
Thailand and Vietnam.  Due to the absence of inland container depots in Mukdahan-
Savannakhet, goods are brought to the border as loose cargo, then transferred to trucks 
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 Swinging cargo prevents them from lolo (lift on-lift off), and is the preferred method.  
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from the bordering country and, if destined for ports, transported to them and then loaded 
into containers (ibid).  
Another major cost is unofficial payments at borders.  Corruption in public 
service along the highway is a major concern of logistics companies. JETRO found that 
the primary problem is the uncertainty of the size of those payments rather than their 
general existence.  These findings were reinforced in interviews conducted during 
fieldwork in Thailand and Cambodia.  One informant noted that Lao officials, fearful that 
their country is being passed over in sub-regional development, see rent seeking from 
transport as their only chance to benefit from GMS initiatives.
73
  This, the industry 
official claimed, induced many to use sea or air routes rather than land.  JETRO contends 
that if the unofficial payments are known in advance, then the cost could be transferred to 
customers.  But without this predictability in payments, the costs are necessarily being 
absorbed by transport and logistics companies (see Malesky 2007).   
John Quarmby, Chairman/VP of Schenker (Thai) Co Ltd, a subsidiary of Deutche 
Bahn, noted in an interview that the CBTA is not working.  He said that ―the boxes take 
on a life of their own and become a constraint‖ [referring to the economic corridors in the 
maps above] (interview November 27, 2009).  He said that firms can only get a tri-lateral 
trucking permit, for shipping through Thailand-Laos-Vietnam, for instance, if they take 
out a customs bond, which is expensive.  Currently, the transit permit is only valid inside 
of the corridor, which limits its effectiveness since few companies are shipping strictly 
within the parameters of the East-West Corridor between Da Nang and central-western 
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Cambodia and Laos may never be a major destination for Japanese FDI.  But, Thailand and Vietnam are 
and Japanese investors need Cambodia and Laos to be part of an efficient sub-regional logistics network, 
even if only transport/logistics hub with some potential small scale industrial spill off. 
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Thailand.  Rather, currently Bangkok—Hanoi is seen as the most important route (Ishida 
2007).       
 In summary, the major infrastructure components of East-West and other 
Economic Corridors have been completed.  In the transformation of the East-West 
transport corridor into an economic corridor, the major accomplishments of the initial 
strategy and action plan set out in the 2001 Pre-Investment Study relate to the Cross 
Border Trade Agreement, in addition to the GMS tourism sector strategy, and the GMS 
Business Forum.  However, only about one-sixth of the policy, project, program and 
institutional initiatives have been implemented to date, and roughly another one-sixth 
have been either partially implemented or are in the process of being implemented (ADB 
2009b:4).   
The second stage of the corridor development is now focusing on the reduction of 
poverty, development of rural and border areas, improvements in the earnings of low 
income and vulnerable groups, including the provision of employment opportunities for 
women, and the promotion of tourism along the Corridor (ADB 2009b:8).
 74
  This 
highlights the ADB‘s ―pro-poor‖ agenda and promotion of political stability.  This 
benefits many businesses, but of course companies will not relocate simply to benefit 
rural areas.  The driving force behind the second stage is ―empowering the private sector 
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 According to the ADB (2009b:49): ―The driving force behind cross-border EWEC investment today 
remains the same as it was when it was first elaborated a decade ago in the Asian Development Bank‘s 
2001 study Pre-Investment Study. In the context of medium and long-term framework, the EWEC trade and 
investment model is one that not only determines the growth potential of intra-regional trade resulting from 
differences in factor endowments, but also one that builds on the growing world-wide trend towards the 
globalization of production and lower production costs from economies of scale and expanding extra-
regional trade. The EWEC provides an opportunity to obtain economies of scale in the production of cross-
border industries, and this larger production area, in turn, provides the basis with which to develop intra-
firm trade, implement marketing processes that take advantage of vertical and horizontal product 
differentiation in markets outside the region, expand the volume of intra-industry trade within the EWEC, 
and bring in much needed domestic and foreign investment and financial capital to the subregion.‖ 
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to promote sustained private sector-led economic growth‖ (ADB 2009b:22).  A 
distinction between the second stage and action plan and the first stage established by the 
2001 Pre-investment Study for the GMS Economic Corridors (ADB 2001) is that the 
private sector will take the initiative in identifying commercial opportunities and the role 
of the government and development partners will be to facilitate that process (ADB 
2009b:8).
75
   
In this framework for economic corridors the ADB is forwarding a general 
stylized model that delineates a niche for the state-as-facilitator that is separate from 
markets.  For instance, border SEZs are promoted to act as private sector-led growth 
nodes that will transform transport corridors into functional economic corridors.  In other 
words, the lack of private sector participation in the transport corridors is a major reason 
why border SEZs have become a prominent focus as ‗incubators‘ of investment, sub-
regional cooperation and economic activation of the fixed capital physical infrastructure 
projects.  In the following section I show one instance wherein the private sector is 
―leading‖ in SEZ implementation and the state is ―facilitating.‖  
 
The Next Generation of SEZs  
SEZs are defined…as geographically delimited areas, frequently physically 
secured, that are usually, but not always, outside the customs territory of the host 
country.  They range in size from single factories to large cities. SEZs are under 
single management, either government or private-sector. Businesses located 
within SEZs are normally eligible for benefits such as duty and tax exemptions on 
goods based on the fact that they are physically located within the zone. Different 
countries have used different names for zones with these characteristics. These 
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 This approach is taken to avoid earlier difficulties that arose from efforts to identify commercial 
opportunities as part of the economic corridor implementation process that failed to be taken up by the 
private sector because the conditions surrounding the projects were not addressed at the sub-regional, 
national and provincial levels (ADB 2009b:22). 
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include ‗industrial free zone‘ and ‗export free zone‘ in Ireland, ‗maquiladora‘ in 
Mexico, ‗duty free export processing zone‘ and ‗free export zone‘ in the Republic 
of Korea, ‗export processing zone‘ in the Philippines, ‗investment promotion 
zone‘ in Sri Lanka, ‗foreign trade zone‘ in India and ‗free zone‘ in the United 
Arab Emirates.‖  
Creskoff and Walkenhorst (2009:7-8)  
 
EPZs and SEZs are usually associated with the world‘s major export oriented 
economies, particularly Mexico‘s Maquiladoras, China‘s SEZs, and EPZs in the Taiwan, 
Korea, Indonesia and Thailand.  These associations persist despite major changes in the 
structure, policies and practices of different bounded economic zones.  They persist 
despite the fact that different zones are prevalent in industrialized countries as well.  For 
instance, the US has 266 foreign trade zones (FIAS 2008:57); many companies use them 
to take advantage of operating in a flexible, duty-free environment.   
The past 30 years have seen a rapid increase in the number of countries initiating 
internationally oriented production and trade zones.  In 1975 there were 79 zones in 25 
countries around the world, employing about 800,000 people (ILO 2003).  A study 
undertaken in 1987 on behalf of the International Labour Organization identified 
approximately 175 EPZs in 53 countries, while a 1995 study cited by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development identified approximately 500 EPZs in 73 
countries (Schrank 2001: 223).  By some estimates, in the mid-2000s there are 
approximately 3,000 zones in 135 countries (FIAS 2008:5), with 2,301 zones in 119 
developing and transition countries, clustered mainly in Asia and the Pacific and the 
Americas (World Bank 2008:26).  Altogether, these zones account for approximately 
$200 billion in gross exports per annum and directly employ some 40 million workers, 
and perhaps some 60 million indirectly (ibid).  Importantly, data shows that zone 
ownership has gone from 100% government owned and operated in 1975 (ILO 2003), to 
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roughly 25% privately owned and operated zones in the 1980s, to 62% privately owned 
and operated SEZs in the mid-2000s (FIAS 2008:18).   
 Many countries, including India and Cambodia use the term special economic 
zone to refer to a zone as small as a few hundred hectares that has little if anything in 
common with the scope and scale of SEZs like Shenzhen (396 sq km and China‘s largest 
port) the Aqaba SEZ in Jordan (375 sq km, including a sea- and airport), the Clark SEZ 
in the Philippines (330 sq km, an airport) and the proposed Mae Sot-Myawaddy SEZ in 
Thailand-Burma that covers several border districts and cities in two countries (see 
Chapter 8) (see Table 17).    
Table 17: Size of select economic zones 
Country Zone Size 
Thailand Amata Nakorn 30.2 sq km  
Thailand Amata City 13.5 sq km  
Vietnam Amata City, Bien Hoa 7.0 sq km  
Cambodia  Kiri Sakor Koh Kong SEZ 17.5 sq km  
Cambodia Sihanoukville SEZ 2 16.8 sq km  
Cambodia Phnom Penh SEZ 3.5 sq km  
Cambodia Sihanoukville SEZ 1 1.78 sq km  
Cambodia Manhattan SEZ  1.57 sq km  
Source: Author‘s compilation 
In the past EPZs and Maquiladoras competed primarily on the basis of fiscal 
incentives, differential labor regulation mechanisms such as reducing or altogether 
banning trade union activity, and/or proximity to major markets. In the case of 
Maquiladoras and China‘s coastal SEZs, the wage differential from major investment 
sources, the US and Hong Kong-Taiwan respectively, were of paramount importance.  As 
the global factory expands and deepens its reach these factor costs are still important, as 
clearly demonstrated in case studies throughout this dissertation.  But, according to the 
World Bank-FIAS (2008) international manufacturers have realized that there is much 
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greater scope to reduce logistics costs than production costs.  This helps to explain the 
proliferation of SEZs over the past 30 years.   
The new generation of SEZs that is emerging differentiate themselves in terms of 
facilities, services, and most importantly, streamlined procedures, and purpose-built 
technology.  Therefore, many zones, especially those that are privately run, are rapidly 
reconfiguring themselves into efficient distribution, production, and trade facilitation 
hubs that reduce logistics costs in order to meet this demand from investors (FIAS 2008).  
Ishida (2008) contends that the as modes of transport have diversified, the day when 
companies can choose the most efficient mode of transport—via sea, air, roads and 
railways—will soon be realized (addressing ‗problems‘ identified above).  Going 
forward, Ishida argues that with the additional options provided by these different modes 
of transport, companies‘ behavior will change (Ishida 2008:34).  Thus, in theory 
embeddening formerly peripheral border areas and countries such as Burma, Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam into global production networks.    
 
Cambodia‟s SEZs 
Cambodia‘s Special Economic Zone Decree was passed on December 29, 2005, 
and with it the Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board was formed.  The Cambodia 
SEZ Board has approved the establishment of 21 SEZs through 2010.  One is in Phnom 
Penh where industry is currently concentrated and seven are located in or near the peri-
urban port city of Sihanoukville.  The remaining thirteen are along Cambodia‘s borders 
with Thailand and Vietnam (See Figure 25).   Six were operational in 2009.
76
  The first to 
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  ―A new ADB technical assistance project has been approved to provide capacity building for the SEZ 
development since investment flows into the area have been minimal.  An assessment attributes the 
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begin manufacturing was the Manhattan SEZ in Bavet near the Cambodia-Vietnam 
border (June 2006), followed by the Phnom Penh SEZ (July 2006).   
Figure 25: Entrances to the Manhattan SEZ (Bavet) and Koh Kong SEZ (Koh 
Kong) 
 
Photos: Dennis Arnold 
 
On the surface it appears that Cambodia is following global SEZ trends.  Almost 
all SEZs in Cambodia are privately developed (this is problematized in Chapter 6), they 
offer one-stop services to address bureaucratic and other state inefficiencies.  SEZs in 
Cambodia are designed to insulate themselves from the rest of the country, where the 
business climate is considered unfavorable to investors, export-oriented foreign invested 
firms in particular. SEZs are enclaves that are outside the customs territory of Cambodia, 
where investors benefit from a favorable tax regime and the exemption of duties.  
However, these benefits apply to all industrial zones throughout Cambodia.  SEZs 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
sluggish development to the following factors: (i) the lack of a national strategic road map for guiding the 
country to pursue SEZ development; (ii) an unclear institutional framework among central agencies and 
between central and provincial authorities; (iii) a weak legal framework and the absence of regulatory 
guidelines; (iv) insufficient technically-qualified officials for SEZ management, investment analyses, and 
negotiations with investors; and (v) the absence of information dissemination and SEZ promotion targeting 
potential investors and beneficiaries‖ (ADB 2009b:51). 
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Figure 26: Map of Cambodia‟s Special Economic Zones 
 
Source: Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board 
 
attempt to differentiate themselves by providing better and/or cheaper infrastructure 
services, e.g. transportation, telecommunication and energy.  They are also offer a new 
spatial regulation of labor where employers can more closely control activist workers and 
trade unions.  They are a way to address cumbersome bureaucracy and rent seeking 
activities.  Importantly for Cambodia, SEZs are promoted as a means to diversify 
industry beyond dependence on apparel exports to include agro-industry and motor 
vehicle assembly.  Furthermore, SEZs are touted as spreading the benefits of links to the 
regional and global economy to provinces with high poverty rates and lack of 
employment options.    
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This is all happening, and the ‗technical‘ aspects of border SEZs, including 
infrastructure development, electricity, transit times etc dominates much of the literature 
and thinking on the subject (Kudo 2009; ADB 2009a, 2009b).  That said, the Indochina 
branch President of a Japanese Fortune 500 corporation, Itochu, said ―If we need to go [to 
a particular location or country], we will go whether there is an economic zone or 
not…SEZs are not enough for FDI.  Education, infrastructure, labor and environmental 
compliance are all important.  Bribery is also an issue, we are afraid of such things.‖ 
 
Border SEZs and Bavet 
One of the primary means to promote SEZs is the ‗One Stop Service‘ of the 
CDC/Cambodia SEZ Board that is located within each SEZ.  This is the key structural 
difference between an SEZ and industrial zones in Cambodia, in addition to the larger 
size of SEZs.  This means government officials are located at each site, issuing permits 
for investors, facilitating import-export processes and other administrative clearances.   
Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training staff are also located at each One Stop center.  
The One Stop Service is intended to reduce time and money spent going to Phnom Penh 
to deal with documents and licenses and approval of new investments, which are all 
located in different offices.   
Interestingly in the case of Cambodia, salaries of government employees stationed 
at the One Stop Service are paid by the SEZ administrators as stipulated in the SEZ 
Decree.  At the Manhattan SEZ there were 22 One Stop Service staff in 2009.  The head 
of the Manhattan SEZ estimates that the zone only needs about 10 One Stop officials 
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(interview, May 19, 2009).
77
  A Cambodia SEZ Board official estimates that salary for 
each One Stop staff including accommodation is roughly $150/month per person.   He 
recognized that the government ―cannot force them [the SEZ administrators] to pay a 
salary at any particular rate, it can be $100 or $200.‖  He went on to say that ―I know this 
practice is completely different from neighboring countries, but government salary 
happens like this [in Cambodia]‖ (interview November 10, 2009).  Larry Kao of the 
Manhattan SEZ noted in interviews that government fees are generally lower inside of 
the zone, and he also believes that SEZs are one way to address the problem of BBC in 
Cambodia—bribes, bureaucracy and corruption (interview November 13, 2009).  Another 
analyst suggested in an interview that SEZs will not eliminate graft, but will make it 
‗easier to see.‘   
Figure 27: Basic Concepts and Conditions for SEZs in Cambodia 
Regarding the basic concept and conditions for the SEZ, the SEZ Sub-decree 
defines as follows. 
 SEZ refers to the special area for the development of the economic 
sectors which brings together all industrial and other related 
activities and may include General Industrial Zones and/or Export 
Processing Zones. Each Special Economic Zone shall have a 
Production Area which may have a Free Trade Area, Service Area, 
Residential Area and Tourist Area. 
 It must have a land of more than 50 hectares with precise location 
and geographic boundaries. 
 It must have a surrounding fence (for Export Processing Zone, the 
Free Trade Area and for the premises of each investor in each 
zone). 
 It must have management office building and Zone Administration 
offices and all necessary infrastructures must be provided. 
 It must have water sewage network, waste water treatment network, 
location for storage and management of solid wastes, environment-
protection measures and other related infrastructures as deemed 
necessary. 
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 The Manhattan SEZ staff in Bavet comprises 20 people: 3 Taiwanese, 5 Chinese, 1 Vietnamese and 11 
Cambodians.   
155 
 
Source: CDC http://www.asean-investment.net/cam/?q=sez_con (last accessed January 
12, 2009) 
  The high cost of electricity is another key impetus for SEZs in Cambodia.  SEZs 
located inland have installed power plants to generate their own electricity, while those at 
the border buy cheaper electricity from Thailand or Vietnam.  For instance, power in 
Phnom Penh costs about $0.20 per kw/h, while power at the Manhattan SEZ on the 
Cambodia-Vietnam border charges $0.125 per kw/h.  This is still high compared to 
Vietnam.  For instance, electricity in the Linh Trung EPZ in Vietnam is $0.6 per kw/h.   
Although the Southern Economic Corridor is still not fully functional, Cambodia 
and Vietnam have reached a bi-lateral agreement on shipping into the Bavet SEZs.  
Trucks bound to/from the Manhattan and other Bavet SEZs need only stop at customs 
once, by the Vietnamese authorities while in transit to Ho Chi Minh City and by 
Cambodian border officials in transit to Cambodia.  Trucks loaded at the Bavet SEZs are 
sealed on site and cleared by customs officials working in the One Stop Service.  
Paperwork is then checked by Vietnamese officials.  Trucks traveling between Ho Chi 
Minh City and Phnom Penh must stop for inspection twice, by both Cambodian and 
Vietnamese authorities at the border, and at another 3 checkpoints before reaching 
Phnom Penh (interview, Hean Sophauline, Cambodia SEZ Board, November 10, 2009).  
Manufacturers in Bavet thus have lower transport costs compared to other parts of 
Cambodia.  The factories in Bavet are all assemblers, importing all inputs from Vietnam, 
and all exports are shipped through Saigon ports.   
Five SEZs have been approved in Bavet, two have started operations, the 
Manhattan and Tai Seng SEZs (see Figure 26).  Both are 6km from the border checkpoint 
and are located on opposite sides of the highway from one another.  Of the six factories 
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operating in the Manhattan SEZ in 2009 (down from nine in 2008), two are mainland 
Chinese firms that received subsidies from the Chinese government to ‗go-out.‘  The 
other four companies are Taiwanese owned.  Three of the companies also operate 
factories in Vietnam, Kingmaker, SYG and Bestway (interview, Yu Chao-Kuan, 
Manhattan SEZ).  The six factories employed some 3,000 Cambodians in 2009, a 
majority from Svay Rieng province (ibid).  It is estimated by zone officials that at full 
capacity it can employ 15,000.  Nationally, of 31 manufacturers operating in 6 SEZs, 10 
are in textiles and garments and footwear (7 and 3 respectively), demonstrating a degree 
of investment diversity.  11 of 31 zone investors are in the Phnom Penh SEZ.  As of 
2010, the most high profile manufacturer involved in Cambodia‘s SEZs is Hyundai, who 
plan to commence auto assembly in a Koh Kong SEZ in 2011 (on the Thai border, near 
Thailand‘s Eastern Seaboard).   
In addition to the Kingmaker factory addressed in Chapter 4, the Manhattan SEZ 
has managed to attract the world‘s largest wetsuit manufacturer, Sheico.  Larry Kao from 
the Manhattan SEZ said that Manhattan  
―…has good networking with companies from Taiwan, China, the US etc, we‘re 
not looking for those easy come easy go type of firms…[our] Investors mostly 
know [Manhattan] through networks, but not all of them.  Manhattan has a 
marketing division who deals with some investors in Taiwan.  Sheico found the 
Manhattan website and decided to invest there.  They found it, organized a visit 
and within 2 weeks signed an agreement on May 14, 2008, they wanted their first 
building ready in August for trainings etc, and started exporting in October 2008.  
Now there are 1,900 workers there.  They will have 15 buildings including staff 
housing, they‘re about halfway there now.  They have a factory in Thailand and 
China, not Vietnam.  Sheico likes the image of Cambodia, the products look like 
it‘s from a country that emphasizes labor conditions.‖  (interview, November 13, 
2009).  
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Mr. Kao said that each SEZ in Cambodia has its own advantages.  In Manhattan‘s 
case the advantages include its proximity to Vietnam, that it is not run by a land 
speculator [referring to the Phnom Penh and other SEZs], and that his company works 
with the government in facilitation, yet is the ―least connected with government among 
the current SEZs, [we] work within the system, without using personal or social 
connections with the government‖ (interview, November 13, 2009).  Peter Brimble, a 
business and development consultant working the region for several decades, said that 
―Manhattan has street credibility to run a zone.78  The Phnom Penh SEZ are not real 
players in the business they‘re involved.  Attwood Group [comprising half of PPSEZ 
shares] is a trading company, the original Japanese investor is a real estate company that 
went under…‖ (interview, November 7, 2009).   
 In summary, the Manhattan SEZ offers investors a new spatial regulation of labor 
(addressed in Chapter 3) and is addressing many of the high costs and uncompetitive 
factors that are inhibiting Cambodia‘s capitalist growth (addressed in Chapter 2).  It is 
also utilizing ADB infrastructure projects through its location on the Phnom Penh-Ho Chi 
Minh City Highway, and it is on the leading edge of activating one important border 
growth node in the Southern Economic Corridor.  Furthermore, the deep links between 
Bavet and Vietnam-based factories demonstrates the necessity of the economic corridor‘s 
focus on logistics.  The Cambodian state is facilitating the development and investment in 
the Manhattan SEZ, primarily through the One Stop Service Center and by housing 
(most) rent-seeking activities under one roof.  In the following chapter I argue that this is 
not a general pattern in Cambodia‘ SEZs.  Rather, Manhattan is an exceptional case.  In 
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 Manhattan International Co. Ltd. and its parent groups Universal Joint International and Medtecs 
International have 10 years of experience in owning and operating an industrial zone in Cambodia. 
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fact, the Cambodian state and business interests with deep links to the state (often acting 
in both capacities) are leading implementation of SEZs.   
Conclusions  
With competition intensifying in low-cost labor intensive export-oriented sectors, 
GMS countries have initiated cooperative regional and trans-national policies aimed at 
more fully integrating rural and border spaces into the regional and global economy.  The 
primary driver is seen to be foreign direct investment from the broader Asia region, in 
many cases ‗go-out‘ capital from China and manufacturers pursuing a China+1 strategy.  
In this process, state and multi-lateral organization policies play an enormous role in 
shaping the geographical patterns of investment and social regulation.  In the case of 
Cambodia these networks emerged in response to the ‗failures‘ of central state authorities 
to implement infrastructure and trade facilitation programs, with the ADB stepping in to 
create a framework and the new opportunity structures that transnational manufacturers 
exploit.  I have shown that the border is increasingly becoming the site in which these 
new articulations of investment and spatial administration are emerging. 
This chapter demonstrates the layering of interests and initiatives that foster the 
emerging GMS geo-economy.  Transport corridors are largely the result of ADB 
programs, and SEZs are becoming prominent incubators of growth in the sub-region.  
SEZs are becoming a key component transforming the ADB‘s transport corridors into 
economic corridors.  There is a delineation of ‗duties and responsibilities‘ in these 
respects.
79
  The ADB is not able to lead the process of SEZ implementation and border 
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Ronald Butiong of the ADB said that the ADB does not yet have a strategy on border economic zones.  
The corridor town development project is only in the fact finding phase at the time of writing.  (interview, 
August 21, 2009).  
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town growth.
80
  They can provide technical assistance grants,
81
 but it is up to individual 
states and the private sector to bring these initiatives to fruition.  From the perspective of 
economic corridors and SEZs, states‘ role is to facilitate capital to produce smooth 
spaces.  The following chapter looks at a different set of state interests in border SEZs.  
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 One possible exception is the Savan-Seno SEZ in Laos where the ADB has provided substantial financial 
and technical support (see Abonyi 2006).   
81
 For instance, the ADB proposed technical assistance of $400,000 for the project: ―Feasability study of 
establishing special border economic zone/Industrial estate at Mae Sot District, Tak Province, Thailand.‖  
See http://www.adb.org/GMS/Projects/devmatrix.asp?fl=2 (last accessed April 9, 2010).  
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Chapter 6  
Activating the Borderlands: Public-private Dynamics of SEZs in Cambodia 
Introduction  
Throughout the GMS specific border and cross-border zones once seen as 
territorial boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly 
being re-articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.  Cambodia‘s recent history of border-based insurgencies and political 
opposition meant it was not in the interests of the central governments to allow border 
regions to expand economic autonomy, and this is still the case in the late 2000s.  The 
consolidation of the CPP‘s power between 2001 and 2008 is, in no small part, a critical 
component of the push to industrialize the borderlands.  In this chapter I show that border 
SEZs represent a new regulatory regime offering new opportunities for profit and power.  
It is a process wherein the state is often acting in a private capacity and the private sector 
in a state capacity, and both are more deeply engaging the industrial economy, perhaps 
for the first time in Cambodia‘s history.  The result is that institutions of national-cross-
border governance and development infrastructure have emerged in ways that combine 
authoritarian political and liberal economic features to manage the ways in which 
different production systems are able to compete in the global economy.   
Whereas Thailand‘s four proposed border SEZs are popularly constructed as 
‗economic dams‘ preventing the ‗contamination‘ of migrants from neighboring countries 
(see Chapter 7), Cambodia‘s border SEZs are important elements of the Cambodian 
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People‘s Party‘s (CPP) political legitimacy.  In other words, the focus is the political 
significance of industrializing Cambodia‘s borderlands.  The previous chapter showed 
that in certain cases border SEZs in Cambodia follow the ADB discourse that economic 
cooperation is necessary for sustained development.  As such, they are economic conduits 
with more diversified neighboring economies and the Asia-regional division of labor.  At 
the same time, border SEZs reaffirm Cambodia‘s territorial integrity at the physical 
border.   
The first part of this chapter focuses on Bavet‘s proximity to Ho Chi Minh City.  
Its location is now considered an advantage in terms of economic corridors and SEZs.  In 
recent history it has led to a series of conflicts.  Bavet is in Chantrea district and is part of 
the ―Parrot‘s Beak‖ as it was known during the wars of the 1960s-1970s.  As such, it was 
a key strategic site of the US invasion of Cambodia in 1970 that, among other things, 
sparked protests at Kent State and other US universities.  It was later a launching site for 
Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam in 1977-1978 to reclaim ‗lost territory.‘  In 2009 
Cambodia‘s opposition leader Sam Rainsy (head of the Sam Rainsy Party) and local 
farmers pulled up border stakes in Chantrea district, claiming Vietnamese encroachment.  
This led to a two year jail sentence for Sam in absentia, a sentence that could mean the 
end of the only significant opposition party left in Cambodia.  Border SEZs are important 
elements of the Cambodian People‘s Party‘s (CPP) material and discursive control of 
Cambodia‘s territory, particularly its troubled borderlands.   
The second part of this chapter demonstrates that greater co-operation between 
national elites may contribute to lessening the specter of inter-state war, and the 
superpower-fuelled carnage of the Cold War (and Khmer Rouge) era are becoming or 
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already are a distant memory (Hughes 2011).  But, economic development and sub-
regional integration has changed the pattern of political contestation in border areas.  This 
suggests that in the short run at least, the transformative potential of border development 
projects is limited: outcomes reflect rather than reshape national and regional orders of 
power (ibid).  It also means a newfound role for Cambodia‘s elites in border 
industrialization initiatives.  SEZs are a component of Cambodia‘s elite‘ domination of 
the natural resource-based economy and into globally connected manufacturing, logistics 
and services zones.  SEZs are not a new industrial policy, rather it is part of the political-
economic process of further consolidation of power in a few hands. 
 
Political Context 
Historical circumstances are central factors when considering the relative 
weakness of Cambodia‘s position in global production networks. Social disintegration in 
Cambodia following the US War in Indochina and the legacy of the Khmer Rouge regime 
have led to a society and state faced with the task of rebuilding from near total 
devastation.  This section briefly outlines how Cambodia came to be in this situation, 
indicating that Cambodia‘s state and society had few options beyond engaging the global 
economy in ways proscribed by donor/lending organizations and nations—the TATA and 
Better Factories Cambodia Program being prominent aspects of this.  However, as state 
reconstruction progresses and memories of the wars fade, the Cambodian state is 
increasingly making its presence felt in industrial and labor relations policies.  
Under the US-backed Lon Nol regime Cambodia was increasingly drawn into the 
US Wars in Indochina.  Cambodia was a ―Sideshow‖ in the US war in Vietnam and the 
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implications were devastating (Shawcross 1979).  One result was the Nixon 
administration‘s carpet bombing of Cambodia from 1965 to1973 (Owen and Kiernan, 
2006). This bombing left much of rural Cambodia devastated and galvanized popular 
support for the ultra-nationalist Maoist Khmer Rouge who, prior to the bombings, had 
little popular support (Chandler, 1991).  The Khmer Rouge victory led to a three and a 
half year rule (from April 1975 through December 1978), a period that left an estimated 1 
to 1.7 million, or one-eight up to a third of the population, dead from execution, torture, 
starvation and hard labor (Chandler, 1991; Owen and Kiernan, 2006).  This period saw an 
already shattered economy and infrastructure further devastated and a state disabled by 
the Khmer Rouge‘s disastrous experiment in national self-reliance and self-styled Maoist 
transformation.  
Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 in response to repeated Khmer 
Rouge border incursions and occupied the country until 1989.  A pro-Vietnam 
government, the People‘s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) led by the Khmer People‘s 
Revolutionary Party (to become the Cambodian People‘s Party, or CPP in 1991) began 
rebuilding the country through the 1980s (Gottesman, 2003).  This was hindered by 
international sanctions backed primarily by the US, the ASEAN nations, Western 
European countries and China, who condemned Vietnam‘s invasion. At the same time, 
the PRK was also fighting a civil war with the Khmer Rouge, which received substantial 
political and material support from these same Asian and Western countries (Robinson, 
2001).  
In 1991 negotiations led to the Comprehensive Political Settlement for Cambodia, 
with four Cambodian factions signing a Settlement which called for the creation of the 
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United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the largest operation in UN history.  
This signaled the beginning of the last phase of civil war and decades of armed conflict in 
Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge dropped out of the agreement and continued a declining 
guerrilla warfare through the late 1990s.  Multi-party, UN-supervised, elections were 
conducted in 1993, with the royalist National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 
Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) winning the largest vote and an 
uneasy coalition with the CPP. Following a coup in 1997, the CPP came to power, led by 
Hun Sen.  The CPP and Hun Sen have remained in power, winning disputed elections, in 
on-again, off-again coalitions with FUNCINPEC through the 2003 elections. In the 2008 
National Assembly elections the CPP further consolidated its power, winning 90 of 123 
seats. 
Following the Settlement and elections, bilateral aid and loans from governments 
including Japan, the US, China and Australia, in addition to funding from the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank, UNDP and others increased dramatically.
82
  Since the 
early 1990s development aid has been the economic foundation of Cambodia‘s state; the 
US Department of State (2009) reported that about half of the central government‘s 
budget depended on donor assistance, with $698.2 million in grants and concessional 
loans pledged for calendar year 2007.  Due to this heavy reliance on foreign aid, 
Cambodia is subject to donor requirements.  These foster the circulation of capital and 
western notions of development.
83
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 On 3 January 1992, the US lifted its embargo against Cambodia, thus normalising economic relations. 
The US also ended blanket opposition to lending to Cambodia by international financial institutions (US 
Department of State 2009). 
83
 The focus of these international interventions derives primarily from neo-liberal approaches favoured by 
dominant actors in the international system, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as 
well as Western donor nations. Hughes (2007: 836) contends that ―these actors espouse an agenda of 
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Throughout the 1990s Cambodia‘s state and society were eviscerated and lacking 
a clear centre of political gravity or autonomous development agenda.  Cambodia thus 
entered the global economy from a position of institutional and economic weakness.  
Cambodia had few domestic capacities to resist international and/or neo-liberal policies, 
and the small political elites of the country supported many of these polices.    
However, with the consolidation of the CPP‘s power in 2003 and subsequent 
elections the Cambodian state is better positioned to put forward an economic 
development agenda that reflects the interests of domestic elites.  Special economic zones 
are a particularly clear illustration of this trend.  However, a majority of SEZs in 
Cambodia are owned and in some cases developed by Cambodians who are part of the 
small ruling elite.  While some may be regarded as land speculators, it signals a shift 
toward a more clearly defined role of Cambodians and the central government in 
industrialization initiatives.     
 
From “Parrot‟s Beak” to SEZs: Wars and Border Tensions  
Penny Edwards (2007) finds that several key nationalist notions that drove Pol 
Pot‘s revolution have found a place in the ideological armature of all of Cambodia‘s 
postcolonial regimes—they all have sought legitimacy in the imagery of Angkor Wat.  
Throughout, Angkor Wat‘s towers and its emblem of antiquity has come to signify 
Cambodia‘s sovereignty, symbolizing faith in Cambodia‘s past glory, and fears of the 
country‘s future disappearance (Edwards 2007:5).  Cambodia is positioned between two 
much more powerful neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, countries that, according to 
                                                                                                                                                              
poverty reduction and economic progress, tied a priori to a model that regards economic growth as the key 
to development, and privatisation and liberalisation as the sine qua non of economic growth.‖  This 
―opening‖ fostered the introduction of export oriented garment production.  
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popular sentiment in Cambodia, have over the centuries ―swallowed up‖ the land 
belonging to the Khmers (Pouvatchy 1986; see also Sam Rainsy Party quotes below).  
Today much of the populace still believes that Vietnam is attempting to control or even 
colonize Cambodia through economic and political means.  Combined, the royalist-
oriented political and military factions in Thailand are believed to have ambitions for 
Cambodia‘s Angkorean heritage and territory, expressed most clearly over the conflict at 
the Preah Vihear Temple.
84
  Many pre-colonial kingdoms in what is now the GMS have 
‗disappeared‘ in the maps of modern nation states, including Champa, the Mon, Shan and 
many others.  Cambodia is, perhaps, the only nation state in Southeast Asia in which the 
fear of disappearing has been such a prominent aspect of national politics in the post-
colonial era.   
This section tells a brief history of the Cambodia-Vietnam border at Bavet from 
1970 through 2009.  It is a small piece of land with a deeply troubled past.  The history of 
warfare and territorial disputes makes it important for the CPPs political legitimacy.  In 
particular, the nationalism of the CPP has been called into question since the 1980s due to 
their (continued) reliance on Vietnam for political, military and economic support.  By 
the mid-late 2000s it appears that the CPP has nearly eliminated political opposition, both 
in the polls and in some cases literally.  This enabled the CPP to move ahead on 
implementing SEZs.  For instance, in 2005 Prime Minister Hun Sen signed a 
controversial border agreement with Hanoi, and returned to Phnom Penh threatening to 
jail any critics of the deal (Hughes 2011).  Six individuals were subsequently arrested and 
imprisoned, including trade union leaders, opposition politicians and popular media 
                                                          
84
 In 2004 anti-Thai sentiments boiled over when a Thai actress reportedly said that the Ankor Temple 
complex belonged to the Thais.  This sparked riots and many Thai businesses and the Thai embassy were 
burned down.    
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figures (ibid).  Although later released, these events intimidated the opposition.  With 
border demarcation disputes seemingly resolved and the opposition cowed, the way was 
apparently open for significant development of the border regions (ibid).  It was in 
December 2005 that the SEZ decree was passed. 
 
The Parrot‘s Beak and ―Vietnamization‖ 
Bavet is at the tip of what was known as the ―Parrot‘s Beak‖ during the Vietnam 
War era, or more accurately the US Wars in Indochina.  It took this name due to the piece 
of land that juts into Vietnam, a border established by the French in 1914 (Pouvatchy 
1986) (see Figure 9).  Through much of the 1960s while Cambodia maintained neutrality 
during the US-Vietnam war the Parrot‘s Beak was part of North Vietnam Army-National 
Liberation Front supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  On April 30, 1970 
American and South Vietnamese soldiers invaded Cambodia, in part believing that they 
could destroy enemy bases in and around the Parrot‘s Beak (see Figure 27).  Acting on 
the recommendation of a security adviser to ―Just bite off the Parrot‘s Beak‖ (Shawcross 
1979:144), Nixon decided that ―…you are going to have a hell of an uproar at home if 
you bite off the Beak.  If you are going to take the heat, go for all the marbles…When 
you bite the bullet, bite it hard—go for the big play‖ (ibid).85  The operation failed 
militarily as no bases were found or captured.  It fed outrage in the US over a broadening 
war and protests at Kent State and other campuses ensued.  More importantly, so did 
intensified US bombing of Cambodia through early 1973, that paradoxically strengthened 
the Khmer Rouge (Owen and Kiernan 2006).   
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 Perhaps more importantly, Nixon was sending a message to the Soviets that ―…we‘re not interested in 
Cambodia.  We‘re only interested in it not being used as a base…We‘re trying to shock the Soviets into a 
conference, and we can‘t do this by appearing weak‖ (Shawcross 1979:145).   
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Figure 28: Map of US Invasion of Cambodia, April-June 1970 
 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambodian_Campaign (citing United States Military 
Academy Department of History), last accessed March 20, 2009 
 
In 1977-1978 Svay Rieng and the Parrot‘s Beak were the front of another historic 
conflict, this time as a launching site of Khmer Rouge incursions into Vietnam to reclaim 
‗lost territory‘ in the Mekong Delta.  In September 1977 fighting escalated, with the 
Cambodians attacking Tay Ninh and surrounding provinces in Vietnam ―with ferocity 
and extreme brutality‖ (Jackson 1978:73).  Tay Ninh was the approach route to Ho Chi 
Minh City on the northern side of the Parrot‘s Beak (Leighton 1978).  The Vietnamese 
government at the time considered the Parrot‘s Beak to be a ―virtual dagger pointed at the 
heart of Ho Chi Minh City‖ (Leighton 1978:448).  In response, the Vietnamese launched 
a general offensive along the Cambodia-Vietnamese border.  In November 1977 
Vietnamese forces extended as much as 35 miles into the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia 
(Jackson 1978).  Just as the US invaded the Parrot‘s Beak to uproot what they believed to 
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be the Vietcong‘s nerve center, Hanoi‘s troops marched into the area to wipe out Khmer 
Rouge sanctuaries and supply lines to Vietnamese resistance groups still active in border 
provinces (Leighton 1978).  Vietnam‘s subsequent withdrawal fueled Khmer Rouge 
delusions of a victory, claiming that one Khmer soldier could kill thirty Vietnamese 
soldiers (Morris 1999:104).  This belief led to further Khmer Rouge incursions and 
ultimately a full scale Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 that resulted in a ten year 
occupation.   
Since 1993, minor border demarcation disputes with Vietnam have been used to 
mobilize both anti-CPP and anti-Vietnamese feeling by opposition politicians and 
activists in Cambodia (Hughes 2011).   For instance, on March 14, 1996 the former First 
Prime Minister Ranariddh delivered a speech in Svay Rieng province in which he 
―elaborated at length‖ on the border problems with Vietnam and discussed Cambodia‘s 
historical loss of land to both Vietnam and Thailand (Amer 1997:85).  He reiterated the 
accusations that Vietnam had been encroaching on Cambodian territory since December 
1995 and referred to the situation as one of Vietnamese ―annexation‖ of land in Svay 
Rieng and other Cambodian provinces (ibid).  
More broadly, since independence, irredentist claims to the Mekong delta have 
been a staple of political rhetoric by successive governments, and the reliance of the CPP 
on the Vietnamese army during the period of the civil war in the 1980s has been regularly 
used by opposition parties as a means to raise questions over the party‘s legitimacy and 
patriotism (Hughes 2011).  This, in many ways, reflects Khmer Rouge assertions 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s that Cambodia was being overtaken by the Vietnamese.   
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In Pol Pot‘s interview with Nick Thayer in 1997, less than one year before he died, he 
said: 
First of all, it‘s a historical fact that in 1975 the Vietnamese liberated the South on 
30 April. They told us many years ago that they were going to liberate 
Kampuchea too. They wanted to occupy Kampuchea. Secondly, they invaded 
Kampuchea at the end of 1978. I, my friends and my movement didn‘t submit to 
them but fought back with the support of the international community until the 
Paris agreements. Akashi [the UN supervisor of 1993 elections] said there weren‘t 
any Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. The force was there, they just took off their 
uniforms. And other civilians from Vietnam came in as well. Cambodia was 
under Vietnamese occupation from 1979 to 1991, over ten years. The Vietnam – 
Cambodia border was not controlled by either sea or land. The implementation of 
the Paris agreements was not respected. Only two parties complied. They still 
organized the election. We thought if we took part in the election, we‘d all be 
killed.  
 
 
Sam Rainsy, Cambodia‘s opposition leader, delivers a similar line of anti-Vietnamese 
nationalist tropes: 
 
Farmers from the eastern provinces are telling me that Vietnam nibbles 
Cambodian territories when I meet them as an MP. Hun Sen does not want to see 
this issue discussed, he threatens people who talk about this issue (with sending 
them) ―coffins.‖ Of course, Hun Sen remains under the Vietnamese influence, a 
discreet one but a solid one nevertheless. He still maintains Vietnamese advisors. 
Even the ones from the 80s still stay in Hun Sen‘s entourage. Furthermore, for 
any important decision to be made, he would jump on his helicopter to go to 
Vietnam which is located only a few tens of kilometers from his residence. 
http://www.samrainsy.info/ (last accessed April 6, 2009) 
 
By 2009-2010 it appears that nationalist tropes of the Vietnamization of 
Cambodia as a source of political legitimacy for the opposition are fading in 
effectiveness.  In October 2009 Sam Rainsy and local villagers pulled up six border 
stakes in Chantrea district to stoke anti-Vietnamese nationalism.  Villagers alleged that 
the border markers were an attempt by Vietnam to encroach on Cambodian land, a 
longstanding claim of Sam Rainsy and his party.  On January 27, 2010, the Svay Rieng 
provincial court convicted Rainsy and two villagers, Meas Srey and Prom Chea, on 
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charges of racial incitement and destroying demarcation posts on Cambodia's border with 
Vietnam (Human Rights Watch 2010b).  Sam Rainsy, who was in Paris, was tried in 
absentia and sentenced to two years in prison and fined 8 million riels (approximately 
US$2,000) (ibid).  Meas Srey and Prom Chea were each sentenced to one year in prison 
for destroying public property.  This follows a pattern of criminal charges pressed against 
government critics.  At least 10 government critics were prosecuted for criminal 
defamation and disinformation based on complaints by government and military officials 
during 2009.  Criminal defamation, disinformation, and incitement lawsuits were also 
filed against two members of Parliament from the opposition Sam Rainsy Party, Mu 
Sochua and Ho Vann, and a youth activist, Soung Sophorn (Human Rights Watch 
2010b). 
Sam Rainsy‘s publicity stunt and subsequent conviction coincided with the CPP‘s 
riding a wave of nationalist support for its ‗defense‘ of Cambodia‘s territorial integrity in 
the conflict with Thailand at Preah Vihear Temple (beginning in 2008).  Many civil 
society groups that were once supportive of Mr. Sam‘s calls for transparent and 
democratic governance are now critical of his party's current direction: They see the party 
as having lost touch with its original pro-democracy platform and focusing instead on 
emotional nationalistic disputes with the ruling party (Brady 2010).  "The Sam Rainsy 
Party has become reactionary and lost their core liberal democratic message," says Ou 
Virak, president of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (ibid).  "They have become 
quite weak, and their future is in great trouble if they keep waiting for confrontational 
events to get media attention.  They need to return to offering alternative policies" (ibid).  
The SRP‘s mantra that the ―Vietnamese-subservient Hun Sen government is pushing 
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Cambodia to commit suicide as a nation‖ (www.samrainsyparty.org) is losing 
effectiveness.  Rather, people want concrete action.  A survey released February 2, 2010 
by the International Republican Institute, a long-time supporter of Sam Rainsy‘s liberal-
democratic, free trade politics, reiterates this point. It found that 51% of respondents want 
political leaders to spend less time talking about the leaders of other parties.  Instead, 
93% want parties to spend more time improving services such as education and health, 
88% want leaders to spend time reducing corruption, 86% believe they should spend 
more time creating jobs and improving the economy and so forth.  Importantly, a 
majority said that they want political leaders to spend less time discussing the civil wars 
and past regimes.  (International Republican Institute 2009).   
In summary, the CPP has suppressed opposition, often violently, yet at the same 
time the opposition is unable to gain legitimacy by delivering on economic development 
initiatives.  Despite widespread sentiment in Cambodia that the CPP is a pawn of the 
Vietnamese, they have much support from the population, perhaps in part because they 
are perceived to demonstrate economic gain and progress on social services.   
With the introduction of border/decentralized SEZs the CPP is able to 
demonstrate Cambodia‘s territorial integrity while fostering economic and industrial 
development.  This is in ‗competition‘ with Vietnam and Thailand over investment, but it 
is at the same time facilitated by cooperation in terms of purchasing electricity, 
streamlining border crossings and the like under the broad framework of the GMS.  For 
instance, Hun Sen and the CPP are fostering the growth of border SEZs that are slated to 
offer tens of thousands of jobs.  That said, allowing Thai, Vietnamese or East Asian 
investors to dominate ownership of Cambodia‘s ―privatized‖ SEZs would risk losing out 
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on the perceived ―Khmerization‖ of the borderland territory, and it may also foster 
discontent from Cambodia‘s moneyed elite.  Perhaps recognizing this, SEZs came to be 
owned and developed almost entirely by a small clique of rulers of Cambodia who act in 
both private and public capacities.  It is to this that I now turn.  
 
Layered Interests: Domestic Elites and the Sub-regional Economy    
Through the 1980s and 1990s in Cambodia, state officials‘ abuse of the neo-
patrimonial state was regarded as a necessary evil (Hughes 2007).
86
  The networks of 
corruption that held the state together were at least effective in controlling the country 
and thus in staving off the much-feared and often-threatened scare of the return of the 
Khmer Rouge (ibid).  This section addresses the need for both domestic and international 
capital to disembed economic relations from their ―old‖ social integument in Cambodia, 
and re-embed them into new social relations supportive of further capitalist development 
(Jessop and Sum 2006).  The ―old‖ social relations generally refer to patronage systems 
and corruption that are regularly cited as major impediments to Cambodia‘s capitalist 
development (Amin, 2004; USAID, 2007; see also Gottesman, 2003; Hughes 2003).  
Corruption discourse is pervasive in explaining Cambodia‘s underdevelopment.  
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 Cambodia‘s Ministry of Commerce summarizes the situation as follows (Ministry of Commerce 2006:5) 
Decades of conflict, ruinous policies and embargos destroyed the institutional fabric of civil society and 
commerce. Cambodia‘s challenge is compounded by the legacy of internal conflict that not only depleted 
the country‘s reserves of human talent on which entrepreneurship is based, but also disrupted the continuity 
of social institutions and formal and informal rules that provide the framework for development, trade, and 
investment. The economic landscape reflects this lack of key institutions, most notably the rule of law. It 
also reflects an attempt by the Government to fill the institutional vacuum through administrative measures 
that have largely been ineffective and created opportunities for corruption. Essential public services and 
infrastructure are absent for much of the population. 
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Following are typical quotes on the subject from different sources in 2009, two from the 
private sector and one private/public consultant:  
―Lower ranking military get about $200/month…teachers make about $100.  
They cannot live on this…Food prices are higher in Cambodia than the region, 
hospitals and medicine are not free…These are the key issues in Cambodia—low 
salary and high cost of living.  Now all are pushed into the cycle of corruption, 
kickbacks [including the person quoted, he was clear to point out].  It‘s a self-
perpetuating system.  Those on top get money from subordinates, subordinates 
need to engage in corruption to supplement their income and kick money up to 
keep their position…Many investors stay away from Cambodia due to 
corruption.‖ 
 
―Government officials are building big houses rather than investing in the long 
term software for developing the economy…Chinese and Vietnamese provinces 
like Dong Nai do more [to develop the economy] than the whole of Cambodia.‖ 
 
―In Cambodia there are too many steps and informal fees [in manufacturing and 
importing/exporting].  BBC is the problem—bribes, bureaucracy and corruption.  
It was getting better for some time, but at times BBC gets worse.  There are fewer 
investors so they are squeezed even more.  With SEZs over time it will get 
better.‖ 
 
Figure 29: A fairly typical mansion in Phnom Penh
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
Bello‘s (2010b) writing on the subject of corruption in the Philippines also applies 
in the Cambodia case.  He contends that in this discourse, the state is the source of 
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corruption, so having a greater state role in the economy – even as a regulator – is viewed 
with skepticism.  Neoliberal discourse ties in very neatly with corruption discourse, 
minimizing the role of the state in economic life and assuming that a more dominant 
market will reduce the opportunities for ‗rent-seeking‘ by both economic and state agents 
(ibid).  I make the assumption that the elimination of corruption in Cambodia would tear 
apart the current political fabric.  Bearing this in mind, rather than focusing on corruption 
as a practice, I will instead look more closely at the CPP‘s and Cambodia‘s small ruling 
clique‘s role in Cambodia‘s SEZs.  Beyond rent-seeking political/economic elites role has 
been minimal in industry.  But SEZs are one important means for both to be brought 
more clearly into the fold of sub-regional development initiatives.  This has numerous 
implications for both the form and trajectory of border economic zones in Cambodia and 
its neighboring countries.  In particular, it means an increased role for state officials and 
elites in border economic zones.  Whether this newfound role will reduce or expand 
current patronage and rent-seeking networks remains to be seen.   
 
Oknhas and Industrial Policy 
Throughout the course of fieldwork for this dissertation I interviewed numerous 
experts on Cambodia‘s economy, politics and industrialization.  A recurring view among 
these individuals is the lack of a clear policy on industrialization in Cambodia.  
Interviews cited below are the views of individuals from the private sector, a policy 
think-tank, an overseas development organization and an inter-governmental 
organization.   
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―There is no budget for industrial policy in Cambodia.  There are consultations 
and meetings and studies but the government has no real control…Cambodia is 
totally free for investors, but it‘s still not competitive.‖ 
 
 ―There is no real macro-economic policy in Cambodia…in reality [socio-
economic development] is based on the first move of the private sector.  Policy 
justifies moves of the private sector.  There is not a think tank in government 
making 10-20 year plans.‖ 
 
―There is no clear investment promotion strategy in Cambodia…With the absence 
of a national strategy it is difficult to go beyond this current focus on 
atomized/individualized industrial zones…From a development point of view I 
want the government to have a policy on industry…but from a business or SEZ 
perspective this is irrelevant, there is nothing in it for them to deal with officials 
or provincial investment sub-committees.‖ 
 
―I suspect business here is more resilient than generally thought.  Some investors 
see that and will come in…There are advantages in Cambodia, but government is 
not dealing with investment from the big picture.‖ 
 
 
Foreign companies have dominated three of Cambodia‘s four economic growth 
pillars: garments, tourism
87
 and construction,
88
 leaving agriculture, which is increasingly 
associated with foreign owned plantations and contracting farming.
89
  Cambodia‘s 
Garment industry has been an extractive industry much like forestry concessions: it was a 
one-off arrangement wherein you deplete the forest and it‘s gone forever, or at least 
decades.  Peter Brimble summed up what is quite likely a popular view among 
Cambodian government officials, saying ―It is kind of a miracle that garments [factories] 
ever came to Cambodia and have stayed here as long as they have‖ (Interview, November 
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 Management of the Angkor Temple complex, the heart of Cambodia‘s national identity, is leased out to 
foreign corporations.   
88
 Korean construction firms dominate the construction boom in Cambodia.   
89
 China has become a major player in plantations in Cambodia.  Rubber is particularly important, fueled by 
demand for rubber in China‘s auto industry and the lack of rubber growing capacity, Chinese rubber 
plantations are found in many parts of the world.   
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7, 2009).
90
  Reinforcing this view, Sok Chenda, head of the Council for the Development 
of Cambodia and the Cambodia SEZ Board wrote that ―History shows that garments 
manufacturers move from one country to another, so while we are happy that our friends 
are providing more than 300,000 jobs for our people, we know that we absolutely need 
other activities‖ (Invest in Cambodia 2008:46).   
Cambodia‘s elites have amassed their wealth primarily through the allocation of 
concessions on forests, land, mineral deposits, fisheries and heritage sites, together with 
‗land swap‘ deals on state-owned buildings (Global Witness 2007:10).  The effect is to 
place valuable public assets under the private control of individuals who are themselves 
part of the ‗shadow state structure (ibid).‘91  SEZs are being surreptitiously inserted into 
the national economic development fold by this same group of leading power brokers in 
the country.  They are private interests but they are also investments from the upper 
echelons of the state, in particular several Oknhas.   
Oknha is a prestigious title or award of honor that was created in 1994.  
Technically it is aimed at those who contribute to the reconstruction and the development 
of Cambodia.  These are mostly influential business people who are connected with the 
high circles of the ruling power and know, for some of them, how to use this title in order 
to obtain preferential treatment (Duong 2008).  Others are senators and provincial 
governors with major business interests.  The title of oknha could be traced back to 
the15th century, under the reign of King Chao Ponhea Yat (1421-1462).  At the time 
oknhas were district and provincial governors as well as the king's personal councilors, in 
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 At the time of the interview Dr. Brimble was consulting for USAID and UNDP.   
91
 Through much of the 2000s tens of thousands of people have been forcibly evicted from their homes 
and/or land to make way for concessions.  This is one of the more critical issues in Cambodia, yet far too 
complex to bring into this discussion.  
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charge of royal, military, judicial and agricultural affairs (ibid).  Today‘s Oknha‘s are 
Cambodia‘s ruling class of elites, in many ways taking their feudal namesake to heart.  A 
majority of them are members of the CPP (Duong 2008), and the top oknha‘s are leaders 
of Cambodia‘s Chamber of Commerce.  According to a 2007 report by Oxfam UK, 
oknha‘s own 23% of territory in Cambodia (ibid).92  One company owned by an oknha, 
Pheapimex, reportedly controls 7.4% of Cambodia‘s total land area through logging and 
economic land concessions (Global Witness 2007:10).  In short, it is a powerful class that 
wields enormous political and economic weight in the country.   
Nearly all SEZs in Cambodia are technically privately owned and developed.  
One exception is an SEZ in Sihanoukville that includes Cambodian and Japanese 
government investment.
93
  A closer look at the SEZ developers and owners demonstrates 
a fine line between state officials and private owners; in several cases SEZ developers are 
in government.  At least 10 of 21 registered SEZ developers‘ posses the oknha title.  One 
more holds the title ‗His Excellency,‖ which precedes the names of ministers and 
provincial governors.  Six more are registered in the names of women.   It is rare in 
Cambodia for women to head major investments, companies or to hold high level 
government officials.  As demonstrated in the box below, many of these women are 
wives of top government officials, including the Minister of Finance and former head of 
Cambodia‘s police.  Following is a list of select SEZ developers and their 
political/business affiliations.
94
  They are all household names in Cambodia.  
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 SEZs comprise only 0.03% of total land area (Adhoc 2009) 
93
 The Japanese government is unable by regulation to invest in wholly privately owned SEZs.  
94
 Four of the six listed above were identified by Global Witness as being among the top tycoons in 
Cambodia who were also appointed senators for the CPP.  They are Lao Meng Khin, Ly Yong Phat, Kong 
Triv and Mong Rithy.  Together they own six of twenty-one SEZs in the country.   
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Figure 30: Select SEZ Developers and Their Political/Business Links 
SEZ Name Zone Developer Political/Business Links 
Neang Kok Koh Kong SEZ;  
Kiri Sakor Koh Kong SEZ  
Oknha Ly Yong Phat CPP Senator and one of Cambodia‘s 
top tycoons (electricity, 
bridge/road/port construction, casinos, 
land concessions, etc) 
Sihanoukville SEZ 1; 
Sihanoukville SEZ 2  
Oknha Lao Meng Khin CPP senator and tycoon; VP of Phnom 
Penh Chamber of Commerce; president 
of Pheapimex, which controls 7.4% of 
Cambodia‘s total land area through 
logging and economic land concessions  
S.N.C SEZ  Oknha Kong Triv VP of Cambodia Chamber of 
Commerce and tycoon; Chair British 
American Tobacco (Cambodia) and 
some 10 other companies  
Oknha Mong SEZ  Oknha Mong Rithy CPP Senator and tycoon (Plantations, 
commodities trading, cattle farming and 
real estate development) 
Kampong Saom SEZ  Neak Oknha Kith 
Meng; 
The ―new face of 
Cambodian 
capitalism‖95 
Chair, Royal Group of Companies 
(Cambodia's leading service sector 
conglomerate); president of Cambodia 
Chamber of Commerce; personal 
adviser to Hun Sen  
Stung Hav SEZ;  
Phnom Penh SEZ  
Lim Chhiv Ho Wife of Commerce Minister, H.E. 
Cham Prasidh 
D&M Bavet SEZ Men Pheakdey Wife of former head of Cambodia‘s 
police Hok Lundy, who was considered 
one of the most powerful people in 
Cambodia until his death in 2008.
96
   
N.L.C. SEZ in Bavet Leang Vouch Chheng Wife of PM Hun Sen‘s brother and 
Kompong Cham Province Governor, 
Hun Neng 
Source: Author‘s compilation  
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 He is often referred to as Cambodia‘s up and coming Thaksin (former PM of Thailand), though this is not 
readily met as a compliment.  At 40 years old he is the face of a new generation of elites in Cambodia, 
basing wealth on services, banking etc rather than economic land concessions, vulgar corruption and 
violence (Crispin 2007;  Gluckman 2008).   
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 Hok Lundy died in a helicopter crash in 2008.  Rights groups contend that Hok Lundy was killed on 
orders of Hun Sen for challenging his power.  Hok Lundy was from Svay Rieng province and was one of 
the more controversial figures in Cambodia.  He was notoriously ruthless.  It is rumoured that he is 
responsible for the murder of over 70 people, including judges and top government officials who opposed 
him.  Human Rights watch said that he "represent(s) the absolute worst that Cambodia has to offer…aside 
from his boss, Prime Minister Hun Sen, there is hardly anyone in Cambodia who has shown more contempt 
for the rule of law than Hok Lundy" (Human Rights Watch 2007).  In 2006 he was denied a visa to the US 
due to suspicion of involvement in human and drug trafficking.   
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The Manhattan SEZ is the only foreign owned SEZ in Cambodia.  It is registered 
under a Taiwanese citizen, Clement Yang, but was originally owned by the secretary 
general of the Funcinpec party, Nhek Bun Chhay, who is also a deputy prime minister.
97
  
Larry Kao of the Manhattan SEZ said that Nhek Bun Chhay and his staff purchased much 
of the land for the SEZ in 2004-2005 but ―it all got complicated‖ and he approached 
Manhattan to take over (interview, November 13, 2009).
98
  He said that initially 
Manhattan was worried about political conflict with the CPP due to Funcinpec 
involvement.  Hun Sen later agreed to take part in the ground-breaking ceremony for the 
SEZ in 2005.  He said that Nhek Bun Chhay is still an adviser to the zone, but he is not 
very involved.  He reported that Nhek Bun Chhay and Hun Sen are usually responsive to 
the company‘s requests. Mr. Kao explained that the Manhattan SEZ is the ―least 
connected with government among the current SEZs, they work within the system 
without using personal or social connections with the government.‖  Obviously and not 
surprisingly, the norm is for SEZs to be run based on networks and connections.   
In summary, SEZs are owned and/or developed by some of the most powerful of 
Cambodia‘s elites who are members of or have close links with the CPP.  It is essentially 
a cross section of people that run Cambodia in what is often referred to as a kleptocracy.  
It is clear from numerous stakeholder interviews in 2009 that not all SEZs in Cambodia 
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 The royalist Funcinpec party was once powerful in Cambodian politics; in the 2008 elections it won only 
274 seats at the communal level, compared to 7,993 seats for the CPP, with the Norodom Ranariddh Part 
(renamed the Nationalist Party) holding 425 and the Sam Rainsy Party at 2,660.  In the 2008 national 
election, Funcinpec and the NRP both fared poorly, winning a total of five seats in the 123-seat National 
Assembly. 
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 In late 2009 Manhattan SEZ did not own all of the land demarcated under the zone.  There are at least 
four additional land owners.  He reported a similar scenario at Manhattan‘s industrial zone in Kompong 
Cham province.  There Manhattan is using 19 of 28ha of land of the zone, the other 9 ha are occupied and 
he said that Manhattan would have to pay for them to leave (which they do not seem to want to do), and 
they do not want to evict them.   
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are created equal.  Many are essentially real estate speculations and it is doubtful that the 
SEZ will ever materialize.  SEZ may be opportunities to launder money or drive up land 
prices.  Others are oknya‘s with no experience running zones, but have managed to attract 
major investments.  For instance Ly Yong Phat has signed deals with Hyundai and Khon 
Kaen Sugar for operations in one of his Koh Kong SEZs (Thai border), in what are 
probably the two largest and high profile zone investments to date.  Lastly, others SEZs 
are owned and operated by companies with years of experience running zones and 
manufacturing firms.  These include the Manhattan SEZ.  Politics and connections are 
certainly important for these firms, but they are clearly outside of Cambodia‘s power 
architecture. 
SEZ are key aspects of political and business elites‘ insertion into the border and 
industrial economy more broadly.  Accordingly it is an insertion into the sub-regional 
economy.  This is not a case wherein powerful transnational corporations are making 
demands of a weak state.  On the contrary, the only major foreign controlled SEZ, 
Manhattan, looks like the proverbial fish out of water when viewed from the perspective I 
have laid out.         
This does not, however, signal a new industrial policy.  Rather, SEZs are, in 
general, part of a process of political-economic consolidation in a few hands.  General 
wisdom holds that states must acquiesce to the needs of international capital if they are to 
capture value and ‗progress.‘  This collides with states led by forces such as the CPP that 
recognize the temporal nature of capital flows and are more concerned with maintaining 
power and legitimacy.  ‗Competitive‘ environments for globally connected firms may or 
may not arise out of this process, and it may be the case with the Manhattan SEZ 
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(Chapter 5), but it is not built into the central rationale of the zones.  One person from the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency who had been working on SEZ promotion for 
several years summed up his frustration by saying, ―the problem with special economic 
zones in Cambodia is there is nothing special about them‖ (interview, May 5, 2009).  He 
was referring to the business operating environment, incentives offered to investors and 
the like.   Clearly, if the will exists among the politically connected SEZ developers to 
implement an environment conducive to global manufacturers they have the ability to do 
so.   
 
Conclusions  
In this chapter I have put forward a differentiated analysis of the evolution of an 
individual state and economy acting within a sub-regional development framework.  This 
moves away from general stylized models forwarded by the ADB (Chapter 5) and it 
entails a move beyond market-state debates to explore how the economy, state, labor and 
multilateral institutions are mutually imbricated, structurally coupled and coevolving.  In 
fact, if one leaves behind the assumption of market self-regulation under the ADB‘s 
GMS, regional integration becomes more appropriately represented as a process by which 
a new regulatory regime emerges offering new opportunities for profit and power 
(Hughes 2011).  Hughes also contends that ―the activities of both state and private actors 
– and state actors acting in a private capacity – on these borders indicates both their 
sophisticated appreciation of this, and the level of contestation which their efforts to gain 
a share of the spoils entails‖ (Hughes 2011:forthcoming). 
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The Cambodian state is the most powerful actor in the formation of border SEZs.   
This is a pronounced shift in the case of Cambodia, a state that lacked autonomy in the 
social and economic fields in the 1980s-1990s.  The CPP recognizes that border SEZs 
provide important means for its economy to be favorably inserted into the emerging sub-
regional and global economy, but that very insertion can fragment the national economy 
and society and create alternative foci of political legitimacy.  It is for this and other 
reasons that the reach of the state and private sector ‗allies‘ is so extensive.   
SEZs are an important and new turn for Cambodia‘s political-economic 
trajectory.  The physical borders are now more secure than at any point in Cambodia‘s 
history as a nation-state.  Border and coastal SEZs owned primarily by Cambodia‘s 
oknhas reinforce the emerging authoritarian state.  They are also a component of oknyas‘ 
and other elites capital formation, from domination of one aspect of the economy—
largely natural resource based—to globally connected manufacturing, logistics and 
services zones.   
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Chapter 7  
National Security State Capital and the Politics of Scale at the Thai-Burma 
Border 
Introduction  
The political processes building a border economy in Mae Sot over the past 10-15 
years sheds much light on the politics of scale and the ways in which states do and do not 
seek to link their territories and citizens with the political dynamics, economic systems 
and natural resources of neighboring countries (Walker 2009).  Doing so demonstrates 
much about the territorial diversity and flexibility of state practices in the sub-region, and 
how this facilitates certain links with regional and global trade and production networks, 
while preventing other links.  This chapter builds upon Pitch‘s (2007) contentions that the 
Mae Sot SEZ initiative, combined with the infrastructure development at Mae Sot, are 
part of realizations that local autonomy is crucial to promote economic growth in the 
area.  However, these ‗local realizations‘ are coupled with fractions of central state 
officials and national-regional-global business interests, meaning local-central binaries 
obfuscate the important changes underlying these initiatives.   
The SEZ proposal has met resistance on the national and local levels for a number 
of reasons.  First, if implemented it would alter Thailand‘s constructive engagement 
policy with Burma by deepening economic and social links at the border.  Secondly, the 
proposal is highly politicized due to its sponsorship and association with the 
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administration of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra.  Third, the new spatial administration 
of the proposed SEZ would undermine the ‗traditional‘ military and police dominance of 
Thai borders and the hegemonic position of ‗national security state capital‘ both at the 
border and perhaps deeper into Burma.     
In this chapter the focus is the changing state regulation along the border and the 
coupled contestation over re-production and policing of physical boundaries that shows a 
clear connection between borders and state power (Gainsborough 2009).  What I present 
is an account of the Thai-Burma frontier which goes beyond generalized ideas of cross-
border ‗cooperation,‘ central-local power dynamics and neoliberalization.  As a result, 
this chapter does not provide a picture of powerful transnational corporations and 
international lending agencies making demands readily met by an eviscerated state, or a 
state that chooses to withdraw from a particular space.  By focusing on the sub-national 
scale I highlight a state that is not monolithic and a global factory that – while 
undoubtedly footloose for the most part -- is also differentially deeply imbricated in the 
concrete specificities of an emerging border space.  One consequence of this analysis of 
economic and social restructuring along the Thailand-Burma border is that Mae Sot 
defies any easy designation as neoliberal space, as the product of a strong or weak state, 
or as an export-processing island driven by the production needs of global value chains.  
Instead, Mae Sot demonstrates that the politics of scale plays out in important ways, 
particularly regarding re-territorialization and domination over populations of migrant 
workers from Burma.  
This chapter begins by outlining what is at stake in Mae Sot and its bordering 
‗sister city‘ in Burma, Myawaddy.  Infrastructure development is ongoing in the border 
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area, largely in line with ADB initiatives for the GMS.  The second section addresses the 
SEZ initiative from several perspectives.  It shows what is at stake for social actors 
including the ‗local‘ private sector, the army and police and central state authorities.  I 
then put forward the technical problems associated with re-scaling territorial 
administration.  Finally, I analyze the most recent initiative to re-territorialize Mae Sot, 
the ‗Special City‘ proposal.  Conflicts over this proposal within Mae Sot are addressed, 
particularly the rationale behind this and the SEZ initiative from the perspective of the 
Mae Sot Chamber of Commerce.  
 
Border Growth and Mae Sot-Myawaddy 
There has been a renewed interest in Thailand‘s borderlands as a focus of state 
development initiatives since the end of the Cold War.  This has been coupled with 
intensive lobbying on the part of provincial and local state and business officials for more 
autonomy in the political economy of border areas.  In the mid-1990s the Tak provincial 
Chamber of Commerce began efforts to establish a special economic zone (SEZ) in Mae 
Sot.  Mae Sot is officially the busiest border trading route between Thailand and Burma, 
and over the past decade it is a rapidly industrializing zone, due primarily to abundance 
of low cost migrant workers from neighboring Burma.  The initial strategy sought to 
establish an SEZ that would encompass three Thai border districts and the neighboring 
city of Myawaddy, Burma.  The long term objective is to establish a duty/tax free 
production and trade zone, wherein manufacturers could share production on both sides 
of the border, finishing export products on the Thai side.   
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Infrastructure Development and Myawaddy/Burma 
The Thai government has been moving forward with its infrastructure led growth 
strategy in the Mae Sot-Myawaddy area.  It is taking on a role the ADB has played in 
much of the GMS due to the ADB‘s restrictions on direct loans and financing for projects 
in Burma.  Plans approved for the Thai side of the border include a second Thai-
Myanmar Friendship Bridge that can accommodate larger trucks; construction of a flood 
prevention system in Mae Sot and Mae Ramat districts; city planning and logistics 
planning (including an inland container depot in Mae Sot); widening of the 86km road 
from Mae Sot to Tak from 2 to 4 lanes; and a proposal to construct a rail link from Mae 
Sot to Tak (Mahanathee 2009).   
Another important component of the areas development is Thai government 
funding for infrastructure projects in Burma.  For example, the 18km Mae 
Sot/Myawaddy-Thingannyinaung/Dawna Range Road Construction Project was finished 
in 2006 under the Ayeyawady - Chao Phraya - Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy 
(ACMECS) project (122.6200 million baht budget) (ACMECS 2009).
99
  The project is 
being extended with the 40km road over the mountain range to Kawkariek, Burma.  Prior 
to construction the 40km section is a single lane road going over mountains rather than 
through mountain passes, meaning the road is narrow and steep and traffic must move 
one way on alternating days (interview, Niyom Wairatpanij, Chairman, Tak Chamber of 
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 In 2003, the former Prime Minister of Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra initiated a regional economic 
cooperation program fully complimentary to the ADB‘s GMS Program with the objective of more 
thoroughly integrating both cross-border regions and the GMS as a whole.  According to the Bagan 
Declaration (Bagan, Burma, on November 12, 2003), Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Thailand agreed 
to establish an economic cooperation initiative called the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic 
Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS)
99
.  Vietnam joined in 2004.  The objectives of ACMECS are to increase 
competitiveness and economic development among ACMECS countries.  Like the ADB GMS Program, the 
ACMECS Action Plan promotes economic cooperation in trade and investment facilitation, agricultural and 
industrial cooperation, transport linkages, and human resource development. 
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Commerce, October 22, 2009).  Construction began in 2009, it is also under the 
ACMECS program.  Both projects are funded by Thailand‘s Ministry of Transport and 
Department of Highways.  Upon completion the road will link Myawaddy/Mae Sot and 
Rangoon.
100
 
Figure 31: The Mae Sot border checkpoint 
 
Photo: Dennis Arnold 
The Burmese Junta has identified Myawaddy as one of six SEZs planned for the 
country.  The Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand completed a feasibility study for the 
construction of industrial zones in Mywaddy, Mawlamyine and Pa-an in 2005 (IEAT 
2005).  This led to the implementation of the plan in Myawaddy beginning in 2006.  The 
total area of the Myawaddy border trade zone is 460 rai (73.6ha), and includes offices, 
distribution centers, a goods inspection unit and a one-stop customs service area covering 
180 rai (28.8ha).  The complex includes an area for truck terminals, and an industrial 
zone is complete with five investors in 2009 (Mahanathee 2009).  The zone was 
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 The Karen Human Rights Group report, ―Development by Decree‖ uncovers the Junta‘s rationale 
behind the road construction and provides extensive details on the human rights abuses that occurred while 
expropriating land for the road and during its construction.  
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constructed using the Musae trade zone on the Burma-China border as a model.  The 
development plans for Myawaddy include commercial buildings, office buildings, 
condominiums, a business complex, commercial banks, hotels, resorts, restaurants and 
entertainment complexes (ibid).   
Niyom Wairatpanij (Chaiman of the Mae Sot Chamber of Commerce) said that 
the Myawaddy zone is nearly ready, but that the Thai side is not following through on its 
plans for the SEZ because of the new government, referring to the post-2006 coup 
Democrat led government that took office from December 2008 (interview, October 22, 
2009).  Apisit Cholsakorn, Vice Chairman of the Mae Sot Chamber of Commerce, voiced 
his frustration saying that ―The Myanmar side has started [the SEZ] already, but on the 
Thai side it‘s still on paper‖ (interview, October 23, 2009).  Ultimately, according to Mr. 
Apisit, they want to join the 3 Thai border districts with Myawaddy, creating a ‗true‘ 
border SEZ that will include a duty/tax free policy in the two areas.  This would benefit 
industry, for instance, by eliminating the 10% export tax from the Burma side, making it 
feasible to share production across the border.  In this scenario, garment firms could 
exchange semi-finished products across the border with finishing and export taking place 
on the Thai side.  
Combined, the opening of an industrial park and trade zone in Myawaddy and the 
further development of physical infrastructure in Burma demonstrate a continued push to 
expand trade and production links.  However, like the Thai state but for a different set of 
reasons, the Burmese Junta is moving toward deeper integration cautiously.  Dr. Naing 
Aung, Secretary General of the Mae Sot-based Forum for Democracy in Burma, contends 
that the Junta does not want to see economic booms occurring in the border areas where 
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ethnic insurgent groups still maintain strongholds.  Myawaddy is different from Burma‘s 
border with China (such as Wa and Shan states) since the SPDC directly controls it 
(interview, November 21, 2009).  However, the Karen National Liberation Army 
(KNLA) has several strongholds in the Myawaddy vicinity, with bases only 6-24 hours 
from the area, and occasionally the KNU threatens areas near the road from Myawaddy 
to Rangoon.  This lack of security in the area, not surprisingly, justifies the broader 
project of border securitization on the Thai side, despite calls from Mae Sot business and 
government demands for a more open, liberal border and trade policy (see below).
101
     
In summary, these infrastructure projects show commitment on the part of the central 
government to deepen links with Burma.  The Burmese side has demonstrated its 
ambition to forge deeper links with Mae Sot, though the Junta is certainly moving ahead 
cautiously.  However, the will to move from the built environment into deeper social and 
political relations is a very controversial matter.  
 
The Mae Sot-Myawaddy SEZ: Re-territorializing the Borderlands 
Mae Sot elicits grand proclamations about its economic potential, based on both 
its geographic position in the sub-region and the trajectory of its trade relations and 
industrialization.  The Mae Sot (Tak) Chamber of Commerce has long promoted it as the 
‗gateway to Europe,‘ projecting its ambitions into the ‗Asian Highway‘ in planning since 
1959.  It would create a continental road network from Da Nang in Vietnam to Istanbul in 
Turkey and on to the European Union.  A team from Chiang Mai University conducting a 
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 Of course, many business and state interests on the Thai side wish to see the Junta address its political 
problems and assert control of its borderlands.  Mr. Niyom from the Tak Chamber of Commerce was very 
clear that he is hopeful that the forthcoming election in Burma in 2010 will resolve its border problems so 
that the country can focus on liberalization rather than security. (Interview, October 22, 2009). 
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feasibility study for the Mae Sot SEZ contend that ―…it is possible for [the] Tak Border 
Economic Area and Thailand to be a trade center in the region and in the world…‖ (CMU 
2007:28).  These views of Mae Sot may be grandiose, but are significant in that they are 
projected from the city outwards rather than views projected onto Mae Sot from major 
metropolitan areas like Bangkok.  In other words, it is a discursive turn of ―the periphery 
into the center of growth‖ (Kudo 2009).  However, from Bangkok, Mae Sot is still largely 
perceived as a peripheral border trading city with neighboring Burma, and perhaps most 
importantly an integral part of state security since it is the primary gateway of the flow of 
the Thais ‗evil and aggressive neighbors.  From this perspective certain central state 
authorities are easily threatened by expansion of Mae Sot‘s socio-economy and a 
structural change in political-economic relations with Burma.  Thus, paradoxically, those 
living on the border view their neighbors as an opportunity, while prevalent views from 
Bangkok are full of the perceived (and real) threats of disease, drugs, crime and other 
social ills.  
Ambitions for Mae Sot as a center of globalized growth are linked in no small 
part to ADB-led initiatives for cross-border trade, infrastructure and production.  Mae Sot 
is planned as a key logistics and distribution hub on the East-West Economic Corridor 
linking Da Nang, Vietnam with the deep sea port planned for Dawei, Burma.  This ‗land 
bridge‘ would cut nearly two weeks off shipping time from East Asia to South and West 
Asia in bypassing the Straits of Malacca.  Importantly, Mae Sot is a key inroad to deeper 
liberalization of resource-rich Burma, one of the last major ‗untapped‘ nations in East and 
Southeast Asia.  Political and business interests in Mae Sot and other parts of Thailand 
are keenly aware of this and a key means for them to both expand beyond their current 
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economic growth rates to meet what they perceive as high economic growth potential is 
to establish a special economic zone.  The shape and meaning of SEZs has changed quite 
often over the past several years, the following section provides a brief review of these 
variations leading up to its (possible) iteration in 2009.   
 
The Mae Sot SEZ Initiative  
In contrast to the process of central state-led SEZs in Cambodia, Mae Sot and 
other Thai border zones have emerged from a complex intertwining of locally-led 
initiatives generated by local-provincial government and business and lobbying the 
central government for special economic zone status.  In summary, the local state in Mae 
Sot has been trying to move deeper into the realms of economic development and 
political autonomy of the area.  However, this has met resistance from the central 
government, and more recently from political leaders within the local government.   
Special economic zones and industrial areas on or near Thailand‘s borders are 
currently promoted to attract and maintain investment flows and ‗manage‘ migrant labor.  
Efforts to establish a SEZ in Mae Sot entail the convergence of local level efforts 
promoting economic growth and East Asian efforts to see it, among other border nodes, 
become a key hub in larger regional production and trade networks.  The ten plus year 
process of establishing an SEZ in Mae Sot-Myawaddy is complex and provides valuable 
insight on the production of regional and global spaces in Thailand and the GMS more 
broadly.   
The legal status of SEZs in Thailand is currently in limbo.  In January 2005 a 
special economic zone bill passed in the Thai cabinet, it approved steps for SEZs in 3 
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locations in Thailand: Mae Sot (in Tak province), Chiang Khong in Chiang Rai province 
(targeting borders with Burma, Laos and China), and Sadao district in Songkhla province 
(targeting the border with Malaysia).  The SEZ bill of January 2005 is still awaiting 
passage into law by parliament.   
In Thailand an SEZ is different from a special border economic zone (SBEZ).  
The SBEZ program was first implemented in 2003 in Chiang Rai province, followed by 
Mae Sot, Mukdahan on the Laos border, and Trat on the Cambodia border.  A SBEZ is 
primarily about special budget allocation and city planning, whereas an SEZ entails 
structural changes in the administration of territory and requires new laws.   
The 2005 SEZ bill was proposed by two major state authorities, the Industrial 
Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) and the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB 2005).  The rationale of the bill addressed the limitation of the 1979 
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act, which limits the organization‘s legal power 
to the industrial sector (NESDB 2005).  The IEAT is a state enterprise.  Essentially, the 
IEAT has no authority outside of an industrial estate, export processing zone etc.  An 
objective of the SEZ bill is to establish more comprehensive and flexible control of entire 
districts and new towns, with the IEAT acting as one of several executive members of the 
new SEZs.  A key component of the bill is that the economic area be considered a juristic 
person, wherein the administration is in the form of an area-based management with 
much greater flexibility and authority (CMU 2007).  The government explicitly made 
reference to the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of China and Mexico's Maquiladora 
programs as models for both the promotion of economic growth and the new structure of 
administration and new regime of labor management and control (Arnold 2007; CMU 
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2007; Pitch 2007).  A major difference with Maquiladoras and China‘s SEZs is industrial 
investment is located within the Thai border, rather than investors moving across the 
border to the less developed country, in this case Burma.  
The 2005 SEZ bill met stiff resistance in certain media outlets and special interest 
groups, and was also resisted by government agencies, most prominently the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration.  Opposition was largely centered on the proposed 521 km² 
Nakhon Suvarnabhumi ―Aerotropolis‖ or a central air hub and urban center around the 
newly constructed Suvarnabhumi airport (NESDB 2005).  The proposed new city around 
the Suvarnabhumi Airport, opened in late 2006, was associated with the SEZ bill, though 
it did not fall under its jurisdiction.  It would have required a law separate from, but 
similar to the SEZs.  The Aerotropolis proposal included: 1) the development of an 
international industrial park; 2) the development of international commercial and trading 
activities; 3) the development of a transportation and logistics center of Southeast Asia; 
and 4) overall area development of the aerotropolis comprising housing development, 
recreational activities, empty or green space and public parks (NESDB 2005). 
Opposition also centered on the proposed industrial zone in Chiang Saen, which 
was identified as the first test site for a border industrial estate in Thailand, prior to the 
SEZ bill.  Mae Sot is an industrial area, but is not a registered industrial estate, -zone, -
park etc.  In Chiang Saen the IEAT identified 5,000 rai (800ha) of land suitable for an 
industrial zone, but protests over potential environmental degradation led to scrapping of 
the proposal.  After strong local opposition to the industrial estate, the government 
decided to register Chiang Saen as a ‗World Heritage Site‘ due to the heritage of Lanna 
culture, in line with demands from groups in Chiang Saen (Tsuneishi 2008; interview 
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NESDB October 5, 2009).  In short, the two primary fronts for opposition to the SEZ bill, 
the aerotropolis and Chaing Saen, were not specifically identified among the first three 
SEZs to be implemented.  Ironically, in the initial year of the SEZ bill there was little to 
no public opposition to the SEZs slated for Mae Sot, Chiang Khong and Sadao, yet they 
were associated with other ―SEZs.‖  
In specific reference to Mae Sot, the SEZ bill was criticized and later opposed by 
many central government officials concerned that the Mae Sot SEZ would attract more 
migrant workers from Burma, rather than acting as an ‗economic dam‘ to prevent their 
flow into central Thailand as proposed by Mae Sot interests (interview, Chaiyuth 
Seneetantikul, Chair, Federation of Thai Industries, Tak Chapter, October 28, 2009).  
Ultimately members of the Thai Rak Thai government of former PM Thaksin withdrew 
the SEZ bill from parliament in 2006, prior to the 2006 coup (Pitch 2007).  The status of 
SEZs in Thailand is politicized both pre- and post 2006 coup.  Thaksin‘s Thai Rak Thai 
party was certainly responsible for much of the advances made on border town 
development and ultimately the proposed transition to an SEZ law, but it is a policy, 
albeit a vague one, that pre-dates Thaksin‘s government.  Regardless, post-coup politics 
in Thailand, particularly the current form and rise of (ultra) nationalist politics shapes 
proposals to further develop Mae Sot in important ways.    
 
Challenging the National Security Border Regime 
A critical aspect of the border regime as proposed by the SEZ bill/initiative, 
and one that is unpopular for another set of reasons, is changing relations with Burma and 
potential deepening of social, political and economic ties.  This entails a reformulation of 
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border policy from a national security toward a liberalized or free market position.  Since 
1988 a number of Thai military personnel and prominent Thai corporations, in particular 
those with military links, have benefitted greatly from economic relations with Burma, 
primarily in natural resource extraction (Glassman 2010).  Examples include the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand‘s many hydroelectric power plants, logging 
concessions, gem trade and more recently former PM Thaksin‘s Shincorp‘s 
telecommunication packages (Glassman 2010).  The Thai military and police are also 
involved in a wide array of illegal activities, including trafficking of people and 
numerous goods (see Human Rights Watch 2010a).   
An important dimension of Mae Sot that Pitch (2007) brings to the fore is the 
cold-war era trade networks that thrived in Mae Sot, particularly those among the Karen 
National Union and business/smugglers in Mae Sot, which include private enterprises, 
the army, police and others in the state.  The running of timber, drugs, gems and humans 
is the foundation of the modern Mae Sot economy (Pitch 2007), over the years garment 
and knitting factories, tourism and other industries have become increasingly prominent.  
With the demise in strength of the KNU in bordering Karen state, combined with the 
gradual ‗opening‘ of Burma, the character of Mae Sot and its business has changed as 
well.   
In many ways business and the state (or army, border police etc) have moved in 
lock step: Thais supplied the KNU with arms in exchange for timber, gems, drugs etc, 
and business in Mae Sot was an integral part of this, in fact it is somewhat difficult to 
delineate the two.  With the SEZ and related initiatives what is taking place is a move 
from the predominance of the ‗illegal‘ or ‗traditional‘ Thai-Burma border economy to a 
197 
 
more globally integrated or ‗legitimized‘ form of capital accumulation.  It is part of 
initiatives initiated in the early 1990s that aim to bring the border economy into the 
national fold and broader development plans. 
A primary impediment is the national security state agencies that do not stand to 
benefit from this changing arrangement, or would be forced to seek new ways to profit 
from it.  Pitch (2007) found that the local state in Mae Sot has been attempting to forge a 
separation from the domination of the security state, which gives no space for the local 
self-government in the regulation of the border area, particularly in terms of economic 
development and political autonomy.   
The security state agencies play a critical role in Mae Sot‘s development, 
particularly in structuring what is possible in the area.  This includes corruption and rent-
seeking activities, but also border trade and the regulation of migrant workers.  The 
power of the military overrules the administrative authority of the Ministry of Interior 
and the Customs Office in terms of trade (Pitch 2007).  According to the law, if border 
tensions intensify then the Military Regional office, not the Ministry of Interior, controls 
the area (ibid).  The Mae Sot-Tak Chamber of Commerce
102
, Federation of Thai 
Industries Tak Chapter, the Mae Sot mayor and provincial governor have been trying to 
move deeper into structuring the economic development trajectory of the area, in order to 
more strategically forward their business and political interests.  It is a liberal, free trade 
agenda that they forward.  Initiatives like the SEZ would, in many ways, give the ‗central 
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 ―Members of the Chamber of Commerce are entrepreneurs who have been engaging in the border 
economy for a generation. They have been frequently outraged when the regional armed conflicts take 
place causing the Myanmar government to close the border. Unlike the military that prefers the frontier 
situation to guard off all socialist influences from Myanmar since the socialist revolution, the Chamber of 
Commerce is advocating opening the border and to down play the national military based security.‖ (Pitch 
2007) 
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government‘ more power in the realm of economic development and provincial/local 
politics, but this insertion would, at the same time, empower ‗local and provincial‘ 
economic and political interests.  Thus, these ‗new‘ social forces (i.e. garment factory 
owners, road builders, gem traders and many local political leaders) are attempting to 
displace the ‗traditional‘ powers of the border, and this process stretches throughout 
Thailand, namely the military-royalist-bureaucrat coalition who has held great power and 
sway over the national economy and politics for generations.  Thus, the SEZ initiative is 
an example of capital‘s need not only to disembed economic relations from their old 
social integument but also to re-embed them into new supportive social relations (Jessop 
and Sum, 2006).      
I have already shown that the police regulate the migrant population at the border 
and gain much economically in the process.  In fact, Mae Sot is one of the most sought 
after police postings in Thailand.  Police also extract rent from factory managers in the 
area who employ unregistered workers.  Thus, clearly the army and police have 
constructed a status quo in Mae Sot over the past decades, and they undoubtedly seek to 
protect their interests.  Regarding labor, the SEZ initiative proposes more flexible migrant 
registration systems in which SEZ administrators determine labor needs, independent of 
central state registration schemes.  The objective is to ‗legalize‘ a higher proportion of the 
current migrant worker population in the area.  For business the interest is to shift away 
from the currently cumbersome and often changing registration systems that are costly 
and generally not effective in terms of workers and employers participation.  It would 
grant more flexibility for employers, and importantly it would reduce or even eliminate 
police rent seeking for employing unregistered migrants.  In this scenario, the SEZ 
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undermines the powers that police enjoy over the migrant.  I hesitate to contend this 
could lead to improvements for migrants‘ work and living conditions in the area, as the 
despotic control of the police in the area could be replaced by another actor.  But, Chapter 
3 argues that migrants in Mae Sot are subject to a dual-despotic control—both police and 
at the factory.  They are increasingly able to negotiate with employers, yet it is not 
possible with the police.   
In summary, efforts to establish an SEZ in Mae Sot represent a vision of 
liberalized capital accumulation that gels with ADB-led initiates for the GMS that 
forward (neo)liberal economic integration.  The Mae Sot SEZ represents a liberal geo-
political vision of borders as incubators of socio-economic growth in the sub-region.  
These conflicts demonstrate the ways in which certain fractions of the state and private 
sector do and do not seek to link territories and citizens with the political dynamics, 
economic systems, labor and natural resources of neighboring countries (Walker 2009).  
It shows the ‗traditional‘ social forces attempts to maintain current forms of territorial 
practices.  At the same time, liberal visions of growth in the case of Mae Sot, Myawddy 
and the GMS in general are largely predicated on primitive accumulation, the despotic 
control of vulnerable migrant and informalized labor, and more broadly uneven 
development in the sub-region (Glassman 2010).   
 
Conflicting Scales of Re-territorialization 
In 2004 Tak province, the NESDB and concerned government agencies 
conducted a study to develop operational plans for the establishment of the Mae Sot 
border economic area as a production base along the East-West Economic Corridor under 
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the GMS framework (CMU 2007).  The study found that Mae Sot had the potential to 
operate in four economic areas, industry, merchandize, tourism and agriculture.  Chiang 
Mai University was commissioned to conduct the feasibility study on three aspects of the 
border economy: industrial estate establishment, adjusting the agricultural production 
structure, and an environmental impact assessment at both the local level and the border 
economic area.  The Tak Governor was designated as the chairperson responsible for 
managing the project (CMU 2007).
103
   
The findings of the report, in terms of industry, are for Mae Sot to be the first 
industrial estate linking investment with Burma as a border economic co-production area.  
Chiang Mai University submitted the final report in February 2007 and the main findings 
were rejected by the NESDB and the IEAT because the three proposed sites for industrial 
zones are in protected forest area (interview, NESDB, October 5, 2009;), and due to the 
conflicted scales of government administration.  Contesting this view, the head of the 
CMU project, Dr. Anurak Panyanuwat, and both the Chair and Vice-Chair of the 
Tak/Mae Sot Chamber of Commerce claim that the report findings, and the SEZ in 
general, are not moving forward due to political reasons, since the SEZ project is 
associated with deposed PM Thaksin (interviews, October 22 and 23, 2009).  I will show 
that the political and scalar views are both are correct.  
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 Chiang Mai University assigned the University Academic Service Center to act as the coordinating 
and managerial unit to work with 13  faculties, institutes and centers comprising 85 faculty and staff 
and 65 personnel, making a total of 150 research staff working under the Project Executive Committee 
chaired by the Vice President for Administrative Affairs and all the deans and directors of the relevant 
faculties/institutes/centers as committee members 
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According to Thailand‘s administrative laws,104 government regulations divide 
administrative units into three levels: central, regional and local (CMU 2007).  In the case 
of Tak province, the lines of authority of these different scales do not directly link to the 
Governor 
105
  Each of these local, regional and central level organizations are 
independent of one another, with their own authority and their own laws.  When they 
enforce their laws, they do not coordinate with other organizations.  This is known as the 
bureaucracy administrative system, and is characterized by functional-based 
management.  In short, this system has complicated with fixed working procedures, 
concise regulations and lines of authority, and the administration lacks independence 
(CMU 2007).  The existing laws do not have a system for eradicating authority conflicts 
between the different levels of organizations which are located in the area.
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Referring to the above problems, the CMU team proposed, mirroring the SEZ bill 
of 2005, establishing an area-based management which provides more independence for 
responsible authorities.  It is a form of management with a host organization responsible 
for the administration.  It is mandated to administer economic, trade and investment 
promotion; providing benefits in import-export tax exemption (a free trade zone); 
exemption and deduction of income tax; infrastructure development and a one-stop 
services center; and managing environmental issues, social problems, migrant labor 
issues, and health problems in the three border districts (CMU 2007).  It would also be 
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 Organization of State Administration Act B.E. 2534 (1991) and the Act Amending Ministry, Sub-
ministry, Department B.E. 2534 (1991) and its amendments until No.8 B.E. 2536 (1993), 
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 These organizations are, for example, the 4
th
 Infantry Regiment Task Force, Mae Sot Customs House, 
Tak Immigration Office, Tak Animal Quarantine Station, Tak Fish Inspection Office and the Tak Plant 
Quarantine Station (CMU 2007).   
106
 Although the government has adopted the integrated administrative principle, or the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) regulation implemented under the Thai Rak Thai government, the Tak governor can only 
integrate the administration of regional-level organizations in his/her line of authority. Other central-level 
and local-level organizations have independent authority in accordance with their laws.  
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tasked with cooperating with the Burma to support the project development and 
execution.  The study suggested, in broad strokes, a form of administration for the 
proposed SEZ in the three border districts.  In summary, they proposed a Public 
Organization Administrative System.  This is a government organization which has the 
status of a juristic person.  It has its own administrative method which differs from the 
bureaucracy system and state enterprise system.
107
  The administrative system would be 
independent and would not have to follow rules and regulations of either system.  It is an 
area based management system that seeks to address the current ‗problem‘ of conflicting 
laws and conflicting powers of the different units operating at different scales of 
government.  The Guangdong Province Committee for Administering Special Economic 
Zones and the Shenzhen municipality‘s administration of the Shenzen SEZ were cited as 
models for the Mae Sot SEZ administration in the 2007 CMU study.
108
  The CMU 
research team visited one of China-Burma border economic zones, Musae, as part of their 
research.    
The SEZ bill as proposed for Mae Sot is difficult to implement, particularly the 
problem of authority transfer. To transfer the authority of related organizations–including 
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 The state enterprise administrative system‘s objective is to carry out industrial or business activities, but 
the administration of the border economic area concerns with public services which require some public 
authority. The border economic area administration may affect right and freedom of people, but the state 
enterprise administration, in general, does not. State enterprise administration is also intensively controlled 
by central government, so it is quite facile. (CMU 2007).  
108
 The draft SEZ bill designated two levels of management, 1) at the level of Special Economic Zone 
Policy Committee with the Prime Minister as Chairman, and 2) up to ten committee members to propose 
for cabinet consideration issues relating to policies and the setting up the of SEZ and the supervising the 
SEZ administration (NESDB 2005).  The second level is the Executive Board for the SEZ, comprising 
Chairperson, Governor of the SEZ, Provincial Governor, two representatives of local administration 
organizations, and not more than five experts to do the work of policy formulation and guidelines for the 
SEZ‘s operation (NESDB 2005).  When SEZ is set up, all the activities, assets, liabilities, and employees of 
IEAT must be transferred to the Office of Special Economic Zone Policy Committee, with IEAT Governor 
serving as Secretary-General of the Policy Committee (NESDB 2005). 
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the Department of Industrial Works, Department of Public Works and Town &Country 
Planning, Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy Planning, The Board of 
Investment of Thailand, The Customs Department, Local Administration Organization, 
etc. – to a newly established public organization in the Mae Sot border economic area, it 
is necessary to set up agreements among these state organizations, which is, of course, 
quite difficult (CMU 2007).  For this reason that the NESDB now claims that China‘s 
SEZs are no longer an effective model for Thailand (interview, October 5, 2009).  Now, 
they say, ―there is no model, we are just taking first steps [toward implementing SEZs].‖   
 
The ‗Special City‘ Initiative in Mae Sot: Why a New Border Regime is ‗Necessary‘  
On October 6, 2009 the Thai Cabinet approved a Ministry of Commerce project to 
develop a special economic zone in Mae Sot, consisting also of a one-stop service center 
and a logistics park.  This is also awaiting passage into law by parliament, and according 
to an informant at the National Economic Social Development Board ―it will not happen 
anytime soon‖ (interview, October 5, 2009).  This was also confirmed by the Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman of the Tak/Mae Sot Chamber of Commerce in interviews.   
In 2007 Thai authorities began another initiative, this time to make Mae Sot a 
‗special city‘ (Mueang Phiset, ―เมืองพิเศษ‖).  It is considered a way to solve the problem of 
implementing an SEZ.  This proposal includes three administrative units of Mae Sot 
district: Tha Sai Luad, Mae Pa and Mae Sot municipality, excluding Mae Ramat and 
Phob Phra districts that were included in early SEZ initiatives (see Figure 7, Chapter 1).  
Mae Sot district is comprised of two municipalities (Mae Sot and Tha Sai Luat) and nine 
sub-district administrative organizations (or tambon administrative organizations) (one of 
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which is Mae Pa), which are a rural municipality with limited resources.  Of the three 
proposed for the ‗special city‘ Mae Sot has the largest population with 27,205 residents.  
Mae Sot was established in 1937, and upgraded from town to city in 2001. It is followed 
by Tha Sai Luad sub-district municipality, established in 1999, with a population of 5,347 
and comprising 10.10 sq km, and Mae Pa sub-district administrative organization, 
established 1997, population 10,211, and covering 198.33 sq km. (All figures 2003, Pitch 
2007). 
This plan was put forward by local authorities and the NESDB (Sai Silp 2007).  
The plan is modeled, in part, on Thailand‘s two special administrative areas, Bangkok 
and Pattaya.  The two differ in that Pattaya is a special kind of municipality, while 
Bangkok is both a province and a municipality.  Both are run by elected local legislative 
authorities, rather than appointed officials.  The mayor of Mae Sot suggests that this new 
structure ―would be better equipped than Bangkok to tackle such local issues as migrant 
workers and border trade problems (Sai Slip 2007)‖.  This initiative is the source of 
controversy and is, like the SEZ bill, being blocked.  This time, however, resistance is 
coming from local political leaders.  
Mr. Apisit (interview, Apisit Cholsakorn, Vice Chairman, Thai Chamber of 
Commerce Tak, October 23, 2009) said that they [Mae Sot] want to become a ‗special 
city‘ or metropolitan area so that they have more independence to set their own policy.  
They want the flexibility to implement initiatives such as road building, with control of 
their own budget without needing to go to the ministry of interior.  In the longer term, 
they want to make their own decisions for the direction of the area (ibid).  He went on to 
say that Pattaya can move quickly to set their agenda, whereas the process in Mae Sot is 
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too slow.  Mae Sot is an emerging logistics center on the East-West corridor, it is a major 
border trade area and it has the potential to be a major industrial center ―because they 
have much labor‖ (ibid).  If Mae Sot is ―stuck with its normal‖ municipal law then it will 
not be able to expand to meet goals as a major hub; to do that he claims ―a big move on 
policy‖ is needed (ibid).  An example is the Mae Sot airport.  Currently the airport has a 
1,500 meter runway, but it needs to expand by 600 meters to accommodate Boeing 737s.  
Currently only small planes can land on the strip, service is limited to only a few flights 
per week (after a several year gap with no air service), and the planes servicing Mae Sot 
are quite old and considered dangerous by most people.  Mr. Apisit contends that this 
hurts business, since factory managers want to fly to Mae Sot, not drive 7 hours from 
Bangkok, and he notes that it also hurts tourism.  Under the Thaksin administration 
budget was approved for a runway expansion feasibility study, but budget for the 
construction has not been allocated.  The movement for the establishment of the Mae Sot 
SEZ and/or the special city, combined with the infrastructure planning at Mae Sot, shows 
that the local state and business associations feel that they have the capacity to deal with 
economic development planning, realizing that local autonomy is crucial to promote 
economic growth in the area.   
Establishing a ‗special city‘ as proposed necessitates combining the Mae Sot 
municipality with Tha Sai Luat municipality and Mae Pa sub-district.  Together it would 
be considered a metropolitan area.  In 2004-2005 all three administrative units were in 
favor of establishing an SEZ in Mae Sot (Pitch 2007), but in late 2009 authorities in Tha 
Sai Luat changed their position and are blocking this new initiate (interview, Apisit 
Cholsakorn, Vice Chairman, Thai Chamber of Commerce Tak, October 23, 2009).  
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Officials in Tha Sai Luad to not want to be incorporated into a ‗special city‘ because in 
doing so they would submit much authority and power to the larger Mae Sot 
municipality.  In other words, some officials would lose positions of power and economic 
benefit.  If a new administrative structure is adopted many would be pushed into lower 
positions, while others out of the administrative structure altogether.  Tha Sai Luad is a 
critical component of the ‗special city‘ initiative since it is the municipality that is on the 
physical border with Burma; Mae Sot municipality is about 8km away from the border 
and the bridge.  Mae Sot district is expanding rapidly and the city of Mae Sot is becoming 
congested, so expansion, particularly inland container depots, free trade zones and 
industrial estates will likely be located in Tha Sai Luad, Mae Pa and other areas.  
Obviously, this means that officials in Tha Sai Luad have increased bargaining power 
with Mae Sot municipality officials.  However, due to the rapidly changing nature of 
these initiatives, it is easy to imagine changing positions from top Tha Sai Luad leaders if 
their interests are secured.  
 
Conclusions  
It is tempting to conceptualize dynamics along the Thai-Burma border as central-
provincial-local struggles for power over territory.  For instance, Pitch (2007) contends 
that the 2005 proposal for the SEZ is an attempt to (re-)centralize decision making power 
to the central state.  In important ways this is playing out, but the logic, alliances formed 
and interests put forward complicate these notions.  Furthermore, it is tempting to find in 
these processes the ‗neoliberalization‘ of the Mae Sot political economy (see Ong 2000, 
Sparke et al 2004 on the case of the Growth Triangle).  Rather than view these processes 
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through the lense of central-local binaries or neoliberalization, I argue that Mae Sot 
demonstrates a complex cross section of central-provincial-local interests are active in 
shaping Mae Sot‘s ambitions to become a new center of the globalizing GMS.  It 
complicates these three scales and the tendency to assign to different actors a notion of 
their scalar interests based on their geographic location, or capital interests.  For instance, 
the Chairman of the Tak Provincial Chamber of Commerce (Niyom Wairatpanij) lives in 
Mae Sot and headquarters his business there, while serving as Vice Chairman of the 
Board of Trade of Thailand, Vice Chairman of the ACMECS Business Council, and 
Chairman of the Economic Promotion with Neighboring Countries Committee.  Despite 
these national and sub-regional positions and interests, when speaking of the Mae Sot 
SEZ he can be perceived to represents ‗local‘ interests.  In fact, his interests are local, 
provincial, national, sub-regional and global simultaneously.   
What I have presented is a business-state alliance, comprised of competing 
fractions of both, that seek flexibility to overcome the ‗traditional‘ social integument of 
the bureaucracy-military-police in Thailand and their dominance of political and 
economic affairs.  In particular, initiatives of the PM Thaksin government, building on 
border economic development initiatives of the NESDB through the 1990s, constitute a 
structural shift and perhaps more importantly, implementation of a changing perspective 
of the borders as security concerns toward the borders as an economic opportunity.  This 
clearly demonstrates that states are not monolithic.  A result is deep tensions among 
competing visions of national-cross border governance and development between the 
‗traditional‘ or ‗old‘ social integument and liberal economic visions.  These liberal 
economic initiatives gel with the ADB‘s vision of a ‗borderless‘ GMS.  The depth of 
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these conflicts demonstrates that much is at stake in peripheral centers of globalized 
growth.   
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions 
This dissertation has focused on two emerging border economic zones in the 
GMS, Mae Sot in Thailand (Burma border) and Bavet in Cambodia (Vietnam border).  In 
these places state practices, changing labor regimes, the shifting Asia-regional division of 
labor in globalized manufacturing networks, and multilateral agencies ambitions embed a 
sub-regional economy in the circuits of the global factory.  I presented a differentiated 
analysis of the evolution of individual states and economies acting within a sub-regional 
development framework.  This approach explored how the economy, state, labor and 
multilateral institutions are mutually imbricated, structurally coupled and coevolving.   
The central thesis of the dissertation demonstrates that mechanisms of global 
economic management, regulation and control are a fragile, eclectic mixture.  
Governance networks comprising state practices, labor regimes, globalized production 
networks and multilateral agencies are creating spaces for capital accumulation in the 
borderlands of the GMS.  I explored these governance networks primarily through the 
prism of global production networks to understand competing interests within and among 
states, capital and multilateral institutions.  No one actor can independently configure and 
maintain the geo-economic and geo-political re-ordering taking place in the GMS.  This 
is largely due to the fact that space making is never only about locking in capital, but also 
about shaping a range of political desires through spatial reconfigurations that offer new 
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opportunities for profit and power.  From this perspective space is multiple and 
contingent, and global and situated elements combine to create regulatory regimes that 
offer new opportunities for profit and power.  Control of feminized and migrant labor 
requires new forms of spatial administration, and the different forms these take within the 
GMS offers insight into changing global-local governance structures and practices. 
Throughout the GMS specific border and cross-border zones once seen as 
territorial boundaries for state power and sites of inter-state conflict are now rapidly 
being re-articulated as functional regions requiring their own structures and practices of 
governance.  The border is increasingly becoming the site in which these new 
articulations of investment and spatial administration are emerging.  Regional integration 
is, as a consequence, becoming more appropriately represented as a process by which 
new regulatory regimes emerge, offering new opportunities for profit and power (Hughes 
2011).   
 Important layers of the sub-regional geo-economy are the production sites 
reacting to national and global production networks.  Border areas are cost-minimizing, 
re-regulated, and flexibly organized industrial areas expanding through the agencies of 
state and private-sector-supported SEZs and industrial areas.  In general they are 
reactions to rising labor and factor costs, cumbersome bureaucracy, industrial disputes 
and other dynamics in urban and peri-urban areas.  One consequence is the development 
of light manufacturing production networks is increasingly dependent on the ability to 
mobilize, marshal and control large labor flows of young, primarily female, workers from 
Burma and rural Cambodia.   
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 In this context the state is deepening its reach through different institutions and 
governance practices by enabling the informalization of labor.  These processes are 
unevenly established in different national and sub-national contexts.  In Thailand a 
distinct regime of policing and ‗partial border citizenship‘ has emerged (Pitch 2007).  It is 
a project in which migrant workers are racialized and their civic rights are peripheralized.  
This means, in short, that the state, particularly the police, national security agencies, and 
border guards work together to regulate nearly every aspect of migrant workers‘ lives to 
create and sustain the conditions for a regime of flexible and informalized labor that 
enables labor intensive industries to survive in the region.  Indeed, precisely because the 
dependence of the regional economy on migrant labor is so large, the mechanisms of 
control and the deployment of state apparatuses are ‗necessarily‘ extensive.   
Cambodia‘s labor regime was defined in the early 2000s by the state‘s withdrawal 
from, or initially its structural inability to regulate labor.  Cambodia witnessed the 
promotion and proliferation of trade unions under the Better Factories Cambodia program 
that is defined by an International Labour Organization (ILO) regulated tri-partite model 
in the garment industry.  Through the state‘s withdrawal and the ILO‘s insertion and 
subsequent quantitative boom of trade unions, the Cambodian People‘s Party (CPP) has 
come to dominate a majority these trade union federations in the garment industry.  Thus, 
the CPP has extended its reach in the factories through the project.  Its initial withdrawal 
facilitated the subsequent insertion.  This is significant since garment workers are the 
single largest organized population in the country.  Furthermore, with the recent 
implementation of fixed duration contracts (FDC) the Cambodian state is further 
deepening its reach in the labor regime.  The state is expanding even further into SEZs 
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where the state and private sector work together to create a new spatial regulation of 
labor in which FDCs are the norm and trade union activity is (currently) restricted.  The 
shift to FDCs, casualization, precarity and spatial administration of labor follows trends 
throughout Asia (Chang 2009), but is important from a policy perspective given the 
global prominence and ‗branding‘ of the ILO‘s efforts to create a model of ‗fair 
globalization‘ in Cambodia.  In summary, the implementation of FDCs in Cambodia and 
policing at the Thai-Burma border are a part of practices in the GMS which moves to 
reinforce and expand the state as a strong and autonomous subject that dominates certain 
social fields, in this case labor regimes (Hardt and Negri 1994). 
China‘s state reformulation of its labor regime and industrial policy in coastal 
regions has sent a ripple effect through Asia‘s division of labor.  Namely, China has 
embarked on a triple policy to weaken its dependence on the ‗China price,‘ or low-wage, 
low-skill, low-value added industrialization, through the ‗go-west, go-out, go-up‘ policy.  
A result is another phase of global industrial restructuring that entails the creation of new 
forms of regional production networks organized around decentralized and border 
economies aimed largely at export markets.  Inland provinces of China including Jiangxi, 
and localities such as Mae Sot and Bavet are being integrated into regionally extended 
production logics.   
Mae Sot and Bavet are two cases that show very different degrees of 
embeddedness in global production networks.  Mae Sot offers producers in Thailand an 
opportunity to maintain garment assembly in (at least partial) full-package production 
networks within the country, due to more established sourcing networks.  In the case of 
Cambodia maintaining investment in light manufacturing is more tenuous.  One 
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manufacturer‘s operation in Bavet, Kingmaker, is a satellite of its production base in 
Vietnam.  It is a production strategy based almost entirely on tariffs from the EU market.  
This demonstrates not only an unstable foothold in globalized production in Cambodia, 
but also the far reaching impact of EU and US trade policy.  States react differently to 
sub-regional development initiatives as a result of varying degrees of embeddedness in 
global production networks.   
Recognizing the mobility of manufacturing capital in Asia, there is another 
layered ‗necessity‘ in the GMS geo-economy, to address poor physical infrastructure and 
cumbersome trade facilitation policies.  Economic corridors and SEZs are ostensibly 
designed to ‗capture‘ producers who deem Thailand and Cambodia production sites as 
largely auxiliary to China‘s factories.  In this realm the ADB‘s GMS Project has been 
most prominent, particularly in Cambodia.   
In 1998 the ADB began a massive physical infrastructure development project in 
the GMS.  States have, of course, been involved and consented, but in this realm the 
ADB has been most prominent.  In the case of Cambodia these engagements emerged in 
response to the ‗failures‘ of central state authorities to implement infrastructure and trade 
facilitation programs, with the ADB stepping in to create a framework and the new 
opportunity structures that transnational manufacturers exploit.  In general terms, it is a 
withdrawal of the state (particularly in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and insertion of a 
multilateral institution to ‗connect‘ the subregion and in the process facilitate state control 
of ‗vague‘ areas.  The effects are perhaps most pronounced in border areas that were once 
controlled by armed insurgents, while in other or the same areas borderlands are critical 
aspects of states discursive legitimacy in ‗defending‘ territorial integrity.   At its core, the 
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ADB project does not seek to displace states or instigate a retreat or withdrawal of the 
state.  In particular, initiatives including the Cross Border Transit Agreement, Border 
Node Development and other specific programs under or closely related to the ADB 
framework carves out a role for states to act as facilitators for deeper engagement with 
the sub-regional, Asia regional and global economy.  Hence, direct state involvement is 
critical to activate the long term, fixed capital investments in infrastructure.  In summary, 
with competition intensifying in low-cost labor intensive export-oriented sectors, GMS 
countries have, at least partially, initiated cooperative regional and trans-national policies 
that aim to more fully integrating rural and border spaces into export-led development 
strategies.   
Through border SEZs and economic corridors I have presented cases of flexible 
states restructuring and adapting to regional and global forces in which ADB projects, 
new governmental actors, and emergent discourses are articulated with broader regional 
and trans-national development strategies.  The ADB‘s Economic Corridors are a new 
spatial practice that is a manifestation of the GMS Project‘s central discourse of the 
―Three Cs:‖ connectivity, competitiveness and community. In this process, state and 
multi-lateral organization policies play an enormous role in shaping the geographical 
patterns of investment and social regulation, albeit unevenly in different contexts.   
In Cambodia‘s SEZs the state is often acting in a private capacity and the private 
sector in a state capacity, and both are more deeply engaging the industrial economy.  
The state in Cambodia moves in two different but layered directions with border SEZs.  It 
follows the ADB discourse that economic cooperation is necessary for sustained 
development.  For instance, the state facilitates economic connections with more 
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diversified neighboring economies and the Asia-regional division of labor by fostering 
the growth of privately developed SEZs.   At the same time an underlying state ambition 
is to reaffirm Cambodia‘s territorial integrity at the physical border, and border SEZs 
provide one important means to do so.  Through this a highly flexible state is both 
withdrawing to allow privately developed SEZs to emerge, and in the process deepening 
state control of its troubled borderlands.  The implications of this are many.  It suggests 
that in the short run at least, the transformative potential of border development projects 
is limited: outcomes reflect rather than reshape national and regional orders of power 
(Hughes 2011).  In Cambodia this is an authoritarian and often violent order of power.  In 
Thailand it is a very entrenched order of power that not only dominates the lives of 
Burmese in the Mae Sot area, but has been critical components of the Thai royalist-
bureaucratic-military elite who have held power over Thailand for many decades.   In 
short, the interests of national security state capital often hold sway over demands for 
more liberal border economic policies. 
Border SEZ processes in Mae Sot are similar to those in Cambodia, but play out 
differently in important ways.   In Mae Sot contestations largely center on the deeply 
embedded state regulation along the border.  In the case of Cambodia the state is in 
seemingly initial phases of (re)asserting its interests and control at the Vietnam border.  
That being the case, Mae Sot demonstrates much about the territorial diversity and 
flexibility of state practices in the sub-region, and how the state facilitates certain links 
with regional and global trade and production networks, while preventing others.   
In Mae Sot the coupled contestation over re-production and policing of 
‗traditional‘ boundaries shows a clear connection between borders and state power 
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(Gainsborough 2009).  As a result, the interests of transnational corporations and 
international lending agencies melts into the background in my analysis, as their 
‗demands‘ are not readily met by an eviscerated state, or a state that chooses to withdraw 
from a particular space.  Instead, Mae Sot demonstrates that the politics of scale plays out 
in important ways, particularly contestations over domination of populations of migrant 
workers from Burma.  Policing of migrants has allowed manufacturers to survive in the 
Mae Sot area, but this arrangement has become an impediment to longer term growth 
strategies for the Mae Sot-Myawaddy zone.  The SEZ initiative in Mae Sot attempts to 
displace direct police control of populations with a ‗new‘ labor regime that is more 
flexible and allows for a more widespread ‗legalization‘ of the migrant workers in the 
area.  Thus, employers and certain state officials at the local, provincial and national 
scales are challenging the current national security state arrangement at the border.  In 
particular, liberal socio-economic actors in Mae Sot and Bangkok are attempting to 
implement a changing discursive and spatial practice of the borders—from practices 
dominated by national security and policing, toward borderlands as new geo-economic 
opportunities that require new forms of administering territory and populations.  Deep 
tensions and contestations have emerged among competing visions of national-cross 
border governance and development, between the ‗traditional‘ or ‗old‘ social integument, 
and liberal socio-economic ambitions for the border area.  Ambitions to re-territorialize 
the borderlands clearly gel with the ADB‘s vision of a ‗borderless‘ GMS.  Yet the army-
police-bureaucracy is maintaining its dominance of the borderlands and holding sway 
over calls for deeper integration with the political dynamics, economic systems and 
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natural resources of neighboring Burma.  The depth of conflicts demonstrates that much 
is at stake in these peripheral centers of globalized growth.   
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APPENDIX 1  
List of Interviews  
December 2008 to November 2009 
 
Regional/ International Organizations  
Cambodia 
Better Factories Cambodia, International Labour Organization (ILO) 
ILO Worker Education Project in Cambodia 
ILO Better Work Programme 
Peter Brimble, Consultant with the United Nations Development Project and USAID 
 
Thailand 
ACE-ASEAN Competitiveness Enhancement Project, Nathan Associates Inc. 
(ADVANCE project) 
Asian Development Bank (2 persons, 2 meetings) 
Noritada Morita (Retired ADB official) 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific  
 
State  
Cambodia 
Cambodia Special Economic Zone Board  
Council for the Development of Cambodia  
Japan International Cooperation Agency  
US Embassy officials 
 
Thailand 
Ayeyawady - Chao Phraya - Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) 
Business Council 
AMEICC (AEM-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee) 
Board of Trade of Thailand 
Economic Promotion with Neighbouring Countries Committee (Thailand) 
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand 
Japan International Cooperation Agency 
Japan External Trade Organization  
National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand  
New Mon State Party 
Office of Industrial Economics-Thailand  
Thailand Development Resource Institute  
Thailand Textile Institute 
 
Private Sector 
Cambodia 
Cambodia Chamber of Commerce 
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Linex Company and the Cambodia Freight Forwarders Association 
Manhattan Group in Phnom Penh 
Manhattan SEZ officials in Bavet 
 
Thailand 
Federation of Thai Industries, Tak Chapter 
Itochu Corporation (2 persons, 2 meetings) 
Loxley Corporation  
Schenker (Thai) Co Ltd. 
Thai Chamber of Commerce-Tak Chapter (2 persons, 2 meetings) 
 
Civil Society Organizations, Academe, Journalists and Individuals  
Cambodia 
Cambodia Federation of Independent Trade Unions  
Cambodia Institute of Development Study 
Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association-ADHOC 
Coalition of Cambodian Apparel Workers Democratic Union (CCAWDU)  
Factory workers in Bavet from the Kingmaker Company   
Independent Democracy of Informal Economy Association 
Sabrina Trade Union 
Womyn‘s Agenda for Change (WAC) 
 Worker Rights Consortium  
 
Thailand 
Agriculture workers (Mae Sot, Burmese migrants) 
Anurak Panyanuwat,  Chiang Mai University 
Burma Labour Solidarity Organisation  
Daisy Dwe 
Factory workers (Mae Sot, Burmese migrants) 
Forum for Democracy in Burma 
Institute of Security and International -Chulalongkorn University (Robert Fitts) 
Karen Human Rights Group  
Lae Dilokvidhayarat, Chulalongkorn University 
Larry Jagan, Freelance reporter  
Map Foundation for the Health and Knowledge of Ethnic Labour 
Mon Human Rights Foundation  
Pattanarak Foundation 
Pastor Baw Gyee 
Rohigya Labor Union  
Thai Labour Campaign 
Thein Swe, Payap University (a retired ADB official) 
Voravidh Charoenloet, Chiang Mai University 
Voravit Suwanvanichkij 
Wat Wang Kawiweilcaram School (Sangkhlaburi)  
Yaung Chi Oo Workers Association  
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Conferences and Trainings  
While conducting fieldwork I participated in the following three events:  
Presenter in a 3 day worker training organized WAC and CCAWDU in cooperation with 
the Asian TNC Monitoring Netwok, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, March 12-14.  
―Global Garments, Migrant Labor and Bordering the Greater Mekong Sub-region,‖ paper 
presented at the international workshop, Gender, Migrant Workers and Citizenship in 
Greater Mekong Subregion: Economic and Political Perspectives for a World in 
Crisis, Asian Institute of Technology and University of Leeds, AIT Conference 
Centre, Ransit, Thailand, 1-3 June 2009. 
Conducted half day worker education program for the Rohigya Labour Union, 
Sangkhlaburi, Thailand, July 25.  
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